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Abstract
The phenomenal advances in cloud computing technology have raised con-
cerns about data privacy. Aided by the modern cryptographic techniques such as
homomorphic encryption, it has become possible to carry out computations in the
encrypted domain and process data without compromising information privacy. In
this thesis, we study various classes of privacy-preserving information hiding schemes
and their real-world applications for cyber security, cloud computing, Internet of
things, etc.
Data breach is recognised as one of the most dreadful cyber security threats
in which private data is copied, transmitted, viewed, stolen or used by unauthorised
parties. Although encryption can obfuscate private information against unauthorised
viewing, it may not stop data from illegitimate exportation. Privacy-preserving
Information hiding can serve as a potential solution to this issue in such a manner
that a permission code is embedded into the encrypted data and can be detected
when transmissions occur.
Digital watermarking is a technique that has been used for a wide range
of intriguing applications such as data authentication and ownership identification.
However, some of the algorithms are proprietary intellectual properties and thus the
availability to the general public is rather limited. A possible solution is to outsource
the task of watermarking to an authorised cloud service provider, that has legitimate
right to execute the algorithms as well as high computational capacity. Privacy-
preserving Information hiding is well suited to this scenario since it is operated in
the encrypted domain and hence prevents private data from being collected by the
xi
cloud.
Internet of things is a promising technology to healthcare industry. A common
framework consists of wearable equipments for monitoring the health status of an
individual, a local gateway device for aggregating the data, and a cloud server for
storing and analysing the data. However, there are risks that an adversary may
attempt to eavesdrop the wireless communication, attack the gateway device or
even access to the cloud server. Hence, it is desirable to produce and encrypt the
data simultaneously and incorporate secret sharing schemes to realise access control.
Privacy-preserving secret sharing is a novel research for fulfilling this function.
In summary, this thesis presents novel schemes and algorithms, including:
• two privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes based upon sym-
metric cryptography using arithmetic of quadratic residues and lexicographic
permutations, respectively.
• two privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes based upon asym-
metric cryptography using multiplicative and additive privacy homomorphisms,
respectively.
• four predictive models for assisting the removal of distortions inflicted by
information hiding based respectively upon projection theorem, image gradient,
total variation denoising, and Bayesian inference.
• three privacy-preserving secret sharing algorithms with di↵erent levels of
generality.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The past decades have witnessed the worldwide popularisation of social networks
and the phenomenal prevalence of public cloud services. Online social networking
platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, have expanded exponentially
with a considerable number of posts and a massive influx of personal information. The
seemingly unlimited storage space and computational capacity o↵ered by the cloud
service providers, such as Amazon, Apple, Dropbox, Google, and Microsoft, have
also opened up opportunities for numerous practical applications and appealed to
individuals and businesses to entrust an increasing amount of data to the environments
out of the control of the data owner. The legality and morality of the use of such
personal data by third parties came into question. In many current privacy policies,
the sharing of personal information with law enforcement agencies without a warrant
is, however, permitted.
Although the public are becoming increasingly reliant upon the Internet,
there are serious concerns regarding privacy of sensitive personal information. For
instance, a person’s social media footprint could a↵ect employment opportunities
since employers may screen prospective candidates through social networks and
search engines. Moreover, a person’s real-time location data might further entail
risks of home burglary since it reveals whether the person is at home or on leave.
There are risks of intentional or unintentional data leakage to untrustworthy third
parties for improper and dishonourable purposes. These issues have raised public
awareness about privacy and the sharing of personal data.
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Personal information can be exploited in both positive and negative ways
depending on the purposes and how they are perceived. On the one hand, sensitive
personal information would enable the desirable personalised services and functional-
ities, for instance, health advice, news feed, product recommendations, and public
transit options. The systems will not be able to function without such personal
information. On the other hand, although private personal data can be harvested
and exploited to understand, engage and influence individuals’ opinions, preferences,
and decisions, the use of such data in political campaigns is under debate. For
example, it was reported that in the 2012 US presidential election, the Obama
campaign employed data analytics and micro-targeting tactics to track individual
voters and identify potential supporters [1]. It has also been alleged that micro-
targeted political advertising was used to influence voters in the 2016 UK Brexit
referendum [2]. The UK Parliament’s Department for Digital, Culture, Media and
Sport (DCMS) condemned that Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and Aggregate IQ
had been involved in the dissemination of disinformation and fake news during the
referendum [3]. The point has been made that citizens can only make truly informed
decisions about who to vote for if they are certain that those decisions have not
been unduly influenced. Hence, when personal data is exploited to target political
messages and advertisements, the use should be both transparent and lawful.
In view of the discussed issues, we conclude that there is an urgent need for
finding a solution to bridge the gap between privacy and functionality.
1.1 Privacy-Preserving Signal Processing
Privacy-preserving signal processing is an emergent discipline, born as a possible
solution addressing privacy concerns in cloud computing [4–10]. The aim is to allow
the processing of data and in the meanwhile preserve information privacy even when
it is exposed in untrusted environments. The realisation of this aim is often achieved
through cooperation with cryptographic schemes, particularly the homomorphic
encryption schemes which allow computations to be performed in the encrypted
domain. Accordingly, this research area is also referred to as signal processing in the
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encrypted domain in most cases.
Although privacy-preserving signal processing is built upon deep theoret-
ical grounds of cryptography, the research outcomes from the applied aspects are
also abundant [11–19]. Apart from the multimedia contents in cloud computing
systems, it may also be applied to protect other privacy-sensitive information such
as biometric data in access control systems [20–22], criminal databases in forensic
investigation systems [23–25], medical records in healthcare systems [26], order his-
tory in recommendation systems [27], video footages in surveillance security systems
[28] etc. If such techniques for processing encrypted data exist, we can then entrust
encrypted data to some service providers in order to fulfil the given tasks e ciently
without o↵ending certain privacy policies. For instance, the International Criminal
Police Organisation, also known as Interpol, has built extensive criminal databases
containing millions of records related to criminals and crimes. This police network
links law enforcement in all member countries and enables authorised parties to
track crime trends around the world in real time. To analyse and employ such data,
external assistance from academic communities may also be beneficial. However,
these research institutions, unlike law enforcement, may not have a su ciently strong
security system to protect sensitive data from leakage during storage and communic-
ations. Furthermore, the content of data might be found rather overwhelming due
to the lack of professional training. In view of these issues, privacy-preserving signal
processing could be a potential solution. For example, the Interpol may request
a researcher institution to perform cluster analysis in such a way that criminal
evidences of similar attributes are linked together [29]. The Interpol encrypts and
entrusts the data to the research institution to be clustered in the encrypted domain
and then the clustered results are returned to the Interpol. The whole process of
clustering is carried out in the encrypted domain. Therefore, the clustered results
are also encrypted and can only be decrypted by the Interpol. In this way, the task
is fulfilled without compromising data privacy.
Amongst various topics of privacy-preserving signal processing, this thesis
focuses on the techniques and applications of privacy-preserving information hiding.
Compared with conventional techniques subsumed under the term ‘information hid-
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ing’, for example, steganography and watermarking, privacy-preserving information
hiding has a rather short history. Nevertheless, the rapid growth in the number
of academic research outcomes suggests that it is a very promising research area.
Multimedia content protection is with no doubt one of the most important topics lies
at the heart of the forensics and security communities. The adoption of conventional
information hiding techniques for multimedia content protection would, however, face
a number of practical issues. In a cloud-based information hiding scenario, sensitive
multimedia contents as well as other private metadata are submitted to a cloud
service provider by which the message embedding process is carried out. In general,
the aim is to protect the given multimedia content via the embedded messages that
describe the ownership, authentication code, and other useful information. The
cloud is usually assumed to be honest and trustworthy and yet this assumption
can only be applied to an ideal world. In reality, the cloud may collect and store
personal information, illegally distribute the multimedia content, or even su↵er from
disastrous security breaches. In 2014, a collection of private photographs of more
than hundreds of individuals and celebrities stored in iCloud were compromised
and leaked by a malicious hacking attack [30]. This devastating invasion of privacy
evoked increasing concerns surrounding security issues of cloud computing services.
The solutions for constructing a secure cloud-based information hiding system are
based upon the possibility of processing encrypted data [31].
1.2 Issues of Privacy-Preserving Information Hiding
Privacy-preserving information hiding is regarded as one of the most promising
and intriguing subdisciplines of privacy-preserving signal processing. It deals with
the problem of hiding information into encrypted carrier data and can be applied
to fulfil many real-life requests such as data exfiltration prevention, data origin
authentication, and electronic data management. It can also be of a substitution
strategy when an information hiding algorithm is registered as a proprietary property
and thus the access to the algorithm can only be made through authorised third
parties. An overview of privacy-preserving information hiding via cloud computing
4
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Figure 1.1: Privacy-preserving information hiding via cloud computing.
is illustrated in Fig. 1.1.
Information hiding is a general term encompassing a wide range of research
problems including steganography and watermarking. In general, information hiding
is defined as the practice of imperceptibly altering a carrier signal to embed a
message. The challenge of information hiding in the encrypted domain is a rather
di cult one for the reason that when protected by encryption, the carrier signals
become semantically unintelligible and cannot be analysed. And the randomness
due to the encryption makes it di cult to exploit data redundancy, prohibiting
conventional methods of information hiding from being deployed. In addition to this,
if a cryptosystem is perfectly secure, it is theoretically not possible to foresee how
the change in the encrypted domain would result in the change to carrier signals.
The true consequences can only be known after decryption; in other words, whether
the distortions caused by information hiding is perceptible or not becomes hardly
manageable and di cult to predict before decryption. The main issues concerning
privacy-preserving information hiding can be summarised as follows:
• Cryptographic algorithms: The choice of cryptographic algorithms forms the
basis of a privacy-preserving information hiding scheme. On the one hand,
modern public-key cryptosystems, particularly those possess homomorphic
properties, are powerful in terms of the ability to perform mathematical
operations in the encrypted domain. Homomorphic encryption opens up the
possibility to transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext which decrypts to
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the same plaintext. This class of cryptosystems is generally secure due to the
inherent advantage of circumventing the risks of key exchange. On the other
hand, traditional symmetric-key ciphers are comparatively easier to implement
since they are usually of low computational complexity and do not have the
drawbacks commonly seen in homomorphic cryptosystems such as ciphertext
expansion.
• Data structures: The data structure in which carrier signals are organised,
managed, and stored needs to be taken into account. It is often that crypto-
graphic algorithms cannot be directly applied to multimedia data since many
of those algorithms were originally proposed to deal with large integers while
multimedia data were not considered or standardised. That is, multimedia
data is not structured in a way to facilitate e cient encryption when crypto-
graphic algorithms were initially developed. There are a variety of ways and
options to format multimedia data structures for the purposes of encryption
and operations that follow. Some structures may, for instance, partition carrier
signals into successive blocks based upon the spatial or temporal positions,
and some may divide signals according to semantic significance. Some arrange-
ments may involve the padding of additional bits for security purposes or for
accommodating privacy-preserving information hiding schemes.
• Information hiding schemes: The designs of privacy-preserving information
hiding schemes are application-oriented and can be characterised by various
features and qualities. Some of the schemes allow the extraction of messages
in the encrypted domain and yet the messages will be filtered out along with
decryption. This type of schemes may be employed to manage the encrypted
files stored online or to monitor the transfer and exportation of encrypted
documents. Some of the schemes preserve the embedded information so that
the protection furnished by information hiding lasts even after decryption. This
type of schemes can be used for the task of information hiding that can be
outsourced to authorised third parties, in the sense that the returned result is
equivalent to that produced from a conventional information hiding algorithm.
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It is also possible to design schemes with a mixture of properties.
• Content-adaptive predictors: The decoding process of some privacy-preserving
information hiding schemes involves the use of content-adaptive predictors,
especially in the schemes that requires the original carrier signals. The precision
of content-adaptive predictors could have a crucial e↵ect on the ability and
quality of recovery. The designs of predictors are often based upon sophisticated
theories and advanced techniques of statistics and signal processing.
1.3 Objectives of This Thesis
The research of privacy-preserving information hiding encompasses a wide range
of technical principles and has found many real-world applications, but, be that
as it may, the current trend of research focuses predominantly on a specific class
of information hiding, namely reversible information hiding. As aforementioned,
a widely accepted definition of information hiding is the practice of imperceptibly
altering a carrier signal to embed a piece of message. In some highly sensitive
applications such as military reconnaissance or medical diagnosis, however, even
an imperceptible alteration of data may be strictly prohibitive. This problem has
become non-negligible especially when it comes to modern artificial intelligence aided
autonomous systems that may have not been trained to be robust against such noise
inflicted by information hiding. As such, reversible information hiding is regarded as
one of the most favourable solutions. This class of techniques permits the restoration
of original carrier signals if desired.
A privacy-preserving reversible information hiding scheme can be categorised
by the cryptosystem on which it is based. The possible cryptographic systems to be
applied include symmetric-key cryptosystems, asymmetric-key cryptosystems, and
other possibly insecure cryptosystems without strict security proofs. By holding the
provable security in high regard, we exclude the adoption of risky cryptosystems from
consideration. There are merits and demerits of symmetric and asymmetric ciphers.
A comprehensive evaluation of props and cons of various cryptosystems is beyond
the scope of this thesis. Thus, we briefly conclude that symmetric-key algorithms are
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generally of higher computationally e ciency, whereas asymmetric-key algorithms
eliminate nearly all risks of secret key exchange. Both class of ciphers are used
widely today and hence it is of significance to develop privacy-preserving reversible
information hiding schemes for various types of encrypted data with remarkable
improvements over the prior art.
Another closely related topic is secret sharing, which is an importance cryp-
tographic technology for access control. A classic secret sharing scheme describes
a method for distributing a secret to a group of participants with an access rule
that the secret can be reconstructed only when a su cient number of participants
present their shares of secret. The sharing process is carried out by a dealer, who is
assumed to be trustworthy. In Internet of things enabled healthcare applications, the
secret can be conceived as health data recorded by wearable devices, and the dealer
is a centre hub that collects and aggregates the data. The dealer shares the health
data amongst a group of authorised medical practitioners and the data can only be
retrieved when a su cient number of practitioners consent to do so. The threshold
may be defined and agreed by the patient. However, the dealer’s privilege to access
patient’s private information might come into question. Even if it is permitted by
patient himself or herself, the risk of data leakage due to malicious cybersecurity
attacks still remains. A potential solution is to encrypt the health data at the very
beginning when it is recorded by the wearable devices and sent to the centre hub.
In order to enable the dealer to distribute data in the encrypted domain, there is a
need for developing privacy-preserving secret sharing techniques.
Recognising the issues argued previously and the need to tackle them, the
objectives of this thesis are summarised as follows:
• To develop privacy-preserving reversible information hiding techniques for
data encrypted respectively by e cient symmetric-key ciphers and secure
asymmetric-key cryptosystems (refer to Chapter 3 and 4).
• To demonstrate how di↵erent homomorphic properties can be utilised to
construct information hiding schemes for encrypted data (refer to Chapter 4).
• To devise di↵erent types of predictive models in order to achieve better per-
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formance in carrier signal recovery (refer to Chapter 3 and 4).
• To make improvements over the state-of-the-art with regard to capacity, fidelity,
and reversibility (refer to Chapter 3 and 4).
• To introduce the novel research of privacy-preserving secret sharing and its
applications (refer to Chapter 5).
1.4 Outline of This Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows.
• Chapter 2 discusses the fundamental knowledge of related disciplines and
gives a literature review. It begins with an introduction of steganography,
watermarking, reversible information hiding, and cryptography. Then, some
of the most representative works in the research area of privacy-preserving
reversible information hiding are categorised and reviewed.
• Chapter 3 presents privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes
based upon symmetric-key ciphers. It begins with an information hiding
scheme that utilises the arithmetic of quadratic residues to embed additional
message and a content-adaptive predictive model derived from the projection
theorem to remove distortions caused by message embedding. It then discusses
another information hiding scheme using lexicographic permutations and a
content-adaptive predictor based upon image edge gradient. At the end of each
scheme construction, an experimental analysis is provided and a comparison
with the state-of-the-art is made.
• Chapter 4 investigates privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes
compatible to asymmetric-key cryptosystems. It presents information hiding
schemes based upon multiplicative and additive homomorphisms respectively.
In order to satisfy di↵erent operational requirements, it introduces an online
predictors based upon total variation denosing model and an o✏ine predictor
based upon Bayesian inference. At the end of it, simulation results are analysed
and discussed.
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• Chapter 5 introduces a novel research of privacy-preserving secret sharing
and showed how to apply this technology to the Internet of things based
healthcare systems. It starts with a discussion of simplest solutions and points
out their deficiencies in practical aspect. Three schemes with an ascending
generality have been proposed to address the issues with na¨ıve solutions. The
proposed schemes permit secrets to be encrypted and shared amongst a group of
authorised users, while the reconstruction of secrets is intended to be as e cient
as possible. Moreover, it has been shown that the proposed privacy-preserving
secret sharing schemes can achieve the same security level and access structure
as Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, which is an ideal scheme and yet is only
applied to unencrypted messages.
• Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and suggests some potential directions for future
research.
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Chapter 2
Background
Privacy-preserving information hiding is a multidisciplinary study combining cryp-
tography, steganography, watermarking, signal processing, statistical analysis, etc.
A good grasp of these disciplines is essential for a clear understanding of the ad-
vancement of privacy-preserving information hiding technologies. With the present
chapter, we begin our exploration of the fundamental knowledge of information hid-
ing. We provide a brief history of two main branches of information hiding, namely
steganography and watermarking, as well as a discussion of their characteristics and
applications. Then we introduce reversible information hiding, on which a large
part of this thesis focuses. In some applications, the ability to remove alterations
inflicted by information hiding would be desirable and hence the notion of reversible
information hiding was introduced to tackle restoration of the original carrier sig-
nals. After that, we provide a brief introduction of modern cryptography including
symmetric-key cryptography, asymmetric-key cryptography, and homomorphic en-
cryption. Di↵erent cryptosystems have very distinct characteristics and thus shall
be handled and used di↵erently in privacy-preserving information hiding systems.
This chapter is ended by a literature review of some of the most representative
privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes.
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2.1 Information Hiding
Information hiding is a general term comprehending the disciplines of steganography
and watermarking [32–35]. Some definitions of steganography and watermarking
were given in the textbook Digital Watermarking and Steganography by Ingemar J.
Cox et al. as [36]:
Steganography is defined as the practice of undetectably altering a work
to embed a secret message.
Watermarking is defined as the practice of imperceptibly altering a work
to embed a message about that work.
Although steganography and watermarking are closely related fields that to
some extent share a great deal of similar techniques, the divergence of essential
principles has led to quite di↵erent requirements and thus the technical approaches.
2.1.1 Steganography
The word steganography comes from the Greek words steganos, which means ‘covered
or concealed’, and graphein, which means ‘writing’ [37]. The first recorded use of
the term was in Trithemius’s book Steganographia written in 1499 [38]. Yet, one
of the first documented evidences and oft-cited examples of steganography can be
traced back to the Histories of Herodotus written in 440 BCE [39]. It recorded
a steganographic method which is to shave the head of a messenger and tattoo a
message on the messenger’s head. After the hair grew, the message would be covered
and become undetectable until the head was shaved again. Another common form
of steganography is through the use of invisible inks, which can be revealed only
under certain circumstances such as being heated, or being mixed with appropriate
chemical substances, or being viewed under ultraviolet light. With the development
of photographic reduction techniques, messages were substantially reduced into tiny
photographs, which can be read only with a specially designed magnifying viewer.
During World War I and World War II, these tiny photographs, called microdots,
were stuck on top of printed periods or commas in innocuous cover material such as
postcards and magazines, which were then delivered through insecure postal channels
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[40]. Public awareness of modern digital steganography increased drastically after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It was suggested that steganographic softwares might
have been applied to coordinate the intrigues.
In 1984, Simmons formulated steganography as the Prisoner’s Problem [41].
Two accomplices in a crime have been arrested and kept confined to separate cells.
Their only means of communication is to convey messages through the warden, who
will only permit to pass the messages if the information is innocuous. In order to
coordinate their escape plan as well as to deceive the warden, they will have to think
of a way to establish a subliminal channel. This problem could be seen as an analogy
for many other real-world applications of steganography [42–50].
2.1.2 Watermarking
Although the art of papermaking can date back to about 105 BCE in China, it was
not until the end of 13th century that watermarks appeared in Italy. The purpose
of watermarks at the time of their invention might be untraceable. They may have
been served as trademarks of paper maker, or simply as decoration. The first specific
watermark in an attempt to thwart counterfeiting of paper currency appeared in 1661
when the first European banknotes were issued in Sweden. A traditional watermark
is a design stamped on wet pulp during the papermaking process and only reveals
itself when the paper is held up to light. It is almost invisible to the naked eye under
normal viewing conditions and is di cult to be reproduced.
The term ‘digital watermark’ was coined in early 90s when the feasibility of
encoding watermarks into digital images was investigated [51]. Digital watermarking
techniques can be used for a wide variety of applications, including but not limited to
access control, broadcast monitoring, copyright protection, data annotation, forgery
detection, message authentication, ownership identification and traitor tracing [52–
54]. The development of digital watermarking can be further categorised into a
number of subfields such as robust watermarking and fragile watermarking.
As its name would suggest, a robust watermark is designed to survive incid-
ental or deliberate removal and is widely used for copyright protection and many
other real-life applications [55–64]. Attacks against robust watermarks often involve
13
desynchronisation operations to paralyse watermark detection process. For digital
images, desynchronisation can be realised by geometrical transformations including
cropping, flipping, padding, rescaling, rotating, shifting, and transposing [65].
By contrast, a fragile watermark would fail to be detected if the cover
content is altered in any way and its fragility can be a favourable characteristic
for authentication purposes [66–73]. After answering whether a content has been
modified, the localisation and restoration of tampered areas may be taken into further
consideration. The knowledge of which part of the content has been altered and which
part is authentic could be beneficial to, say, the understanding of motivations behind
tampering, while the possibility of recovering the altered parts can, for example,
save the cost of retransmissions or be even more valuable when retransmissions are
not possible. To enable the function of localisation, the watermark components
should be embedded in such a way that failing to verify one component should not
a↵ect the verification of others [74–79]. To further recover the altered areas, one
may resort to the self-embedding approach in which the watermark payload contains
a reconstruction reference such as a compression code of the cover content itself
[80–93].
The properties of watermarking schemes and their relative importance is
dependent upon the application in hand. Amongst various watermarking systems,
most common properties are capacity and fidelity. The capacity refers to the amount
of data payload can be encoded into digital media. It may be measured by the
number of bits per pixel for images, per second for the audios, per frame for videos,
or per sentence for texts. The fidelity refers to the perceptual similarity between the
original content and its watermarked counterpart. It can be evaluated by objective
quality assessment metrics such as mean square error (MSE) or signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) [94–96]. It is also possible to produce the rate by subjective methods, for
example, by involving human observers or applying perceptual models of human
visual system (HVS) and human auditory system (HAS) to automatically predict
human judgement [97].
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2.2 Reversible Information Hiding
In digital forensic science, one of the most critical issues would be the authentication
of digital evidence against illegitimate manipulations [98]. Digital signature schemes
serve as one of the most e↵ective solutions towards message authentication [99].
Typically, a digital signature is the encryption of a hash value, or a digest of a file,
in a sense that:
• It cannot be forged as long as the private key (for encryption) remains secure.
• It is verifiable as long as the public key (for decryption) is available.
In 1993, Friedman proposed a trustworthy digital camera that contains
a microprocessor for generating digital signatures when photos are taken [100].
The private key only known to the camera manufacturer is programmed into the
microprocessor, whereas the public key is stored as image files’ metadata and also
engraved on the camera body. To verify the image file in question, the verification
software decrypts the stored signature with the public key to obtain the hash
value, and compares it with the hash value produced from the image in question.
The verification is passed if both values match; otherwise, the image fails to be
authenticated and is judged as tampered.
This construction, however, requires additional storage space for signatures
and furthermore has risks of data loss and mismanagement during storage, trans-
mission, or format transformation. Although watermarking can be considered as
a potential solution addressing the problem of mislaying digital signatures as well
as other auxiliary information, the modifications by the act of watermarking it-
self may violate the initial objective of integrity protection. In some cases, these
non-malicious modifications and imperceptible distortions could be admissible and
tolerable. In some sensitive scenarios, however, such alterations would be strictly
forbidden, especially in the cases such as military reconnaissance or medical diagnosis.
It might be argued that the noise introduced is too faint to be a possible cause of
misinterpretation of medical images in a malpractice suit. Yet, this argument may
not be persuasive in a courtroom.
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panda colour noise gibbon
Figure 2.1: A demonstration of adversarial perturbations. By adding an imperceptible
colour noise to an image ‘panda’ from ImageNet, GoogLeNet mistakenly categorised
it as a ‘gibbon’ with 99.3% confidence.
Another critical concern is accompanied by the recent development of artificial
intelligence aided automated systems, such as autonomous vehicle systems and
autonomous diagnostic systems. It is evident that many current deep neural networks
would not able to sustain some adversarial perturbations in a sense that some
imperceptible noise would chance to or intend to mislead the model in a wrong or
even chosen direction, as a demonstration shown in Fig. 2.1 provided by Goodfellow
et al. [101]. It is also of a practical possibility that a few distorted samples of data
collected and used in the training process would poison and eventually compromise
the whole model. Hence, we conclude that the ability to preserve perfect copies
of original images is not only an academic pursuit but also of great significance in
real-life applications.
In order to fulfil the requirement of preserving the original carrier signals,
the notion of reversible information hiding was introduced and has continued to
advance over the last two decades [102]. Reversible information hiding is a special
class of information hiding techniques that permits the restoration of original carrier
signals once the embedded messages are extracted. To the best of our knowledge,
the very first reversible information hiding algorithm was invented by Barton and
issued as a US patent in 1997 [103]. The invention relates to an information hiding
method and apparatus for verifying whether the digital data has been modified
from its intended form and allowed restoration of data to its original state if desired.
Relevant literature suggested that reversible information hiding schemes are favour-
able for many authentication applications, and thus we would argue that reversible
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Greyscale image Bit planes
Figure 2.2: An example of eight bit planes of a greyscale image. The significance of
bit planes decreases from top left to bottom right.
information hiding is more associated with watermarking, instead of steganography,
from the application aspect. Accordingly, we may also refer to reversible information
hiding as reversible watermarking and message payloads as watermarks. In the rest
of this section, we review some of the most representative techniques of reversible
information hiding.
2.2.1 Lossless Compression
To some extent the problem of reversible information hiding can be conceived as
lossless data compression with a fidelity constraint [104–109]. In other words, if
we are able to compress some perceptually insignificant components of the carrier
signal, then we are able to accommodate additional information while preserving the
similarity between the original and modified signals. This idea is intuitive and to
some extent feasible, but it would encounter an inherent problem of a rather limited
embedding capacity due to the nature of signals. It can be observed that those
imperceptible parts of signals in most cases would look like random noise signals,
which is nearly incompressible. Let us take digital images of 256 pixel intensities as
example. It can be seen in Fig. 2.2 that the randomness of each bit plane increases
as the visual significance decreases. It indicates that if one wants to embed more
amount of information, some significant components of a signal might inevitably be
modified, which inflicts visible distortions.
The problem of reversible information hiding can be considered as a matter
17
of striking a good fidelity-capacity trade-o↵. The overall objective is to reach a more
e cient balance in a sense that higher capacity is achieved under a fixed fidelity
constraint or vice versa. A theoretical aspect of this problem was investigated by
Kalker and Willems, who formulated it as a rate-distortion problem.
Theorem. Let X and Y denote the memoryless random variables of carrier signal
and its marked transition respectively, H denote the entropy function, and D denote
a preferred distance function. The upper bound of embedding rate ⇢ under a distortion
constraint   is given by
⇢( ) = max{H(Y )} H(X), (2.1)
where the maximum is over all transition probabilities P (y|x) satisfying the distortion
constraint X
x,y
P (x)P (y|x)D(x, y)   . (2.2)
Based upon the theoretical formulation, Kalker and Willems presented a
recursive reversible embedding approach aiming at approaching the theoretical upper
bound [110]. The idea is straightforward: First, we segment the carrier bitstream
into n disjoint subsequences x = x1||x2|| . . . ||xn. Second, we encode the first piece of
payload into x1 through an arbitrary irreversible embedding technique and obtain the
result y1. Third, we compute the auxiliary information needed to reconstruct x1 when
y1 is available. Theoretically, the amount of information required is equal to H(x1|y1).
Then, we embed the auxiliary information for reconstructing x1 as well as the next
piece of payload into x2 via the chosen irreversible embedding technique, resulting
in y2. We repeat this process recursively until the one but the last subsequence
xn, for which we simply deploy the lossless compression strategy. However, this
pioneering study only considered independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
random variables of carrier signal and therefore, e cient approaches to cope with non
i.i.d. sequences and to narrow the gap between theoretical and practical performance
have played a pivotal role in this line of research [111–117].
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2.2.2 Di↵erence Expansion
Di↵erence expansion is a branch of techniques based upon reversible integer transform.
This idea was first introduced by Tian [118], who proposed to transform a pair of
adjacent pixels of the carrier image into a pair of moving average or trend and moving
di↵erence or fluctuation via integer Haar wavelet transfrom, and embeds one bit
into the expanded di↵erence term. Let x and y be a pair of adjacent pixels of an
8-bit greyscale image such that 0  x, y  255. Their average µ and di↵erence   are
defined as
µ =
 
x+ y
2
⌫
,
  = x  y,
(2.3)
where b.c denotes the floor function. The inverse transform from µ and   to x and y
is computed by
x = µ+
 
  + 1
2
⌫
,
y = µ 
 
 
2
⌫
.
(2.4)
Let b denote one bit of information to be embedded such that b 2 {0, 1}. The
message embedding procedures are operated as follows:
1. Transform x and y into µ and  .
2. Expand   by a scale of 2 and embed b by
 0 = 2⇥   + b. (2.5)
3. Transform µ and  0 inversely into x0 and y0.
Given that most of the energy is preserved in the trend signal which has been kept
changed during the embedding process, only tiny fluctuations in visual quality would
occur. The message extraction and image recovery procedures are demonstrated as
follows:
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1. Transform x0 and y0 into µ and  0.
2. Extract b by
b =  0 mod 2. (2.6)
3. Recover   from  0 by
  =
 
 0
2
⌫
. (2.7)
4. Transform µ and   inversely into the original x and y.
Albeit its simplicity, the above scheme leaves the problems of overflow and underflow
unsolved. In other words, the modified pixels x0 and y0 went out of bounds of the
colour depth (256 possible grey levels). To rectify this flaw, the encoder needs to
record the location of changeable pixel pairs on a location map. There are many
possible ways to communicate this map to the decoder. For instance, we can employ
the LSB replacement method to replace least significant bits (LSBs) of some pre-
agreed pixels between the encoder and decoder with the compressed bitstream of
the location map, and then make the original bits as a part of the message payloads.
Example. We illustrate the di↵erence expansion approach with an example provided
in Tian’s article. Assume that we have two pixels x = 206 and y = 201, and we
would like to embed a bit b = 1. First, we compute the average µ and di↵erence   by
µ =
 
206 + 201
2
⌫
= 203,
  = 206  201 = 5.
Then, we expand the di↵erence   by a scale of 2 and add the bit b to it, resulting
 0 = 2⇥ 5 + 1 = 11.
Finally, we transform µ and  0 inversely into new pixel values x0 and y0 by
x0 = 203 +
 
11 + 1
2
⌫
= 209,
y0 = 203 
 
11
2
⌫
= 198.
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To extract the bit b, we compute
b = 11 mod 2 = 1.
We then obtain the original average µ and di↵erence   by
µ =
 
209 + 198
2
⌫
= 203,
  =
 
11
2
⌫
= 5.
Finally, we use µ and   to restore x and y as
x = 203 +
 
5 + 1
2
⌫
= 206,
y = 203 
 
5
2
⌫
= 201.
Followed by this paradigm, there have been rapid developments in reversible
integer transform. Improvements over Tian’s original method include a generalised
integer transform by Alattar [119], a reversible contrast mapping by Coltuc and
Chassery [120], and other e cient integer transforms [121–123]. To further reduce
the size of location map, a sorting technique was proposed by Kamstra and Heijmans
[124].
2.2.3 Histogram Shifting
One of the most significant breakthrough in reversible information hiding techniques
is the histogram shifting approach proposed by Ni et al. [125]. This idea had laid
the groundwork for a variety of improved constructions. An overview of histogram
shifting technique is shown in Fig. 2.3. In general, an embedding algorithm consists
of three steps:
1. Generate the histogram of the host signal.
2. Split the histogram into an inner region and an outer region.
3. Embed message by modifying the inner bins.
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Figure 2.3: An illustration of the histogram-shifting reversible watermarking tech-
nique. Given a designated bin (coloured in light grey), the adjacent bins are emptied
out by shifting the bins at both sides (coloured in dark grey) outwards. To represent
the payload information, the sample values of the designated bin are mapped to the
adjacent values.
In order to make room for data embedding, or equivalently to disambiguate the outer
bins and the modified inner bins, the outer bins are to be shifted outwards. In more
detail, the adjacent bins of a designated bin, usually the peak bin, are emptied out
by shifting outwards. Then, each sample value of the designated bin is mapped to its
adjacent values to represent the payload information. The process can be reversed
by simply shifting the bins inwards and mapping the values back. If the bins at two
ends of the histogram are not empty in the first place, a small amount of additional
information will be needed to record the overflow.
Among various extensions, one of the most renowned method is prediction-
error expansion by Thodi and Rodriguez [126]. This method takes account of
correlations inherent in the neighbourhood of a pixel, rather than merely the cor-
relation between two adjacent pixels. This technique has greatly influenced the
subsequent development of reversible information hiding schemes. Improvements
over this method mainly focus on exploiting more advanced prediction techniques
to generate a more sharply distributed prediction-error histogram. Sachnev et al.
utilised rhombus prediction, double-layered embedding mechanism, and sorting
strategy to improve the performance [127]. Luo et al. devised an interpolation-based
predictive model which calculates the estimated pixel value as the weighted sum of
its four adjacent neighbours [128]. Qin et al. employed an inpainting technique to
assist the prediction [129]. Fallahpour adopted gradient adjusted predictor (GAP) to
improve the estimation accuracy [130]. Coltuc investigated and analysed a variety of
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predictors and their performances within scope of reversible information hiding [131].
Ou et al. proposed a idea of using a two-dimensional prediction-error histogram
[132].
Furthermore, adaptive embedding and pixel-selection strategies were de-
veloped to classify pixels according their local complexity, and by exploiting only
pixels in the smooth regions, a sharply-distributed prediction-error histogram can be
generated to carry a larger payload [133–137].
Another type of improved methods aims to find optimal histogram bins for
data embedding. Fallahpour and Sedaaghi devised a block-based mechanism that
embeds data by modifying the peaks of histograms generated from distinct blocks of
the carrier image [138]. Xuan et al. suggested to modify the histogram generated
from high frequency coe cients of the integer wavelet transform (IWT) of the host
image [139]. Li et al. proposed a general framework that concludes a number of
histogram shifting based schemes as its special cases [140]. Wang et al. modelled
the multiple-layered histogram shifting as a rate-distortion problem and employed
the genetic algorithm (GA) to search for the nearly optimal bins [141]. E cient
methods using multiple histograms were also investigated [142–145].
2.3 Modern Cryptography
Cryptography is the study of secure communications in the presence of malicious
adversaries [146]. In a narrower sense, it is referred to the study of a pair of encryption
and decryption algorithms such that the sender enciphers a message, or a plaintext,
into a disguised message called ciphertext in order to prevent the secret information
from being revealed to an eavesdropper, and only the intended recipient is able to
decipher and read the message. In the literature of cryptography, for convenience
and to aid comprehension, the name Alice is often used to refer to the sender, Bob
to the intended recipient, and Eve to the adversary, especially the eavesdropper. We
will use these names of fictional characters extensively in discussions about a variety
of systems and protocols.
The modern study of cryptography can be generally divided into symmetric-
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key cryptography and asymmetric-key cryptography [147]. As their names suggest, the
symmetric-key cryptography is referred to the cryptosystems that use the same key
for both enciphering and deciphering, whereas the asymmetric-key cryptography, also
known as public-key cryptography, indicates the cryptosystems that utilise di↵erent
keys for encryption and decryption of the messages. In response to privacy concerns
in cloud computing environments and other privacy-aware applications, there has
been a surge of research in the development of homomorphic cryptosystems which
permit computations on ciphertexts. We begin this section with basic cryptographic
principles and attacks. Then, we discuss some representative cryptosystems of di↵er-
ent categories. This section ends with a non-technical introduction of homomorphic
cryptosystems.
2.3.1 Kerckho↵s’s Principles
In 1883, A. Kerckho↵s stated six principles for the design of military ciphers, which
have been regarded the basic tenet of cryptography [148]:
i The system must be practically, if not mathematically, indecipherable.
ii It must not require secrecy and must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy
without inconvenience.
iii Its key must be communicable and retainable without the aid of written notes,
and must be changeable or modifiable at the discretion of the correspondents.
iv It must be applicable to telegraphic correspondence.
v It must be portable, and its usage and function must not require the concourse
of several people.
vi Finally, it is necessary, given the circumstances that control the application,
that the system is easy to use, requiring no mental strain, or the knowledge of
a long series of rules to be observed.
Although some of the rules are no longer applicable due to the emergence of
modern computers, the second rule is still of great significance today. This rule was
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echoed and rephrased by C. Shannon as ‘the enemy knows the system’, which is also
widely recognised as Shannon’s maxim [149]. In other words, if the messages were
eavesdropped and copied while en route, the messages should be indecipherable even
though the enemy has full knowledge of the algorithms and apparatus used.
2.3.2 Basic Cryptographic Attacks
A cryptographic attack is a method for discovering the weaknesses in algorithms,
protocols, or implementations of cryptosystems with the eventual goal to determine
the key and thus the secret message in its entirety. This process is also known as
cryptanalysis. Attacks can be classified based upon what information is available to
the attacker. The most common and basic types of cryptanalytic attacks are listed
and discussed in order of severity as follows [150].
• Ciphertext-only attack (COA): The attacker is assumed to have only access
to a set of ciphertexts and attempts to deduce some information about the
key or the plaintext. A cryptosystem that is vulnerable to this type of attack
would be considered as completely insecure. In the history of cryptography,
one of the simplest and most widely known encryption techniques is Caesar’s
cipher, which simply shifts the plaintext alphabet left or right by some number
of positions. This classical cipher can be easily broken in a ciphertext-only
scenario by frequency analysis, that matches up the frequency distribution of
the enciphered letters with the statistics of the plaintext language.
• Known-plaintext attack (KPA): The attacker has access to a set of plaintexts
and their enciphered counterparts, which can be used to deduce the secret keys
or codebooks. One of most well-known practice of this method is the breaking
of the German Enigma machine by Alan Turing and other cryptanalysts during
World War II. To decipher the Enigma messages, British cryptanalysts enticed
the Germans to include particular words, called ’cribs’, in their enciphered
messages. This process of planting cribs was called ‘gardening’. Chunks of
known plaintext enabled the exhaustive search space to be narrowed down
to an amount that eventually can be solved with the help of systematically
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constructed electro-mechanical devices, such as the Bombe.
• Chosen-plaintext attack (CPA): This model presumes that the attacker is
able to acquire the corresponding ciphertexts of arbitrarily chosen plaintexts.
The target is to reveal the plaintext that was encrypted to give some other
ciphertext, or the challenge ciphertext. It is usually conceptualised by allowing
the attacker to interact with an encryption oracle, or less pedantically a black
box. Yet, this attack is a realistic threat in many scenarios. During the Pacific
War, US Navy cryptanalysts has intercepted a message from Japan containing
the ciphertext fragment ‘AF’ and they believed that it might correspond to
the plaintext ‘Midway Island’. In order to prove this hypothesis, they devised
a ruse by instructing the US forces at Midway to broadcast an uncoded radio
message stating that Midway’s freshwater supplies were low. Within 24 hours,
the US cryptanalysts intercepted a message from Japan reporting ‘AF was
short on water’, which confirmed their hypothesis.
• Chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA): This model presumes that the attacker is
given the capability to obtain the decryption of any chosen ciphertext. The aim
is to determine the secret key in whole or in part. In other words, the attacker
is allowed unlimited access to a decryption oracle. By its very nature, this
attack is di cult to mount and yet the vulnerability to such attack is not only
a theoretical possibility. In real life, often, the attacker can issue ciphertext
queries to a server and fool it into decrypting those chosen ciphertexts. The
attacker is also possible to learn partial information about the plaintext from
observing server’s responses such as ‘invalid checksum’, ‘invalid timestamp’, or
‘invalid password’.
We conclude by noting that di↵erent application scenarios may require res-
istance to di↵erent types of attacks. It is not always the case that a cryptographic
scheme secure against the most powerful type of attacks would be favourable. When
taking the algorithm e ciency and computational complexity into account, the
cryptographic scheme secure against weaker attacks may be preferred provided that
it su ces for the applications at hand.
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2.3.3 Symmetric-Key Cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptosystems refer to cryptographic algorithms that use the same
keys for both encryption of plaintext and decryption of ciphertext. As one of the
most notable milestones in the history of cryptography, an unbreakable cipher was
invented by Vernam with a patent granted in 1919 [151], which is also referred to
as the one-time pad today. Yet, it was not until 1949 that the perfect secrecy of
Vernam’s cipher was proved by C. Shannon in his seminal work Communication
Theory of Secrecy Systems [149]. It was shown that the one-time pad is unbreakable
and anything unbreakable is naturally a one-time pad. Despite its theoretical perfect
secrecy, it is by no means a practical system given that it is unbreakable if and only
if
• The key is truly random.
• It is only used once and never reused in whole or in part.
• It is kept completely secret.
• Its length is the same as, or longer than, the length of the message.
As might be expected, it is hard to generate truly random keys and, moreover,
even the definition of true randomness could be considered as a vague philosophical
question. In addition to this, the cost of storing and exchanging such large volumes
of keys would be very expensive. To overcome these issues, stream ciphers were
innovated as an approximation of the unbreakable one-time pad, which generate keys
via a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). One of the most prominent and
widespread stream ciphers is Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4), designed by R. Rivest in 1987
[152]. It has been used and supported in many commercial software packages.
Data Encryption Standard (DES) was a publicly available cipher developed
by H. Feistel and the research team of IBM, and became a public standard in 1977
with the involvement of the National Security Agency (NSA) [153]. However, it has
been criticised for a relatively short key length (56 bits). As computational speed
continued to grow rapidly, this weakness had become more serious and finally been
rendered insecure by brute-force attacks. In 2001, Advanced Encryption Standard
27
(AES) was published as a successor of DES [154]. It is sometimes referred to as
Rijndael owing to its original designers Rijmen and Daemen. The main strength of
AES rests upon the various options of key sizes (128, 192, or 256 bits), which make
it exponentially stronger than DES. There is, as of this writing, no practical attack
against AES that could reduce the amount of time to crack it to less than billions of
years, or the age of the universe, even on the world’s fastest supercomputer.
2.3.4 Asymmetric-Key Cryptography
A common issue with all of the symmetric-key cryptosystems is that the sender and
the recipient must agree on a key prior to the communications. In order to pre-share
the key, a secure channel resistant to eavesdropping must be established and yet
the cost of implementation and maintenance could be very expensive. This major
problem has led to a full-blown revolution in cryptography, starting from a seminal
paper New Directions in Cryptography by W. Di e and M. Hellman in 1976 [155],
credited as one of the most influential papers in the history of cryptography. A brief
description of Di e–Hellman key exchange protocol is provided as follows.
• A sender Alice and a receiver Bob publicly agree to use a modulus p = 23 and
base g = 5 (which is a primitive root modulo 23). In other words, these two
digits can be known by an enemy without threatening security.
• Alice selects a secret number a = 4 and then sends Bob
A ⌘ ga mod p ⌘ 54 mod 23 ⌘ 4. (2.8)
Note that a should be remained secret to anyone but Alice herself.
• Bob chooses a secret number b = 3 and then sends Alice
B ⌘ gb mod p ⌘ 53 mod 23 ⌘ 10. (2.9)
Note that b should only be known to Bob himself.
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• Alice computes the shared key
k ⌘ Ba mod p ⌘ 104 mod 23 ⌘ 18. (2.10)
• Bob obtains the shared key
k ⌘ Ab mod p ⌘ 43 mod 23 ⌘ 18. (2.11)
• As a result, Alice and Bob now share a key k = 18, which can be used to
encrypt messages in their following communications.
The security of Di e–Hellman key exchange is based upon discrete logarithm
problem, recognised as one of the most computationally intractable problem in
number theory. In other words, to break the scheme is equivalent to solve a very
hard mathematical problem and the concept of which lies at the heart of subsequent
development of asymmetric-key cryptosystems. In fact, the problem of good cipher
design is essentially one of finding di cult problems, subject to certain conditions.
As suggested by Shannon [149]:
There are two approaches to this problem; (1) We can study the possible
methods of solution available to the cryptanalyst and attempt to describe
them in su ciently general terms to cover any methods he might use. We
then construct our system to resist this ‘general’ method of solution. (2)
We may construct our cipher in such a way that breaking it is equivalent
to (or requires at some point in the process) the solution of some problem
known to be laborious. Thus, if we could show that solving a certain
system requires at least as much work as solving a system of simultaneous
equations in a large number of unknowns, of a complex type, then we
would have a lower bound of sorts for the work characteristic.
In 1978, one of the first, and also the most dominant to date, public-key
cryptosystems was invented at MIT by R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman [99].
Unlike Di e–Hellman protocol, RSA solution does not require any information to
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be sent or exchanged prior to the intended ciphertext. The need for exchanging
information beforehand opens a security loophole that if without any authentication
mechanism the communications might be manipulated and controlled by an attacker
between two parties and thus vulnerable to a so-called man-in-the-middle attack.
Another valuable feature of RSA algorithm is that it can be used to generate digital
signatures for verifying the authenticity of messages. Furthermore, RSA is one of
the earliest schemes built upon integer factorisation problem, which together with
discrete logarithm problem form the two most important cornerstones of asymmetric-
key cryptography. Since then, a large number of data encryption, digital signature,
key exchange, and other public-key cryptographic algorithms have been developed,
such as the elliptic curve cryptography [156].
2.3.5 Homomorphic Encryption
The notion of privacy homomorphisms was introduced by Rivest et al. in 1978
[157], which gave birth to the research on homomorphic cryptosystems and their
applications. Privacy homomorphisms can be viewed as particular algebraic mappings
between the paintext and ciphertext spaces that allow the result of operations
upon the ciphertexts, when deciphered, to match the result of operations upon the
plaintexts. As yet another precious legacy of RSA cryptosystem, its multiplicative
homomorphic property allows multiplication to be operated in the encrypted domain.
Suppose that we take two encrypted digits and multiply one with another. The
product, when decrypted, is equivalent to the product of two plain digits. If a
cryptosystem produces the sum of plain digits through arbitrary operations on
encrypted digits, then we say that this cryptosystem has an additive homomorphic
property. Note that the given operation in the ciphertext domain is not necessarily
the same as the resultant operation in the plaintext domain.
Schemes that only possess one of the properties, or do not operate completely
on ciphertexts, are said to be partially homomorphic, including the Rabin cryptosys-
tem [158], Goldwasser–Micali cryptosystem [159], ElGamal cryptosystem [160], Ben-
aloh cryptosystem [161], Okamoto–Uchiyama cryptosystem [162], Naccache–Stern
cryptosystem [163], Paillier cryptosystem [164], and Damg˚ard–Jurik cryptosystem
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[165]. By contrast, those that support arbitrary computations on ciphertexts are
referred to as fully homomorphic cryptosystems [166–176]. Although fully homo-
morphic schemes are apparently far more powerful, they have been criticised by
the tremendous consumption of computational resource and thus the utilisation in
practice has been questioned. By contrast, partially homomorphic schemes are more
compact and arguably adequate for a number of real-world applications. In this
following paragraphs, we discuss two typical partially homomorphic cryptosystems,
with which this thesis primarily concerns. In particular, we examine the multiplic-
ative homomorphic property o↵ered by the RSA cryptosystem and the additive
homomorphic property given by the Paillier cryptosystem.
RSA Cryptosystem
A well-understood example of multiplicative homomorphism would be the RSA
cryptosystem whose security strength is known to be equivalent to the di culty of
solving integer factorisation [99]. Suppose that p and q are two large primes and the
modulus is computed as N = p · q. Let e and d be the public and private keys of the
RSA cryptosystem, respectively, such that e and d satisfy the condition that
e · d ⌘ 1 (mod  (N)), (2.12)
where   is Euler’s phi function, i.e.  (N) = (p  1)(q   1). The RSA cryptosystem
defines an encryption function
c ⌘ me (mod N), (2.13)
and a decryption function
m ⌘ cd (mod N), (2.14)
where m denotes the message and c denotes the cipher. Consider the goal of
generating the encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches the product of two
messages m1 and m2 through the operations upon the ciphers c1 and c2. This goal
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can be achieved by multiplying two ciphers as
c1 · c2 ⌘ (m1e) · (m2e) (mod N)
⌘ (m1 ·m2)e (mod N).
(2.15)
In other words,
D(E(m1) · E(m2)) = m1 ·m2, (2.16)
where E(·) and D(·) denote the encryption and decryption functions, respectively.
Paillier Cryptosystem
The RSA cryptosystem is limited, however, by solely permitting the multiplication
of messages. As a consequence, designing homomorphic encryption algorithms that
permit various mathematical operations upon ciphers has been one of the active
research areas. Among a variety of historical antecedents, the Paillier cryptosystem
is one of the most widely used additive homomorphisms [164]. The system consists
of three phases: key generation, encryption, and decryption. In the key generation
phase, we choose two large primes p and q. Then, we compute N = pq and
  = lcm(p  1, q   1), where ‘lcm’ stands for least common multiple. Next, we select
a random integer g 2 Z/N2Z⇤ and calculate
µ ⌘ (L(g  (mod N2))) 1 (mod N), (2.17)
where
L(x) =
x  1
N
. (2.18)
The public key is (n, g) and the private key is ( , µ). In the encryption phase,
let m be a message to be encrypted and r be a randomly selected integer, where
m, r 2 Z/NZ. The ciphertext is then computed as
c ⌘ gm · rN (mod N2). (2.19)
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In the decryption phase, the plaintext message is deciphered by
m ⌘ L(c  (mod N2)) · µ (mod N). (2.20)
Let m1 and m2 be two messages and c1 and c2 be two ciphers. To produce the cipher
of sum of m1 and m2, we calculate the product of c1 and c2 and obtain
c1 · c2 ⌘ (gm1 · r1N ) · (gm2 · r2N ) (mod N2)
⌘ g(m1+m2) · (r1 · r2)N (mod N2).
(2.21)
To yield the cipher of product of m1 and m2, we compute the exponentiation of c1
by m2 such that
cm21 ⌘ (gm1 · r1N )m2 (mod N2)
⌘ g(m1·m2) · (rm21 )N (mod N2).
(2.22)
As an alternative expression, we write
D(E(m1) · E(m2)) = m1 +m2, (2.23)
and
D(E(m1)m2) = m1 ·m2. (2.24)
It can be observed that the size of encrypted data is expanded as the message space
is M = Z/NZ and the ciphertext space is C = Z/N2Z⇤.
2.4 Literature Review
The rapid advancement of cloud computing technology has intrigued researchers
to explore the possibility of outsourcing the task of reversible watermarking to
cloud service providers without compromising the privacy of carrier signals. We
have witnessed a dramatic growth in the research of privacy-preserving reversible
watermarking over the past few years and a majority of works focused on a particular
types of carrier signals, namely digital images. Since reversible watermarking is
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usually viewed as a subclass of fragile watermarking, the robustness against attacks
such as geometric transformation targeting conventional robust watermarking will
not be covered. The focus of privacy-preserving reversible watermarking is primarily
the methodology of embedding information into encrypted images or other media.
In the rest of this section, we review some of the most representative works in this
research area.
2.4.1 Prior Art Based on Symmetric Cryptography
One of the very first reversible information hiding scheme for encrypted images can be
traced back to the work by Puech et al. who proposed to use block ciphers to encrypt
images and embed one bit of information into a block of 4⇥ 4 pixels by substituting
a significant bit of a selected carrier pixel with the intended bit of payloads [177].
Since encoding was realised through bit replacement, the watermark can be decoded
directly in the ciphertext domain. Removing the distortion caused by watermark
encoding is equivalent to unraveling whether the bit of the selected pixel is originally
a zero or an one. This issue was resolved by analysing the local standard deviation
of the decrypted image block in the two possible cases. As follow-up studies, this
idea was refined by an adaptive local entropy analysis [178] and a most significant
bit (MSB) predictor [179]. This series of works, however, has an inherent weakness
in the fidelity of marked images due to alterations of significant bits of pixels.
One of the most oft-cited works is Zhang’s method, which exploits the three
least significant bits (LSB) of a block of encrypted pixels to encode one bit of
information and recovers the original pixels by a fluctuation function that captures
spatial correlations in natural images [180]. This design paradigm e↵ectively resolved
the issue of low fidelity owing to the fact that only some imperceptible signals are
distorted. It method was improved by many follow-up studies including:
• A side-match mechanism that involves recovered blocks in the smoothness estima-
tion process [181].
• An evaluation function for estimating pixel distributions of a given block through
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analysing the absolute mean di↵erence of a given pixel and its adjacent pixels
[182].
• A support vector machine (SVM) which handles the problem of image recovery as
a binary classification problem [183].
• An elaborate selection of changeable pixels, instead of altering a whole block of
pixels, in order to enhance the visual quality of marked images and a content-based
adaptive judging function in light of the fact that pixel fluctuations are minimal
along the isophote direction [184].
• A double-round embedding approach based upon cyclic-shifting and data-swapping
for encoding more information [185].
• A sub-block division strategy that enables multiple bits, instead of a single bit, to
be embedded per block and thus augments the embedding rate [186].
This class of schemes encodes messages mostly through bit flipping and therefore
the message decoding process was accompanied by the image recovery process in
the plaintext domain. In view of this, these schemes are often referred to as joint
schemes. Message detection in the plaintext domain might, however, limit some
potential applications such as encrypted data management that utilises the embedded
annotations to supervise and administrate the storage and transfer of encrypted files,
and even to protect files against cybersecurity breaches.
In contrast to the class of joint schemes, the notion of separable schemes
emphasises the separability of message extraction process and signal recovery process.
In response to this required property, Zhang proposed to compress encrypted images
and append additional messages to the vacated space [187]. The possibility of com-
pressing encrypted data was investigated by Johnson et al. ahead of the invention of
privacy-preserving reversible information hiding techniques [188], and has undergone
profound development over years [189–193]. At first glance, it appears that only a
minimal amount of information could be compressed due to the fact that encrypted
signals are in general of high randomness and thus high entropy. Nevertheless, the
problem of compressing encrypted data can be modelled and solved by distributed
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source coding. Improvements over this pioneering compression-based scheme include:
• A use of low-density parity-check (LDPC) code for approaching an optimal com-
pression rate [194].
• A three-round embedding strategy for increasing the embedding rate and a pro-
gressive recovery mechanism that exploits previously recovered pixels in the future
round of recovery [195].
• An extension to deal with encrypted JPEG bitstreams [196].
In order to comprehend the concept of distributed source coding in a more
concrete sense, let us depict it with the following analogy. Suppose there are two
geographically close towns in which a resident of one town, Alice, wishes to compress
and communicate the local weather record to a resident of the other town, Bob,
using as few bits of information as possible. Since two towns are geographically close
to each other, their daily weathers are assumed to be strongly correlated with merely
a small probability that they are not of the same weather. We suppose that the
weather is either good or bad, which can be represented by 0 and 1, and each day
the weather is independent to the past weather. Hence, Alice’s weather record can
be viewed as an analogy to the encrypted binary image under our assumption of
independence of everyday’s weather. In other words, the weather record is as random
as an encrypted image. Moreover, Bob’s weather record can be considered as an
analogy to the cryptographic key since it is strongly correlated to Alice’s weather
record. It may seem a little counter-intuitive and yet it is comprehensible when we
take signal redundancy into account and think in a way that the plain binary image
is smooth enough so that most of its elements are the same. Thus, when a stream
cipher is applied to encrypt the image, the resultant encrypted image would be very
similar to the cryptographic key.
Let us exemplify the idea as follows. Suppose that the weathers between
Alice’s town and Bob’s town are correlated in such a way that the di↵erence is no
more than one day in every successive three days. In other words, for successive
three days, the possible 3-bit di↵erence sequences are: (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0),
and (0, 0, 1). Suppose Alice weather record is (1, 1, 0) and Bob’s weather record is
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(1, 1, 1). Let us construct a codebook in which each pair of farthest 3-bit vectors
are jointly represented by a 2-bit codeword, as illustrated in Table 2.1. According
to the codebook, Alice encode, or compress, her record into a codeword (0, 1) and
send it to Bob. At the receiving end, Bob knows that Alice’s record must be either
(0, 0, 1) or (1, 1, 0) by referring to the codebook. Given the prior assumption that
the di↵erences between Alice’s and Bob’s records are no more than one bit, Bob can
confidently determine that Alice’s record is (1, 1, 0). It should be kept in mind that
this toy example only serves as a conceptual model. In reality, natural signals would
be much more complex and therefore we need to apply more powerful codes and
make some adjustments to this conceptual construction.
Table 2.1: Codebook
codeword vectorpair
(0, 0) {(0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1)}
(0, 1) {(0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)}
(1, 0) {(0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1)}
(1, 1) {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1)}
In literature, the above schemes are often referred to as the class of vacating
room after encryption (VRAE) in contrast to that of reserving room before encryption
(RRBE), which is characterised by some compulsory preprocessing steps contributing
to a comparatively enormous payload capacity. Ma et al. utilised self-embedding
approach to embed some insignificant bits of a part of the image into another part
of the image in a reversible manner so that the reserved space can be used to carry
additional information even after encryption [197]. The improvements in this line of
research mainly focused on more e cient representations of images, including:
• A sparse coding technique that encodes images into sparse representations via a
pre-trained K-means singular value decomposition (K-SVD) based dictionary so
that the original images can be reconstructed in presence of the sparse codes and
residuals [198].
• An extended run length code that e ciently compresses the most significant bit
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(MSB) plane [199].
However, this class of schemes would have rather restricted range of applications
taking into account the fact that an individual may have too limited computational
resource to execute preprocessing algorithms in the first place. In other words, it
may constitute a violation of the chief purpose of accessing cloud computing services,
in spite of the fact that it could be of good value in some other circumstances and
applications.
2.4.2 Prior Art Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
Schemes based upon public-key cryptography involve relatively high computational
complexity and often induce non-negligible ciphertext expansion problem. It is
especially the case when attempting to operate the encryption process pixel by pixel
[200–203], due to the fact that public-key cryptography usually involves modular
arithmetic with large numbers and thus it would not be e cient to project a small
pixel space onto a large ciphertext space. To some extent, schemes adopting ill-
constructed encryption procedures would be of limited practical value considering
that the expanded file size would be far greater than the payload size in most cases,
excluding the standard and inevitable expansion inheres in the given cryptosystem.
Furthermore, this class of schemes usually cannot produce a marked plaintext since
the payloads are often embedded into the expanded space o↵ered by encryption,
which evaporates along with decryption. In other words, an intended watermark
will be filtered out after decipherment and thus from that point onwards the carrier
data will no longer be under the protection of the watermark. Despite the fact that
schemes of this type can be suitable for some other potential applications, they would
not be applicable when the aim is simply to outsource the task of watermarking to a
cloud service provider with expectation of receiving a marked content.
The reserving room before encryption (RRBE) paradigm has also been
adopted by schemes compatible with asymmetric-key cryptosystems and has been
realised by
• A pre-computation of reversible integer transform and a pre-recording of over-
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flow/underflow locations enabling the di↵erent expansion techniques to be operated
in the encrypted domain [204].
• A pre-shrinking of image histogram to reconcile the statistical distribution of
carrier signals with the subsequent histogram-shifting encoding in the encrypted
domain [205].
• A self-embedding technique to reserve space and an encoding technique based
upon mirroring ciphertext group strategy to prevent over-saturation of pixels in
the plaintext domain [206].
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced three fundamental disciplines – information
hiding, reversible information hiding, modern cryptography – that form the building
blocks of privacy-preserving information hiding systems. Their histories, applications,
properties, and other aspects have been concisely reviewed. Although these disciplines
have been mostly discussed at an elementary and nontechnical level, a brief grasp
of some notions and terminologies would pave the way for our exploration of more
detailed and technical principles. We have also reviewed the previous art of privacy-
preserving information hiding and classified it by the cryptosystem on which it is
based. In the following chapters, we will present our proposed schemes based upon a
variety of theoretically secure cryptosystems.
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Chapter 3
Information Hiding Based on
Symmetric Cryptography
With the global growth in the usage of social media and cloud storage, many
companies and organisations are faced with concomitant challenges and security risks.
The firms getting compromised will not only su↵er from a great financial damage,
but also a loss in public credibility. Some of the most dreadful cybersecurity threats
would be data breaches, referred to as security incidents in which confidential data is
copied, transmitted, viewed, stolen or used by unauthorised parties. ISO/IEC 27040
defines a data breach as:
Compromise of security that leads to the accidental or unlawful destruc-
tion, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to protected
data transmitted, stored, or otherwise processed.
Encryption is a potential solution to obfuscate sensitive data against unau-
thorised viewing and yet it may not stop data from being transferred or exported.
Depending upon the importance of the files, it is possible that computationally-
intensive cryptanalytic attacks are employed for the decipherments of files after
malicious exfiltration. Data saved to the personal cloud accounts of some public
celebrities, for example, might be the target of interest. It may also be the case
that industrial or political espionages are committed to leak classified documents
to adversarial parties. In order to defend against hacking or spying activities, there
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is an urgent need for imposing a more secure access control to the encrypted files
stored online.
Privacy-preserving information hiding techniques would serve as a potential
solution to this issue. It opens up the possibility of annotating cipher data with
permission codes in such a way that a message prescribing whether the exportation
can take place is embedded into the cipher data and can be detected when transmis-
sions occur. In addition to a permission code, an authentication code can also be
embedded for the purpose of tamper proofing. In other words, it o↵ers a two-factor
authentication to deter malicious removal of permission codes that attempts to
deceive an automated export system to release the files. The system may require the
operations of embedding and detection to be carried out in the encrypted domain in
order to preserve data privacy throughout storage, retrieval, and transfer.
In this chapter, we present two schemes based upon symmetric cryptography.
The proposed schemes permit message extraction in the encrypted domain and
therefore are suitable for the applications such as data exfiltration prevention. The
first scheme embeds the message by encoding the carrier data as one of the square
roots of a quadratic residue, whereas the second scheme embeds the message by
encoding the carrier data as one of the possible lexicographic permutations. We
would like to note that the schemes are not capable of strictly recovering the images
without any loss. We define the reversibility as the degree to which the carrier
image can be recovered and measure it by the probability of perfect recovery and
the average PSNR of recovered images. Some common properties shared by the two
schemes are summarised as follows:
• A synchronous stream cipher is used to encrypted a carrier image. By mak-
ing computational e ciency a high priority, symmetric-key algorithms are
favourable compared to asymmetric-key algorithms.
• Message embedding is based upon a one-to-many mapping. One embedding
algorithm utilises square roots of a quadratic residue and the other one utilises
lexicographic permutations.
• Message extraction can be carried out in the encrypted domain. This opens up
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the possibility to deter unauthorised data transmissions without compromising
data privacy to a network administrator.
• Content-adaptive predictors are used to assist the recovery of the carrier image.
One predictive model is derived from the projection theorem and the other one
is based upon edge gradients.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1 elaborates
the proposed method using quadratic residues as well as a predictive model based
upon the projection theorem. Section 3.2 presents the proposed method using
lexicographic permutations as well as a predictive model based upon image edge
gradients. Section 3.4 concludes this chapter and outlines the directions for future
research.
3.1 A Scheme Using Quadratic Residues
Privacy-preserving information hiding is a multidisciplinary study that has opened
up a great deal of intriguing real-life applications such as data exfiltration prevention,
data origin authentication, and electronic data management. Information hiding is a
practice of embedding intended messages into carrier signals through imperceptible
alterations. In view of some content-sensitive scenarios, however, the ability to
preserve perfect copies of signals is of crucial importance, for instance, considering
the inadequate robustness of recent artificial intelligence aided automated systems
against noise perturbations [101]. Reversibility of information hiding systems is a
valuable property that permits a recovery of original carrier signals if desired.
In this section, we present a novel privacy-preserving reversible information
hiding scheme inspired by the mathematical concept of quadratic residues [207]. This
is one of the first schemes associating reversible information hiding in the encrypted
domain with this particular concept in number theory. A quadratic residue has four
(not necessarily distinct) square roots and this one-to-many relationship between a
quadratic residue and its square roots can be utilised to encode payloads in a dynamic
fashion. Furthermore, a predictive model based upon the projection theorem is
devised to assist the recovery of carrier signals to a perfect state. The design of
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cryptographic and watermarking algorithms follows Shannon’s maxim: ‘the enemy
knows the system’ [149]. In other words, all the detailed construction of algorithms
ought to be publicly known and only the keys for decrypting the carrier signal
and decoding the watermark remain secret. Experimental results showed significant
improvements over the state-of-the-art schemes with respect to three principle factors:
capacity, fidelity, and reversibility.
3.1.1 Quadratic Residues
We give a brief introduction to quadratic residues and how to find their square roots
[208]. An integer a is called a quadratic residue modulo n if and only if there exists
an integer x such that
x2 ⌘ a (mod n). (3.1)
Otherwise, a is called a quadratic nonresidue modulo n. According to Euler’s
criterion, if an integer a is relatively prime to an odd prime p, then a is a quadratic
residue modulo p if and only if
a
p 1
2 ⌘ 1 (mod p). (3.2)
and a quadratic nonresidue modulo p if and only if
a
p 1
2 ⌘  1 (mod p). (3.3)
This can be expressed concisely by the Legendre symbol:
a
p
⌘ a p 12 (mod p). (3.4)
The Jacobi symbol generalises the Legendre symbol by considering an odd positive
integer modulus n which is not necessary an odd prime. Suppose that n has the
prime factorisation n = p1 ⇥ p2 ⇥ · · ·⇥ pk. Then the Jacobi symbol is defined as
a
n
=
a
p1
⇥ a
p2
⇥ · · ·⇥ a
pk
. (3.5)
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If a is a quadratic residue modulo n, then (a|n) = 1. However, the converse
does not hold. In other words, a is not necessary a quadratic residue modulo n even
if (a|n) = 1. Consider the case that an odd positive integer n is factorised into two
odd prime p and q. The Jacobi symbol of 1 is possibly the product of two Legendre
symbols of  1. That means both x2 ⌘ a (mod p) and x2 ⌘ a (mod q) have no
solutions and thus x2 ⌘ a (mod n) has no solutions even though the value of Jacobi
symbol is 1. To solve this ambiguity, we need to check whether the value of each
Legendre symbol is 1.
We have discussed how to determine whether a quadratic congruence equation
is solvable and now we want to find its solutions. It is widely known that factoring a
large composite integer is of significant di culty. The hardness of integer factorisation
has formed a cornerstone of a variety of modern cryptosystems such as the Rabin
cryptosystem. It is known that Eq. (3.1) is very di cult to solve when n is the
product of two large primes p and q. However, if p and q are known, then the Chinese
remainder theorem (CRT) can be applied to solve for x. First of all, let us consider
an example of the CRT. Let p and q be two relatively prime moduli and ↵ and   be
two known integers, the CRT states that there exists an integer x such that
x ⌘ ↵ (mod p),
x ⌘   (mod q).
(3.6)
and such x is a unique solution modulo n = pq. Now, we want to solve Eq. (3.1) by
solving
x ⌘ xp (mod p),
x ⌘ xq (mod q).
(3.7)
where
x2p ⌘ a (mod p),
x2q ⌘ a (mod q).
(3.8)
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We can use trial and error to solve for xp and xq and express the solutions by
xp ⌘ ±pa (mod p),
xq ⌘ ±pa (mod q),
(3.9)
For odd primes p, q ⌘ 3 (mod 4), there exists an e cient formula for solving Eq.
(3.8). That is,
xp ⌘ ±a p+14 (mod p),
xq ⌘ ±a q+14 (mod q).
(3.10)
The CRT has a unique solution for Eq. (3.7) formulated by
x ⌘ (xp · q · bq + xq · p · bp) (mod n). (3.11)
where bq is a unique modular multiplicative inverse of q with respect to the modulus
p, and bp is a unique modular multiplicative inverse of p with respect to the modulus
q. That is to say,
q · bq ⌘ 1 (mod p),
p · bp ⌘ 1 (mod q).
(3.12)
Let us rewrite Eq. (3.12) by
q · bq + p · yp = 1,
p · bp + q · yq = 1.
(3.13)
where yp and yq are unknown and irrelevant to our problem. Since gcd(p, q) = 1, Eq.
(3.13) has the form
↵x+  y = gcd(↵, ). (3.14)
where ↵ and   are arbitrary integers and x and y are solvable with the extended
Euclidean algorithm. Thus, both bq and bp in Eq. (3.12) can be solved accordingly.
By substituting the solutions for xp and xq in Eq. (3.10) into Eq. (3.11), the four
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square roots for Eq. (3.1) are obtained by
x1 ⌘ (+a p+14 · q · bq + a q+14 · p · bp) (mod n),
x2 ⌘ (+a p+14 · q · bq   a q+14 · p · bp) (mod n),
x3 ⌘ ( a p+14 · q · bq + a q+14 · p · bp) (mod n),
x4 ⌘ ( a p+14 · q · bq   a q+14 · p · bp) (mod n).
(3.15)
3.1.2 Fundamental Mechanisms
In this subsection, we present the fundamental mechanisms that form the building
blocks of our proposed privacy-preserving reversible watermarking scheme. We begin
by introducing the watermark encoding and decoding mechanisms based upon the
Rabin cryptosystem and demonstrate them with a simple example. Then, we discuss
the content-adaptive prediction mechanism for assisting image recovery.
Encoding and Decoding Mechanisms
Let us start with the encoding and decoding mechanisms based upon Rabin cryptosys-
tem [158]. The goal is to embed information into an encrypted carrier image. We use
stream cipher to encrypt an image and exploit properties of the Rabin cryptosystem
to encode the watermark into the encrypted image. We refer to the information
to be embedded per round of operation as a watermark symbol denoted by w and
a random variable of the enciphered carrier image as a cipher symbol denoted by
c. Note that a cipher symbol is not a pixel. Instead, it is an integer convert from
certain bits of a group of selected pixels. We shall see the construction of cipher
symbols later.
Let p and q be two distinct prime numbers and n = pq be a modulus. The
encryption and decryption functions of Rabin cryptosystem are defined as
Encryption : a ⌘ c2 (mod n), (3.16)
and
Decryption : {⇢0, ⇢1, ⇢2, ⇢3} ⌘
p
a (mod n), (3.17)
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where c is an input plaintext, a is an output ciphertext, and ⇢i, 0  i  3 is a possible
deciphered result. It can be observed that the decipherment of Rabin cryptosystem
is unusual is a sense that it produces four possible answers, though it is not necessary
that they are all distinct numbers. In number theory, a is called a quadratic residue
modulo n and ⇢i is one of its square roots. Note that any square root can be encrypted
into the same quadratic residue. In addition to this, the chosen prime numbers p
and q are required for e ciently calculating the square roots.
The watermark encoding process is carried out as follows. To begin with, we
apply Rabin cryptosystem to encrypt c into a and subsequently decrypt a into a
set of four possible numbers, {⇢0, ⇢1, ⇢2, ⇢3}, in which the numbers are assumed to
have been sorted in ascending order, that is, ⇢0  ⇢1  ⇢2  ⇢3. Then, we embed
w by replacing c with ⇢w resulting c0 = ⇢w. Consider that at a certain time an
authorised party wants to extract w for some intended purposes. With the presence
of watermarking key, c0 is processed with an encryption and immediately followed
by a decryption that yields {⇢0, ⇢1, ⇢2, ⇢3}. Finally, the watermark w is determined
by matching c0 with ⇢w. It is worth pointing out that the number of bits that can
be carried may vary in each round of the watermarking operation. There are three
di↵erent cases to be taken into consideration:
1. If there are four distinct values in the set of square roots, two bits of information
can be embedded.
2. If there are two distinct values in the set of square roots, one bits of information
can be embedded.
3. If there are only one distinct value in the set of square roots, no information can
be embedded at all.
In summary, the number of bits able to be carried is equal to log2 ⌘, where ⌘ denotes
the number of distinct square roots of a given quadratic residue. Due to the fact
that the encryption and decryption functions of Rabin cryptosystem are used in
conjunction throughout our scheme, we refer to this conjoint operation as Rabin
transform for simplicity of notation.
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Example. An example of how to encode and decode the watermark is demonstrated
as follows. Consider a 7-bit carrier cipher symbol
c = (0100100)2 = 36.
By applying Rabin transform, the resultant square roots in ascending order are
{⇢0 = 8, ⇢1 = 36, ⇢2 = 41, ⇢3 = 69}.
Given that c yields 4 distinct square roots, we can embed 2 bits of information into c.
Suppose that the intended watermark symbol is
w = (10)2 = 2.
To encode the information, we substitute c with ⇢2, resulting
c0 = 41.
To decode the information, we compute the Rabin transform of c0 and sort the yielded
square roots in ascending order. Finally, by matching c0 to ⇢2, we determine w = 2.
Prediction Mechanism
A marked cipher symbol can be recovered into four candidate symbols, although they
are not necessarily all distinct numbers. These candidate symbols would then result
in four sets of possible values of the original pixels, which will be discussed later. The
issue to be addressed at the moment is to distinguish which set of pixels amongst
some given sets is more likely to be the original set. It can be realised through
developing a predictive model that is capable of estimating pixels at certain locations
by pixels at other locations. By perceiving an image as a Markov random field, a
predictive model can generate a denoised image in a sense that some contaminated
pixels are purified by their neighbouring correlated pixels.
Let us divide pixels of an image into a group of changeable pixels and a group
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Figure 3.1: Sets of changeable and unchangeable pixels.
of unchangeable pixels in such a fashion that each changeable pixel is encircled by
four unchangeable pixels located at its north, south, east and west, as illustrated
in Fig. 3.1. The changeable pixels are those used for carrying the payloads and
the unchangeable pixels are those used for assisting image recovery. We adopt an
e cient but also e↵ective predictive model:
eu =X
i
 i · ui
=  N · uN +  S · uS +  E · uE +  W · uW ,
(3.18)
where eu is an estimated pixel, ui is an uncontaminated pixel, and  i is a weight of
the predictive model. The remaining issue is to compute proper weights that lead to
an accurate prediction.
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Let ~u denote a column vector of n changeable pixels such that
~u =
266666664
u1
u2
...
un
377777775 , (3.19)
and ~ui denote a column vector of n unchangeable pixels at corresponding locations,
for example,
~uN =
266666664
uN ,1
uN ,2
...
uN ,n
377777775 . (3.20)
An optimal predictive model would be that minimises the L2 norm:     ~u X
i
 i · ~ui
     
2
. (3.21)
According to Hilbert projection theorem, minimising this norm is equivalent to
finding a set of weights such that ~v = ~u P i~ui is orthogonal to ~uN , ~uS , ~uE , and
~uW , respectively. In other words, for a given vector ~uN , we have
~u|N · ~v = 0, (3.22)
and
~u|N · ~u = ~u|N ·
X
 i~ui. (3.23)
Let us express the above equation as
266666664
uN ,1
uN ,2
...
uN ,n
377777775
| 266666664
u1
u2
...
un
377777775 =
266666664
uN ,1
uN ,2
...
uN ,n
377777775
|
An⇥4
266666664
 N
 S
 E
 W
377777775 , (3.24)
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where
A =
266666664
uN ,1 uS,1 uE,1 uW,1
uN ,2 uS,2 uE,2 uW,2
...
...
...
...
uN ,n uS,n uE,n uW,n
377777775 . (3.25)
By deriving the orthogonality for other three vectors ~uS , ~uE , and ~uW in a similar
manner, we have
A|~u = A|A~ , (3.26)
where
~ =
266666664
 N
 S
 E
 W
377777775 . (3.27)
Finally, the weights are given by
~ = (A|A) 1A|~u. (3.28)
3.1.3 Scheme Constructions
In this subsection, we present detailed procedures based upon the mechanisms
discussed previously. The aims and tasks of three parties involved (i.e. data owner,
cloud server, and end user) are discussed respectively.
Data Owner
Let m = {m1,m2, . . . ,mN} denote an one-dimensional row vector converted from a
carrier image such that each element of m is a pixel. The data owner carries out the
encryption procedures as follow:
Step 1. Learn the weight variables  = { N , S , E , W} for the predictive model
from the given image. The weights are recorded by using 64 bits and may
be further compressed into fewer bits.
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Step 2. Encrypt each pixel mi by a stream cipher such that each bit of the pixel
is combined with a pseudo-random bit of the keystream via exclusive-or
operation. In other words, an enciphered bit is generated by
E(mki ) = mki   rki , (3.29)
where mki denotes the k
th bit of the pixel mi and rki denotes a pseudo-
random bit defined likewise. In a similar fashion, the cryptographic key
is denoted by r = {r1, r2, . . . , rN} and the enciphered image is denoted by
E(m) = {E(m1), E(m2), . . . , E(mN )}.
Step 3. Encrypt the weights via an arbitrary cipher, resulting E( ), and if the
watermark is provided by the data owner instead of the cloud server,
compress and encrypt also the watermark E(w). Depending on di↵erent
applications, the watermark could be the data owner’s intended message
such as authentication codes or cloud server’s auxiliary information such as
data annotation.
Step 4. Send the set of encrypted files {E(m), E( ), E(w)} to the cloud server for
the subsequent task of watermarking.
Cloud Server
Let p and q be two distinct prime numbers chosen by the cloud server and n = pq is
the modulus. The cloud server chooses two distinct prime numbers for activating
the Rabin transform mechanism, and carries out the message encoding procedures
as follows:
Step 1. Sample ` changeable encrypted pixels randomly and group them together,
yielding  N/` groups of pixels in total, where   denotes the proportion,
or the ratio, of changeable pixels. In other words, the total number of
groups is equal to the number of changeable pixels divided by the number
of pixels sampled each round and thus is represented by  N/`. The random
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sampling is initiated by a random seed, which serves as the watermarking
key. In other words, the embedded information can only be extracted with
the presence of this key; otherwise, an unauthorised party can only employ
brute force attack to find out the sampling patterns.
Step 2. Extract the tth bit from each pixel in a group to form a cipher symbol in
a sense that a symbol is a decimal integer converted from ` bits. There
are  N/` cipher symbols in total, and yet by considering the modular
arithmetic involved in Rabin transform, the number of changeable symbols
should be represented more precisely by
N 0 =  N/`  ✏, (3.30)
where ✏ denotes the number of symbols whose value exceeds the modulus
n = pq. Let us denote the changeable cipher symbol used in the current
round of watermarking operation by c.
Step 3. Convert E( ) and E(w) into N 0 watermark symbols in a sense that each
watermark symbol w is composed of four, two, or zero bit(s) of information
adjusted dynamically according to the capacity of corresponding carrier
symbol c. The encoding mechanism is realised by Rabin transform as
described previously and produces a marked cipher symbol c0. A collection
of all marked cipher symbols is converted in an inverse manner to construct
the marked and encrypted image denoted by E(m0).
Step 4. Send the marked and encrypted image to the intended end user, who could
be the data owner if the initial purpose is to outsource the task to the cloud
server, or could be the cloud server if the aim is to utilise the annotations
to manage encrypted files stored in the cloud and to prevent unauthorised
file exportation. It is also possible that the end user is another authorised
party with permission to access the image file as well as the watermark
information.
It is worth noting that 2` must not be greater than the modulus n since we
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use ` bits to form a cipher symbol and feed it into the functions involving modular
arithmetic. In practice, we determine ` first and then choose proper prime numbers
p and q to yield proper modulus n. In addition to this, the parameter ` governs the
balance between the capacity and reversibility. On the one hand, if a cipher symbol
is composed of more pixels, the total number of cipher symbols for carrying message
payloads decreases and thus a lower capacity. On the other hand, involving more
pixels in the construction of a symbol would reduce the probability of sampling a
series of unpredictable pixels. Also note that the parameter t governs the fidelity and
is also in charge of the reversibility. Depending on the application in hand, we may
choose a smaller value for t if the visual quality of watermarked image is of more
concern; otherwise, a larger value for t may be chosen to enhance the probability of
recovering the watermarked image to a perfect copy.
End User
There are three di↵erent levels of accessibility to be taken into consideration depending
on the types of keys available to the end user. Let us demonstrate how the end user
can react in three di↵erent scenarios:
1) The end user has granted the key r for decipherment and thus is able to obtain a
meaningful marked image denoted by m0.
2) The end user has acquired the watermarking key, namely the locations of pixels
in each round of sampling. Hence, by applying the decoding mechanism, the
embedded messages E( ) and E(w) can be extracted. We assume that the end
user is authorised to decrypt and decompress them into meaningful information.
3) The end user has gained access to both cryptographic and watermarking keys.
The aim is not only to obtain the marked image and embedded information, but
also to recover the original image. The task of image recovery can be realised with
the aid of the previously discussed prediction mechanism. We start by inputing
the weights  and marked image m0 into the predictive model, which outputs a
denoised image em. We take a copy of the marked and encrypted image E(m0)
and find out  N/` groups of changeable pixels via the known sampling patterns.
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For a group of ` cipher pixels, we convert their tth bits into a cipher symbol c0
and apply Rabin transform to generate four corresponding square roots, which
are not necessarily all distinct. We replace ` bits of each square root with the
tth bits of the very group of ` pixels respectively, resulting four modified groups
of pixels. Then, we decipher them into four groups of plain pixels. Finally, we
compare these four candidate groups of pixels with the group of corresponding
pixels of the denoised image. The group of pixels that gives the smallest L1 norm
is determined as that of recovered pixels. The recovery procedures are performed
iteratively until all the groups of pixels have been properly processed.
It is worth noting that the reversibility is content-dependent and is also
a↵ected by the configurations of parameters ` and t. As aforementioned, these
parameters play a pivot role in balancing a three-way trade-o↵ between capacity,
fidelity, and reversibility. We will examine their impacts in more detail through the
following experiments.
3.1.4 Experiments
In this subsection, we examine the scheme’s performance with respect to capacity,
fidelity, and reversibility. We measure the capacity by the number of bits carried
and fidelity by peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR). Algorithms are evaluated on
standard grayscale test images of size 512 ⇥ 512 widely used across literature, as
shown in Fig. 3.2. Images generated from di↵erent steps are illustrated in Fig 3.3.
This demonstration begins with an original carrier image, whose semantics are later
obfuscated by a stream cipher. After that, 4096 bits of information are embedded
into it resulting in a marked and encrypted image, which is then decrypted into
a meaningful marked image with fidelity of about 33.64 (dB). In the end of this
demonstration, the original image is restored. The parameter configurations are
` = 8 and t = 6, indicating that each carrier symbol is formed by the 6th bits of 8
changeable pixels. The scheme’s performance is evaluated and compared with the
prior art including the schemes by Zhang [180], and Liao and Shu [182], and Dragoi
et al. [209].
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Airplane Lena Peppers Zelda
Figure 3.2: Standard 8-bit test images of size 512⇥ 512.
original image encryption watermarking decryption recovery
Figure 3.3: Images generated from di↵erent steps of process.
Maximum Payload Capacity
The test results of the watermarking capacity with di↵erent configurations of para-
meters (p, q, and `) are presented in Table 3.1. It is shown that the proposed scheme
achieves a larger capacity than [180] and [182] in most cases, and outperforms [209]
when the length of symbols (in bits) increases to `   8. In general, the capacity would
decrease as the number of changeable symbols diminishes, namely as ` increases.
Nonetheless, an interesting observation can be made on the case in which ` = 7. It
can be observed that despite a steady decrease of payload bits from ` = 6 to ` = 9,
there is a sudden downturn when ` = 7 (i.e. 22099 bits). The underlying reason
is mainly the infeasible selection of p and q. According to our scheme design, the
choice of p and q must satisfy pq  2`  1 and a symbol is changeable only if its value
in [0, 2`   1] is smaller than the modulus n = pq. A large gap between n and 2`   1
would lead to a great number of unchangeable symbols and hence it is desirable to
choose a pair of p and q such that pq is as close to 2`  1 as possible. However, in the
case when l = 7, we are not able to find a pair of proper prime numbers that keeps
the gap small enough and thus an abrupt drop in terms of the capacity is observed.
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Table 3.1: Maximum payload capacity
Payload (bits)
Proposed (` = 6, p = 3, q = 19) 31219
Proposed (` = 7, p = 3, q = 31) 22099
Proposed (` = 8, p = 11, q = 23) 29998
Proposed (` = 9, p = 11, q = 43) 25331
Dragoi et al. (` = 6) 32512
Dragoi et al. (` = 7) 27867
Dragoi et al. (` = 8) 24384
Dragoi et al. (` = 9) 21675
Zhang 16384
Liao and Shu 16384
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Figure 3.4: Capacity-fidelity curve (Airplane).
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Figure 3.5: Capacity-fidelity curve (Lena).
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Figure 3.6: Capacity-fidelity curve (Peppers).
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Figure 3.7: Capacity-fidelity curve (Zelda).
Capacity-Fidelity Curve
We evaluate the fidelity of marked images under the given capacity. The quality of
recovered images will be measured later. The test results of the capacity-fidelity
(rate-distortion) curves are shown in Fig. 3.4 to Fig. 3.7. Let the pixels specified by
coordinates i and j be denoted by ui,j and its marked version by u0i,j . The fidelity of
a marked image is measured by
PSNR = 10⇥ log10
2552
MSE
, (3.31)
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where the mean squared error (MSE) is calculated by
MSE =
P512
i=1
P512
j=1(ui,j   u0i,j)2
512⇥ 512 . (3.32)
It can be seen that a superior rate-distortion performance over the prior art is
achieved when the 4th bit plane is set as the watermarking channel, namely when
t = 4. It can also be observed that a striking decline in performance occurs when
t = 6, causing the proposed scheme and [209] to be inferior to [180] and [182]. The
changes in the 6th bit plane cause severe distortions in visual quality of marked
images. Nevertheless, choosing a more significant bit plane as the watermarking
channel would enhance the reversibility, namely the probability to recover a perfect
copy. Overall, our scheme achieves high fidelity due to the fact that the watermarking
process does not necessarily alter all the bits of changeable symbols, and attains
high capacity by embedding two bits into each changeable symbol for the most part.
Hence, under the same fidelity constraint, the proposed scheme reaches a higher
embedding rate, and vice versa.
Reversibility
The reversibility refers to the ability to recover the altered pixels. As aforementioned,
we assumed that the number of changeable pixels is  N , where N is the total number
of pixels of a carrier image and   is the ratio of selected changeable pixels. A more
precise value for the number of changeable pixels is calculated by
⇠
H   2
2
⇡
⇥
⇠
W   2
2
⇡
+
 
H   2
2
⌫
⇥
 
W   2
2
⌫
, (3.33)
where H and W denotes the height and width of an image. Hence, there are in total
130050 changeable pixels for an image of size 512⇥ 512.
The reversibility strongly depends on the accuracy of a given predictive model.
Table 3.11 presents the weight parameters of the applied predictive model as well as
its average prediction error, as calculated by
Error =
P130050
i=1 |ui   u˜i|
130050
, (3.34)
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Table 3.2: Average prediction error
 N  S  E  W Error
Airplance 0.2474 0.2191 0.2786 0.2564 2.84
Lena 0.4046 0.4075 0.0935 0.0954 3.07
Pappers 0.2574 0.2860 0.2461 0.2125 4.03
Zelda 0.4770 0.4760 0.0240 0.0237 2.20
Table 3.3: Recovery rates for each bit plane
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
Airplance 60.86% 60.57% 75.94% 88.73% 95.42% 98.95% 99.97% 100.00%
Lena 56.78% 56.67% 69.21% 85.72% 95.81% 99.34% 99.98% 100.00%
Pappers 55.14% 55.26% 64.52% 79.26% 93.25% 98.68% 99.87% 100.00%
Zelda 57.50% 57.56% 71.26% 89.92% 99.24% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00%
where ui denotes the original value of a changeable pixel and u˜i denotes its estimated
value. Overall, the predictive model is content-adaptive with low prediction error
on average. Table 3.3 shows the rates of correct recovery of altered bits by purely
considering the pairwise distances. The aim is to test and analyse to what extent
the predictive model is capable of assisting the recovery of flipped bits.
Let ui be an original pixel, u¯i be its altered counterpart with the tth bit being
flipped, and u˜i be its estimated value generated from the predictive model. We
model the problem as to resolve which of the values, ui or u¯i, is more likely to be
the original value. To decide which one is the original pixel value, we calculate their
respective distances to u˜i and determine the original pixel value as the closer one.
In the real context, ui and u¯i are two possible candidates to be disambiguated and
we do not know which one is the original one. Nonetheless, in order to evaluate the
rate of successful recovery, we assume the fact that ui is the original one is known
and hence the rate of successful recovery is computed by
Rate =
P130050
i=1 ⌧i
130050
, (3.35)
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where
⌧i =
8>><>>:
1, if |ui   u˜i|  |u¯i   u˜i|,
0, otherwise.
(3.36)
As anticipated, it is much easier to recover the bits from a significant bit plane than
an insignificant bit plane. Note that this recovery rate does not represent the real
recovery rate because in the proposed recovery process we calculate the accumulated
distances for a group of pixels that together form a symbol, instead of considering
individually one pixel after another.
Tables 3.4 to 3.7 show the average reversibility from 500 trails of experiments
with di↵erent payload settings (4096, 8192, and 16384 bits). In each trail, we generate
a random payload and assign a new watermarking key for randomly selecting `
changeable pixels to form a symbol. The reversibility is measured by the probability
of perfect recovery denoted by Pr and the average PSNR of recovered images. In
spite of the fact that the watermark extraction process and carrier recovery process
are independent in the proposed scheme, it is not the case for the prior art. In the
prior art, failing to recover the carrier image causes a mistaken watermark decoding.
Thus, we also include the number of incorrect bits being extracted as one of the
measurements, as denoted by Bits. It can be observed that the selected tth bit plane
plays a pivotal role in the reversibility. It is scarcely possible to restore a perfect
copy when embedding payloads into an insignificant bit plane (t = 4) and it is more
likely to achieve a perfect recovery when a more significant bit plane is used to carry
the payloads (t = 6). Apart from this, the number of pixels forming a symbol also
has substantial impact on carrier signal recovery. By comparing the cases of ` = 6
and ` = 9, it can be seen that the reversibility is significantly higher when more
pixels are grouped together to form a symbol. For [180] and [182], a perfect recovery
is barely possible. For [209], a superior reversibility can be achieved under small
payload setting (4096 to 8192 bits). Nevertheless, the proposed scheme is in general
of higher reversibility when large payloads are applied (16384 bits). Furthermore,
the proposed scheme is able to extract the watermark bits without any errors.
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Table 3.4: Reversibility (Airplane).
Airplane (4096 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 58.10 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 59.90 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.06 64.79 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.67 68.51 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 59.47 50.67
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 64.05 12.16
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.92 64.43 1.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 1.00 1 0.00
Zhang 0.00 51.07 170.86
Liao and Shu 0.00 60.18 16.46
Airplane (8192 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 55.11 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 56.86 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 62.37 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.40 68.31 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 56.36 102.86
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 60.20 28.74
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.90 64.14 1.10
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 0.88 62.40 1.09
Zhang 0.00 47.15 1174.80
Liao and Shu 0.00 56.82 130.75
Airplane (16384 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 52.06 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 53.75 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 58.82 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.18 66.60 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 52.15 270.65
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 54.84 97.39
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 55.97 7.48
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 0.35 60.87 1.69
Zhang 0.00 43.17 3061.40
Liao and Shu 0.00 53.89 258.96
Table 3.5: Reversibility (Lena).
Lena (4096 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 57.47 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 58.75 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.64 67.91 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.92 69.26 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 58.34 65.37
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 62.35 17.67
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.98 64.43 1.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 1.00 1 0.00
Zhang 0.00 54.13 55.30
Liao and Shu 00.0 60.21 12.00
Lena (8192 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 54.47 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 55.83 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.05 65.85 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.69 68.85 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 55.28 132.05
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 58.74 39.98
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.97 64.43 1.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 0.89 62.67 1.00
Zhang 0.00 46.58 1232.30
Liao and Shu 0.99 55.47 161.53
Lena (16384 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 51.46 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 58.81 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 62.54 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.51 68.65 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 51.54 311.81
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 54.44 106.84
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 56.28 7.06
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 0.23 60.69 1.80
Zhang 0.00 43.50 2502.00
Liao and Shu 0.00 52.56 315.26
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Table 3.6: Reversibility (Peppers).
Peppers (4096 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 54.40 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 58.75 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 62.81 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.41 67.65 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 56.69 95.50
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 59.82 31.31
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.93 64.23 1.07
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 1.00 1 0.00
Zhang 0.00 52.02 93.40
Liao and Shu 0.00 56.01 35.90
Peppers (8192 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 51.34 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 51.77 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 59.25 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.26 65.62 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 53.61 193.58
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 56.04 74.16
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.87 64.19 1.08
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 0.75 62.25 1.14
Zhang 0.00 45.21 1645.5
Liao and Shu 0.00 52.82 282.05
Peppers (16384 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 48.35 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 48.77 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 56.07 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.04 64.07 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 49.35 515.57
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 50.94 238.70
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.00 52.39 16.51
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 0.04 57.72 3.52
Zhang 0.00 41.96 3443.70
Liao and Shu 0.00 50.01 537.5
Table 3.7: Reversibility (Zelda).
Zelda (4096 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 63.10 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 66.17 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.96 69.20 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 1.00 1 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 61.35 32.91
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 66.92 6.61
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 1.00 1 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 1.00 1 0.00
Zhang 0.00 60.80 12.46
Liao and Shu 0.00 67.89 3.00
Zelda (8192 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 60.10 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 63.18 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.93 70.06 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 1.00 1 0
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 58.35 65.41
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 63.13 14.82
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 1.00 1 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 0.92 62.48 1.06
Zhang 0.00 46.80 1122.00
Liao and Shu 0.00 56.74 122.62
Zelda (16384 bits)
Pr PSNR Bits
Proposed (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 57.10 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 60.01 0.00
Proposed (` = 6, t = 6) 0.92 70.71 0.00
Proposed (` = 9, t = 6) 0.99 70.20 0.00
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 4) 0.00 54.68 151.57
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 4) 0.00 59.05 37.31
Dragoi et al. (` = 6, t = 6) 0.01 57.05 5.97
Dragoi et al. (` = 9, t = 6) 0.40 61.32 1.50
Zhang 0.00 44.03 2142.30
Liao and Shu 0.00 53.90 233.25
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3.2 A Scheme Using Lexicographic Permutations
Privacy-preserving reversible watermarking, as a subfield of secure signal processing,
has received a growing research attention in the recent years due to privacy concerns
in cloud computing. In general, the cloud is assumed to be an honest-but-curious or
semi-honest party that is interested in learning the information from the protocol
(e.g. the plaintext), but does not deviate from the protocol specification. This
research problem is challenging since an imperceptible alteration in the ciphertext
domain may cause a nontrivial distortion in the plaintext domain. If a cryptosystem
is perfectly secure, it is theoretically not possible to foresee how a change in the
ciphertext domain would result in a change in the plaintext domain.
There are a variety of possible applications of privacy-preserving reversible
watermarking. Consider a network administrator whose responsibility is to monitor
data transmissions. It is of crucial importance to prevent classified documents from
leakage beyond this point, and yet the privilege to read the documents may not be
granted to the administrator. To address this issue, we may encrypt the document
and embed a watermark in the ciphertext that indicates the confidentiality and
prohibits unauthorised transmission when detected. In the meantime, we also design
an algorithm that is able to determine the existence of such a watermark, and if
detected, refuses to transmit the ciphertext unless the privilege is demonstrated.
In this section, we present a novel reversible watermarking scheme for data
exfiltration prevention. This scheme enables the cloud to embed labels that indicate
the degree of confidentiality into the encrypted documents in such a way that the
network administrator can monitor the document exfiltration through detecting the
labels in the encrypted domain without compromising data privacy. An e cient
watermarking algorithm is devised primarily based upon the concept of lexicographic
permutations. In addition to this, a content-adaptive signal estimation mechanism
is constructed for assisting host media recovery. Experimental results show that
the proposed scheme outperforms the state-of-the-art with regards to watermarking
capacity, fidelity, and recoverability.
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3.2.1 Lexicographic Permutations
To begin with, we introduce a privacy-preserving reversible watermarking scheme
based upon lexicographic permutations and then present an updated scheme with
detailed discussions. An overview of the proposed scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3.8.
The encoding process utilises lexicographic permutations to embed watermarks
into encrypted signals, whereas the decoding process extracts the watermarks and
recovers the signals in aid of a content-adaptive signal estimation mechanism. In
more detail, the transmitter encrypts a host array of symbols s with a key k and
then uploads the encrypted array of symbols e to the cloud. A watermark w is
encoded into e producing a marked array ✏w which is then downloaded to the
receiver. At the receiving end, w is extracted and a permutation group containing
the original encrypted array, denoted by {✏i}ti=0, is generated. After decryption, a
group containing the original array, denoted by { i}ti=0, is yielded. Eventually, the
original array is restored with the assistance of additional information, denoted by s˜,
obtained by a signal estimation mechanism. We would like to emphasise that the
restoration is not perfectly lossless and the aim is to achieve the restoration quality
as high as possible.
encrypter encoder
k w
Transmitter Cloud
s e ✏w
a
b decoder decrypter recoverer
w k s˜
Receiver
✏w {✏i}ti=1 { i}ti=1 s
a
b
a
b
Figure 3.8: An overview of the proposed scheme based on lexicographic permutations.
Consider the host signal as an 8-bit greyscale image. In order to satisfy the
fidelity requirement, significant bit-planes should not be modified during watermark
embedding process. We assume that the four most significant bit-planes are un-
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modifiable, though the scheme permits variations in implementations depending
on di↵erent fidelity requirements. Let us refer to the remaining four insignificant
bit-planes as a nybble-volume, where the basic unit is a nybble, namely, a four-bit
aggregation. While this nybble-volume is generally modifiable, only a portion of
the nybbles are selected for carrying the payload and the rest part is kept intact for
the purpose of reversing watermarking distortions. The selection follows a rule that
each selected nybble is encircled by eight unselected immediate neighbours. The
unselected nybbles will remain intact and be exploited for estimating the selected
nybbles during the reverse process. A nybble can be represented by an integer
between 0 and 15. Let a sequence of r modifiable nybbles be converted into an
integer, referred to as a host symbol, between 0 and N   1, where N = 24r.
Let us divide the host symbols into non-overlapping arrays of length n and
each array can be processed independently. Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) be an array of
modifiable host symbols and k = (k1, k2, . . . , kn) be an array of randomly generated
key symbols. The transmitter encrypts the former with the latter by
e ⌘ s+ k (mod N). (3.37)
Note that the array arithmetic operations are carried out element by element. Then,
the transmitter uploads the enciphered array e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) along with the
watermark w to the cloud, in which the watermark encoding is realised through
lexicographic permutations. Before proceeding further, let us define the number
of permutations of a given set. If the set of size n consists of n distinct elements,
the number of permutations is simply the factorial of n, denoted by n!. If the set
consists of repeated elements, then the multiplicity of each element shall be taken
into account. Let M be a multiset of size n consisting of l distinct elements and the
multiplicities of the elements be m1, m2, . . . , ml. The number of permutations of
M is then given by
t =
n!
m1!m2! . . .ml!
. (3.38)
Let G✏ = {✏0,✏1, . . . ,✏t 1} be a group consisting of all the possible permutations
of e sorted with lexicographic order, where ✏u = e and 0  u  t   1. A possible
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watermarking strategy is to encode a payload of log2 t bits into one of the possible
permutations. For instance, if an encrypted array e and a message 0  w  t   1
are encoded into ✏w, during the decoding process we can e ciently determine w as
the lexicographic order of ✏w. Note that the watermark extraction process is carried
out in the encrypted domain. As a result, the network administrator can inspect
the decoded watermark to decide whether the host file has been given approval to
be transmit beyond this point without actually inspecting the file itself. In other
words, this scheme prevents data exfiltration without compromising data privacy.
Apart from knowing the watermark information, we can also be certain about that e
is one of the possible permutations of ✏w, though we are not able to recognise which
it is in the absence of further information. At the receiving end, one may want to
remove the distortions caused by watermarking. Since it is theoretically not possible
to make inferences from the encrypted data, we decipher each possible one by
 i ⌘ ✏i   k (mod N), (3.39)
and obtain G  = { 0, 1, . . . , t 1}. As a result, we can employ signal processing
techniques to analyse each  i and draw an inference on the original one in which some
distinguishable structures may inhere. However, failed inferences may occur with
high probability when we happen to process a sequence of intrinsically similar host
symbols and a sequence of intrinsically similar key symbols. For example, consider
s = (s1, s2) and k = (k1, k2) such that s1 ⇡ s2 and k1 ⇡ k2. We encrypt s into e and
then encode e into either ✏0 or ✏1 depending on whether w = 0 or w = 1. Assume
that e is of the 0-th permutation order, namely, ✏0 = e, and accordingly
✏0 = (e1, e2) = (s1 + k1, s2 + k2),
✏1 = (e2, e1) = (s2 + k2, s1 + k1).
(3.40)
In order to recover the original permutation, we decrypt respectively ✏0 and ✏1 into
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 0 and  1, as given by
 0 = ✏0   k = (s1, s2),
 1 = ✏1   k = (s2 + k2   k1, s1 + k1   k2).
(3.41)
If s1 ⇡ s2 and k1 ⇡ k2, then  0 ⇡  1. We can observe that in this case  0 is
indistinguishable from  1.
3.2.2 Invertible Transform
In the previous scheme, we permute e lexicographically and obtain a lexicon, or a
codebook, for watermark encoding. To overcome the ambiguity in some extreme
cases, we update the previous scheme by introducing an invertible transform to e
prior to the creation of the lexicon. Let  (N) be Euler’s totient function which
describes the number of positive integers up to N that relatively prime to N . A
positive integer that is coprime to N is termed a totative of N . Suppose that e is the
u-th permutation. We multiply e with the u-th totative, denoted by pu, and obtain
e0 ⌘ e · pu (mod N). (3.42)
An important property of the above computation is that an inverse transform exists,
which is given by
e ⌘ e0 · qu (mod N), (3.43)
where qu is a unique modular multiplicative inverse of pu with respect to the modulus
N , that is,
pu · qu ⌘ 1 (mod N). (3.44)
A unique modular multiplicative inverse qu exists if and only if pu is coprime to N ,
that is, gcd(pu, N) = 1, where gcd stands for greatest common divisor. The number
of permutations of e0 is also t since the transform from e to e0 is a bijective mapping.
We sort the permutations of e0 lexicographically and form an ordered lexicon
G✏ = {✏0,✏1, . . . ,✏t 1} and encode a watermark w of log2 t bits into one of the
permutations yielding the marked result ✏w. In the decoding phase, w can be
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e ciently recognised by the order of ✏w. Let {p0, p1 . . . , pt 1} be the first t totatives
in [0, N ], and {q1, . . . , qt} be their respective modular multiplicative inverses. To
restore the original array, we choose any ✏i from the lexicon and multiply it with
each multiplicative inverse yielding G↵ = {↵0,↵1, . . . ,↵t 1}, where
↵0 ⌘ ✏i · q0 (mod N),
↵1 ⌘ ✏i · q1 (mod N),
· · ·
↵t 1 ⌘ ✏i · qt 1 (mod N).
(3.45)
Then, we sort the elements in each array with the lexicographic order in accordance
to the array index and yield an updated group of arrays G  = { 0,  1, . . . ,  t 1}.
For instance, the elements in ↵i is sorted with the i-th lexicographic order yielding
 i. Note that the choice of ✏i does not a↵ect the resultant G ; in other words,
any ✏i yields the same group of results. The u-th array in G↵ is the original
encrypted array with scrambled elements, whereas the u-th array in G  is exactly
the original encrypted array, namely  u = e. Since it is not possible to distinguish
the original array in the encrypted domain, we decipher each array in G  and obtain
G  = { 0, 1, . . . , t 1}. With the aid of signal analysis techniques, we can retrieve
the original one, namely  u, with relatively low error rate. Let us see how this
updated scheme is able to resolve the aforementioned ambiguity. Again, consider
two host symbols and two key symbols such that s1 ⇡ s2 and k1 ⇡ k2. Assume that
e is of the 0-th permutation order and accordingly e0 = e · p0. Then, we encode e0
into either ✏0 or ✏1 depending on the watermark bit. In the recovering phase, two
possible candidates are generated by
 0 =  0   k = sort(↵0, 0)  k = sort(✏i · q0, 0)  k,
 1 =  1   k = sort(↵1, 1)  k = sort(✏i · q1, 1)  k,
(3.46)
where sort(x, i) denote a sorting function that sorts the elements of an array x
according to the i-th lexicographic permutation, and ✏i can be either ✏0 or ✏1. We
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further derive that
sort(✏i · q0, 0)  k = ((s1 + k1)p0q0   k1, (s2 + k2) · p0q0   k2) = (s1, s2), (3.47)
and  1 equals to either
sort(✏i · q1, 1)  k = ((s1 + k1)p0q1   k1, (s2 + k2) · p0q1   k2), (3.48)
or
sort(✏i · q1, 1)  k = ((s2 + k2)p0q1   k1, (s1 + k1) · p0q1   k2). (3.49)
In either case, two candidates are not likely to be similar since the term puqv, where
u 6= v, thoroughly randomise the incorrect candidate; in other words, the original
array should be very distinguishable from a sequence of random numbers with high
probability.
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Figure 3.9: Pixels at the block positions are modifiable in terms of their low nybbles,
whereas those at the white positions are unmodifiable.
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3.2.3 Predictive Model
To complete the proposed scheme, we devise a signal estimation mechanism for
assisting host signal recovery. As aforementioned, for an 8-bit greyscale image we
embed payloads into selected low nybbles while each of which is encircled by eight
unselected immediate neighbours, as illustrated in Fig. 3.9. The aim is to estimate
the low nybble of a pixel p0 with the aid of the high nybble of p0 and the neighbouring
pixels p1, p2, . . . , p8. Image regions can be roughly divided into smooth, edge-carrying,
and highly textured patches. Due to the fact that the statistical distribution of pixel
values varies a lot in di↵erent regions, we have to identify the class the observed p0
belongs to. Let
M(X) =
1
 
 X
i=1
|xi   µ(X)| (3.50)
represent the mean absolute deviation (MAD), where µ(X) represents the arithmetic
mean and   represents the number of elements in a given set X. The score for
smooth patches is given by
 smth =M(p1, p2, . . . , p8), (3.51)
and the scores for di↵erent degrees of edges are given by
 0  =
M(p1, p2, p3) +M(p4, p5) +M(p6, p7, p8)
3
,
 45  =
M(p2, p4) +M(p3, p6) +M(p5, p7)
3
,
 90  =
M(p1, p4, p6) +M(p2, p7) +M(p3, p5, p8)
3
,
 135  =
M(p2, p5) +M(p1, p8) +M(p4, p7)
3
.
(3.52)
Let the minimum value of { smth,  0  ,  45  ,  90  ,  135 } be denoted by  min. If  min is
no greater than a threshold ✓ (empirically ✓ = 15), then we calculate an anticipated
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value for p0 by
p˜0 =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
µ(p1, p2, . . . , p8) if  min =  smth,
µ(p4, p5) if  min =  0  ,
µ(p3, p6) if  min =  45  ,
µ(p2, p7) if  min =  90  ,
µ(p1, p8) if  min =  135  .
(3.53)
Otherwise, an anticipated value for p0 is determined by the closest value in the
neighbouring area, that is,
p˜0 = argmin
pi
| pi   p0 |, (3.54)
where i 2 {1, 2, . . . , 8}. Finally, we estimate p0’s low nybble in such a way that the
resultant pixel value approaches the anticipated value p˜0, as formulated by
p˜⇤0 = argmin
p0,j
| p0,j   p˜0 |, (3.55)
where j 2 {0, 1, . . . , 15} and p0,j denotes a value generated by setting p0’s low nybble
to one of the possible patterns.
3.2.4 Experiments
A series of experiments were carried out for validating and evaluating the proposed
scheme. Images of size 512 ⇥ 512 with 256 greylevels are used as the host media,
as shown in Fig. 3.10. The scheme utilises a synchronous stream cipher to encrypt
images and is therefore semantically secure, as presented in Fig. 3.11. Let the
number of host symbols in each array be fixed to n = 4. Each symbol is formed by r
modifiable nybbles, where r is set from 2 to 5, and correspondingly the symbol values
lie in [0, 31], [0, 63], [0, 127], [0, 255], and [0, 511], respectively. The experimental
results are shown in Table 3.8. Since the total number of modifiable nybbles is
invariable, the total number of host symbols decreases when each symbol is formed
by more nybbles, which explains the inverse proportionality between watermarking
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capacity and r. We can also observe that the error rate of image recovery reduces
and the fidelity of recovered images improves as r increases. When a symbol is made
of more nybbles, it is more likely that it consists largely of well-estimated nybbles,
which is of crucial importance to the recovery process. Let pi,j denote the pixel at
the i-th row and the j-th column, and pˆi,j denote its noisy counterpart. We evaluate
the image quality by peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) defined as
PSNR = 10⇥ log10
2552
MSE
, (3.56)
where mean square error (MSE) is calculated by
MSE =
1
512⇥ 512
512X
i=1
512X
j=1
(pi,j   pˆi,j)2. (3.57)
Fig. 3.12 shows the marked images generated by embedding the payload into all the
modifiable nybbles. It is shown that the PSNRs of various test images are all no
less than 40.7 dB. Fig. 3.13 shows the recovered images generated by adjusting the
embedding rate to 0.057 bits per pixel (bpp). The results show that the PSNRs are
all greater than 51.9 dB.
We compare the proposed scheme with the state-of-the-art schemes [182, 187,
209] in terms of watermarking capacity, fidelity, and recoverability. As can be seen
from Fig. 3.14, the proposed scheme outperforms the previous methods with regard
to the fidelity of marked images under the same embedding rate. As reported in Fig.
3.15, the proposed scheme also achieves the best results with respect to the fidelity
of recovered images given the same amount of payload. Overall, it is evident that
the proposed scheme achieves a substantial improvement in algorithm performance.
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(a) Airplane (b) Lena (c) O ce
(d) Sail (e) Wine (f) Zelda
Figure 3.10: Test images.
(a) Airplane (b) Lena (c) O ce
(d) Sail (e) Wine (f) Zelda
Figure 3.11: Encrypted images.
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(a) Airplane (b) Lena (c) O ce
(d) Sail (e) Wine (f) Zelda
Figure 3.12: Marked images: (a) Airplane, PSNR= 40.88 dB. (b) Lena, PSNR=
40.74 dB. (c) O ce, PSNR= 40.72 dB. (d) Sail, PSNR= 40.71 dB. (e) Wine, PSNR=
40.91 dB. (f) Zelda, PSNR= 40.90 dB.
(a) Airplane (b) Lena (c) O ce
(d) Sail (e) Wine (f) Zelda
Figure 3.13: Recovered images: (a) Airplane, PSNR= 52.87 dB. (b) Lena, PSNR=
51.96 dB. (c) O ce, PSNR= 54.01 dB. (d) Sail, PSNR= 53.17 dB. (e) Wine, PSNR=
53.75 dB. (f) Zelda, PSNR= 52.39 dB.
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Figure 3.14: Comparison with the state-of-the-art in terms of fidelity. The horizontal
axis displays the watermarking capacity, whereas the vertical axis shows the PSNR
of marked images.
76
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Capacity (bits) ×104
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
P
S
N
R
(d
B
)
Proposed
Liao and Shu
Zhang
Dragoi et al.
(a) Airplane
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Capacity (bits) ×104
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
P
S
N
R
(d
B
)
Proposed
Liao and Shu
Zhang
Dragoi et al.
(b) Lena
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Capacity (bits) ×104
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
P
S
N
R
(d
B
)
Proposed
Liao and Shu
Zhang
Dragoi et al.
(c) O ce
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Capacity (bits) ×104
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
P
S
N
R
(d
B
)
Proposed
Liao and Shu
Zhang
Dragoi et al.
(d) Sail
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Capacity (bits) ×104
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
P
S
N
R
(d
B
)
Proposed
Liao and Shu
Zhang
Dragoi et al.
(e) Wine
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Capacity (bits) ×104
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
P
S
N
R
(d
B
)
Proposed
Liao and Shu
Zhang
Dragoi et al.
(f) Zelda
Figure 3.15: Comparison with the state-of-the-art with regard to recoverability. The
horizontal axis depicts the watermarking capacity, whereas the vertical axis presents
the PSNR of recovered images.
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Table 3.8: Scheme performance at di↵erent number of nybbles per symbol (r = 2, 3,
4, and 5). WR is watermarking rate (in bpp), ER is error rate (in bpp), and PSNR
is peak signal-to-noise ratio (in dB).
r = 2 r = 3
WR ER PSNR WR ER PSNR
Airplane 0.143 0.094 46.86 0.095 0.049 49.43
Lena 0.143 0.120 45.95 0.095 0.066 48.21
O ce 0.143 0.041 50.65 0.095 0.023 50.02
Sail 0.143 0.096 46.97 0.095 0.047 49.84
Wine 0.143 0.051 49.84 0.095 0.027 52.39
Zelda 0.143 0.088 47.77 0.095 0.042 50.72
r = 4 r = 5
WR ER PSNR WR ER PSNR
Airplane 0.072 0.034 50.81 0.057 0.021 52.87
Lena 0.072 0.040 50.36 0.057 0.026 51.96
O ce 0.072 0.020 53.59 0.057 0.017 54.01
Sail 0.072 0.027 52.16 0.057 0.020 53.17
Wine 0.072 0.020 53.48 0.057 0.019 53.75
Zelda 0.072 0.022 53.08 0.057 0.020 53.39
Table 3.9: Comparisons of two proposed schemes with respect to PSNR of marked
images and recovered images under the same capacity.
Capacity: 4096 bits
Airplane Lena Mandrill
QUADRA LEXICO QUADRA LEXICO QUADRA LEXICO
(l = 9, t = 6) (n = 3, r = 3) (l = 6, t = 6) (n = 6, r = 3) (l = 9, t = 6) (n = 6, r = 1)
marked images 33.69 44.43 34.73 47.13 33.70 51.47
recovered images 1 66.27 1 65.35 59.20 51.89
Capacity: 8192 bits
Airplane Lena Mandrill
QUADRA LEXICO QUADRA LEXICO QUADRA LEXICO
(l = 6, t = 6) (n = 4, r = 3) (l = 7, t = 6) (n = 6, r = 1) (l = 8, t = 6) (n = 6, r = 1)
marked images 31.79 42.70 31.30 48.31 30.35 48.49
recovered images 67.44 64.28 1 59.63 54.28 49.08
Capacity: 16384 bits
Airplane Lena Mandrill
QUADRA LEXICO QUADRA LEXICO QUADRA LEXICO
(l = 9, t = 6) (n = 5, r = 2) (l = 9, t = 6) (n = 6, r = 1) (l = 8, t = 6) (n = 6, r = 1)
marked images 27.73 42.12 27.66 45.41 27.33 45.51
recovered images 67.44 56.75 1 55.01 52.48 46.19
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3.3 Comparisons of Two Proposed Schemes
In this section, we compare the performance of two proposed schemes in terms of
the following two aspects:
• visual quality of marked images and recovered images under the same capacity;
• execution time.
The quadratic residue-based method (QUADRA) is parameterised by l and t, rep-
resenting that a host symbol is formed by the t-th bits of l pixels. The visual
quality of marked images decreases when a higher bit-plane is used to form the host
symbols (i.e. greater t) and on the other hand the visual quality of recovered images
increases. The lexicographic permutation-based method (LEXICO) is parameterised
by r denoting the number of low nibbles to form a host symbol and n denoting the
number of host symbols to form a permutation group. The embedding capacity grows
with the number of possible permutations, which is associated with the number of
host symbols in a permutation group.
In Table 3.9, it can be observed that under the same capacity constraints
(4096, 8192, and 16384 bits respectively), LEXICO achieved higher PSNR of marked
images, while QUADRA yielded higher PSNR of recovered images. In addition
to this, QUADRA realised perfect recovery in some cases in contrast to LEXICO.
For each method, we evaluated the encoding time (watermark embedding) and
decoding time (watermark extraction and image recovery) given 4096 payload bits.
As shown in Table 3.10, the execution time of QUADRA did not have noticeable
fluctuations under di↵erent settings of parameters, which contrasted sharply with
that of LEXICO. The decoding time of LEXICO grew with n. It can also be seen
from Table 3.11 that LEXICO took much more time for watermark extraction and
image recovery when embedding more bits of information.
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Table 3.10: Evaluation of execution time (in second)
parameters encoding time decoding time
QUADRA
l = 6, t = 4 0.73 2.22
l = 6, t = 5 0.69 2.20
l = 6, t = 6 0.69 2.19
l = 7, t = 4 0.77 2.47
l = 7, t = 5 0.77 2.39
l = 7, t = 6 0.78 2.41
l = 8, t = 4 0.68 2.59
l = 8, t = 5 0.67 2.55
l = 8, t = 6 0.69 2.50
l = 9, t = 4 0.73 2.65
l = 9, t = 5 0.73 2.64
l = 9, t = 6 0.73 2.68
LEXICO
n = 2, r = 1 1.35 2.28
n = 2, r = 2 1.13 2.45
n = 2, r = 3 1.17 2.79
n = 3, r = 1 0.67 1.75
n = 3, r = 2 0.56 1.73
n = 3, r = 3 0.54 1.96
n = 4, r = 1 0.46 2.42
n = 4, r = 2 0.38 2.68
n = 4, r = 3 0.37 2.88
n = 5, r = 1 0.40 7.27
n = 5, r = 2 0.33 9.59
n = 5, r = 3 0.33 10.01
Table 3.11: Growth of execution time (in second)
parameters encoding time decoding time
capacity 4096 16384 4096 16384
n = 2, r = 1 1.35 4.72 2.28 8.84
n = 2, r = 2 1.13 4.60 2.45 9.86
n = 2, r = 3 1.17 3.10 2.79 7.50
n = 3, r = 1 0.67 2.51 1.75 6.75
n = 3, r = 2 0.56 2.20 1.73 7.15
n = 3, r = 3 0.54 2.29 1.96 7.86
n = 4, r = 1 0.46 1.77 2.42 9.78
n = 4, r = 2 0.38 1.55 2.68 10.84
n = 4, r = 3 0.37 1.52 2.88 11.87
n = 5, r = 1 0.40 1.55 7.27 30.76
n = 5, r = 2 0.33 1.34 9.59 39.04
n = 5, r = 3 0.33 1.32 10.01 40.73
n = 6, r = 1 0.40 2.41 7.27 226.76
n = 6, r = 2 0.33 2.28 9.59 307.42
n = 6, r = 3 0.33 2.28 10.01 317.41
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3.4 Summary
In this chapter, two novel reversible information hiding schemes are introduced for
embedding watermarks into encrypted images in cloud computing environments.
These techniques can be used for data breach protection and also other potential
real-world applications. We adopt a secure and e cient symmetric-key cipher for
image encryption.
The first scheme utilises the arithmetic of quadratic residues for watermark
embedding. In addition to this, a content-adaptive predictive model based upon the
projection theorem is devised to fulfil the requirement of recovering the original copy.
Experimental results show that in most cases the proposed scheme outperforms the
prior art in terms of capacity, fidelity and reversibility.
The second scheme embeds payloads into encrypted images via lexicographic
permutations. We derive further an updated version of the scheme in order to
minimise the error rate in host recovery. In addition to this, a content-adaptive signal
estimation mechanism based upon image edge gradients is devised for assisting the
carrier signal recovery process. Experimental results show a remarkable breakthrough
over the state-of-the-art in capacity, fidelity, and recoverability.
It is expected that the research in this field will continue to move forwards.
From our perspective, privacy-preserving reversible information hiding will find
more real-world applications in the near future because it has evolved the classical
information hiding to address security and privacy issues in many new technologies.
Its reversibility is also a desirable feature for many artificial intelligence aided
automated systems in which the available perfect copies are of great significance to
the system performance. Minimisation of error rate in carrier signal recovery entails
further investigation.
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Chapter 4
Information Hiding Based on
Asymmetric Cryptography
Sitting in the intersection of watermarking and cryptography, privacy-aware revers-
ible watermarking permits a party to entrust the task of embedding to a cloud service
provider without compromising information privacy. The early development of
schemes were primarily based upon traditional symmetric-key cryptosystems, which
involve an extra implementation cost of key exchange. Although recent research
attentions have been drawn to schemes compatible with asymmetric-key cryptosys-
tems, there are notable limitations in the practical aspects. In particular, the host
signal must either be enciphered in a redundant way or be pre-processed prior to
encryption, which would largely limit the storage e ciency and scheme universality.
To relax the restrictions, we propose a novel research paradigm and devise di↵erent
schemes compatible with di↵erent asymmetric-key homomorphic cryptosystems. In
the proposed schemes, the encoding function works in a way similar to noise addition,
whereas the decoding function can be perceived as a corresponding denoising process.
Both online and o✏ine content-adaptive predictors are developed to assist watermark
decoding for various operational requirements. A three-way trade-o↵ between the
capacity, fidelity and reversibility is analysed mathematically and empirically.
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4.1 Privacy-Preserving Reversible Information Hiding
The past decades have witnessed the phenomenal prevalence of public cloud services.
The seemingly unlimited storage and computational capacity of the cloud have
opened up opportunities for businesses and individuals to entrust their data to cloud
service providers. Meanwhile, the rapid development of cloud computing technology
has also raised privacy and security concerns. A powerful solution against cyber
security threats is to obfuscate the classified documents through encryption [149].
On the other hand, although encryption algorithms are widely used to protect the
confidential information, some desirable functionalities might be unrealisable for the
encrypted data. In response to this issue, there was a surge of research interest in
secure signal processing in the encrypted domain [7, 8, 18]. As an emerging topic
in this research field, privacy-aware watermarking has attracted a lot of attention
in recent years. For the reason that many watermarking algorithms are proprietary
properties, there are restrictions for commercial purposes and the availability to the
general public is rather limited. An e cient solution is to request an authorised
cloud service provider to encode the watermark into the given digital media, not only
due to the high computational capacity of the cloud, but also the availability of the
intellectual property right or license to carry out the algorithms. On the other hand,
since the cloud server is regarded as a semi-honest entity that may collect some
information from the digital contents, data privacy should be taken into account.
Therefore, privacy-aware watermarking is intended to the problem of entrusting the
task of watermarking to a cloud server without compromising data privacy. This
research trend is also known as watermarking in the encrypted domain.
In general, there are three parties involved in a watermarking protocol: a
sender who encodes the watermark into the host media, a recipient who decodes
the watermark from the marked media, and an adversary who has a malicious
intent against the protocol. The malicious party is often modelled as a noisy
channel between the encoder and the decoder. The watermarking strategy can be
either fragile or robust against the channel noise depending on the applications.
Conventionally, robust watermarking is applicable to copyright protection [55, 58, 60,
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64], whereas fragile watermarking is advantageous to data authentication [68, 73, 75,
77]. Nevertheless, fragile watermarking, as a temper detection technique, contradict
itself by inevitably inflicting distortions upon the content of media. Although the
distortions are generally imperceptible, the e↵ect could be arguable in particular
circumstances featuring a strict integrity requirement, especially when the host media
is used for military reconnaissance or medical diagnosis. Considering these potential
applications, the notion of reversible watermarking was introduced in order to permit
the reproduction of the original content once the authenticity of media is verified
[104, 118, 119, 125, 126, 210–212].
Consider a watermarking protocol as illustrated in Fig. 4.1, where the sender
Alice wants to communicate a digital content to the receiver Bob over an insecure
channel. In order to resist malicious tampering, Alice has to embed a signature,
which is sensitive against manipulations, into the content prior to dispatching it to
Bob. Supposing that Alice, as a general individual, has no permission or resources
to employ the watermarking algorithm, the task of watermarking has therefore to
be entrusted to a licensed cloud server, e.g. Charlie. As a general presumption,
Charlie is an honest-but-curious party who would not deviate from the protocol
specifications, though on the other hand has the interest in learning the privacy
information of the content. Hence, due to privacy concerns, Alice encrypts the
content prior to commissioning it to Charlie for watermarking. In summary, to
utilise the complementary advantages of watermarking and cryptography, it is of
great significance to develop a secure reversible watermarking system that enables
the watermarking function to be operated by a licensed third party in the encrypted
domain in order to preserve privacy.
The challenge of reversible watermarking in the encrypted domain is a rather
di cult one. Considering that the message is concealed by encryption, we are not
able to observe, analyse, and exploit data redundancy. The early development of
schemes was primarily compatible with symmetric-key cryptosystems [177, 181, 187,
188, 190, 192, 194, 195, 213–215]. These schemes are confronted with a practical
issue that a secret key must be pre-shared between the sender and the recipient. In
order to communicate the secret key, a secure channel resistant to eavesdropping or
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a secure key exchange protocol must be established. Any of these solutions comes
with extra costs.
In contrast to symmetric-key algorithms, asymmetric-key algorithms, also
known as public-key cryptosystems, relax the restriction by using a publicly distrib-
uted key for encryption and a secret key known only to the recipient for decryption.
Over the last few years, the watermarking research has extended to manage ciphers
generated by public-key algorithms. The first class of strategy encrypts the data
in such a manner that the input to the encryption function has a value range that
is far smaller than it should be. Consider that each individual pixel is an input to
be enciphered. The value range of pixels is between 0 and 255 for 8-bit greyscale
images, while the message space of a given cryptosystem is, for example, between
0 and N , where N is the product of two large primes. Therefore, the input space
defined by the watermarking shceme is much smaller than the actual message space
defined by the cryptosystem. In implementation, a number of zeros are concatenated
to the end of the input message to assure the length of input conform with message
space. As a consequence, zero paddings can be viewed as additional redundancy for
accommodating the payload in the encrypted domain [200–202]. It is nevertheless
deficient for the following reasons. First, redundant bits are appended and thus
the system is not space-e cient. Second, it is considered problematic since the
amount of padded redundancy is at least equivalent to that of the payload in most
cases. One may even simply append the payload information after the host signal
in the plaintext domain, rather than performing complex computation to trade the
pre-appended redundancy for the payload in the ciphertext doamin. Third, it is
insecure since the watermark can be easily filtered out by decryption. To overcome
these deficiencies, we suggest to encrypt a bit-stream of su cient length each time,
instead of a single sample with zero-padding.
The second class of strategy, though following the space-saving principle,
requires a specific type of pre-processing to be applied prior to encryption. It utilises
either truncation [205] or self-embedding [206] to shrink the range of sample values
and then encrypts a su cient number of samples each time. As a result, although
the input space seems to be equal to the message space defined by the cryptosystem,
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the actual input space is much smaller. For instance, initially the sample values
range from 0 to 255 and yet subsequent to data pre-processing the possible values are
reduced to a subrange. The reserved space can then be exploited to accommodate
the payload in the encrypted domain. This class of strategy, also known as reserving
room before encryption, was first developed for watermarking schemes to work in
conjunction with symmetric-key cryptosystems [197, 198, 216]. The practicality of
this strategy is however limited because a specific type of pre-processing must be
applied to the data. To remove this restriction, we suggest to encrypt data without
any specific pre-processing.
In this chapter, we address the problem of entrusting the task of watermarking
to a cloud service provider without compromising information privacy. Considering
the security threats of symmetric-key cryptosystems, we study reversible watermark-
ing schemes compatible with public-key cryptosystems. The recent development of
schemes requires the host data either to be enciphered in a redundant fashion or to
be pre-processed prior to encryption. In response to this, we propose a novel research
paradigm to overcome the aforementioned shortcomings. Two schemes are proposed
to cope with ciphers generated by two types of homomorphic cryptosystems, respect-
ively. The first scheme is constructed based upon multiplicative homomorphism and
provides high content fidelity as well as high flexibility in watermarking capacity.
The second scheme is devised based upon additive homomorphism and achieves an
optimal reversibility. In addition to this, both online and o✏ine content-adaptive
predictors are introduced to assist watermark decoding. The former type of predictor
is based upon variational method and utilises an iterative algorithm to approximate
the signal, while the second type of predictor is based upon statistical inference
and pre-trains a probability table for signal estimation. An accurate predictor can
greatly improve the rates of correct watermark extraction and host signal recovery.
Experimental results shows that the proposed predictors achieve the state-of-the-art
performance. In summary, several positive contributions and improvements are made,
which are briefly outlined as follows:
• Modern public-key cryptosystems are adopted to avoid the security risks and
implementation costs of key exchange.
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Figure 4.1: The proposed privacy-preserving reversible information hiding protocol.
A transmitter Alice wants to protect a signal through embedding a watermark,
which can be fulfilled by a cloud service provider Charlie. A marked signal is then
transmitted over an insecure channel to a recipient Bob who is able to verify the
authenticity of the received signal through analysing the extracted watermark and
reproduced signal.
• Reversible watermarking schemes compatible with di↵erent types of partially
homomorphic cryptosystems are studied.
• Storage e ciency is considered by encrypting a su ciently long sequence of
bits, instead of a single sample with redundant zero padding, each time.
• Specific type of data pre-processing prior to encryption is not required, which
enhances the practicality and universality.
• Both online and o✏ine content-adaptive predictors are developed with flexibility
for various operational requirements.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses how
to apply public-key cryptosystems to encrypt digital images. Section 4.3.1 introduces
the proposed watermarking scheme for multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystem.
Section 4.3.2 further derives a scheme for additive homomorphic cryptosystem.
Section 4.4 studies content-adaptive predictors based upon variational method and
statistical inference. Section 4.5 evaluates the scheme performance and makes
comparisons with state-of-the-art algorithms. Section 4.6 concludes our work and
outlines the directions for future research.
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4.2 Image Encryption
As aforementioned, when encrypting a digital image, it is not advisable to consider
each pixel as an individual message. Generally, the value range of pixels is far smaller
than the message space, as the latter is associated with large prime numbers. If a pixel
is treated as a independent message to be encrypted, then a long sequence of zero
bits will be padded after the bits of the pixel. Encrypting every pixel independently
provokes serious ciphertext expansion. Apart from this, if the watermark is embedded
into the padded bits created for accommodating the encryption algorithm, it will
normally be filtered out by decryption. In some applications, this feature would not
be desirable. There are several possible approaches to encrypt digital images without
expanding the image files, for example, converting the image into a bit stream and
encrypting a segment of su cient length each time. In order to preserve the visual
significance, we propose to encipher each bit-plane separately. Let I denote an 8-bit
digital image such that
I = (b1||b2|| . . . ||b8), (4.1)
where ‘||’ is the concatenation operator and b1, b2, . . . , and b8 are eight di↵erent
bit-planes. For each bit-plane
bi = (bi,1||bi,2|| . . . ), (4.2)
we sample a su ciently long bit-stream each time to form a message, which is then
encrypted into a cipher. Supposing that the message space of a given cryptosystem
is Z/NZ, a message is therefore a decimal number of log2N bits, or of blog2Nc bits
more precisely, considering that the former is not necessarily an integer.
The watermarking process is performed sequentially upon the selected mes-
sages until all the payload is embedded, while the unselected ones remain intact. Due
to the fidelity constraint, we only change the messages converted from insignificant
bit-planes. Intuitively, it seems that the optimal choice should be to select messages
of the least significant bit-plane. However, by considering the decoding process, it is
necessary that the selected messages are formed by some well-predictable bits. We
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shall see the reason behind this later. To pave the way for the following presentation,
let us assume that the messages for watermarking have been determined. The map
to record the locations of selected messages serves as the watermarking key. In the
following section, we will discuss separately how to embed watermarks into encrypted
data generated by di↵erent types of cryptosystems.
4.3 Schemes Using Privacy Homomorphisms
In this section, we present a privacy-preserving reversible watermarking scheme for
RSA-like cryptosystem and a scheme for Paillier-like cryptosystem.
4.3.1 RSA-Based Scheme
Let us recapitulate the problem statement. Let Alice denote a sender, Bob a recipient,
and Charlie a cloud server. Suppose that Alice wants to deliver to Bob a digital
file in which a watermark is embedded for authentication purposes. Due to various
constraints (e.g. proprietary issues), Alice has to entrust the task of watermarking
to Charlie by providing the encrypted file and the watermark. The encryption key is
publicly known, while the decryption key is only known to Bob. We assume that the
watermark payload is a sequence of compressed and encrypted digits such that only
the intended recipient Bob is able to decode.
Consider the objective of embedding watermarks into ciphers generated by
a multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystem such as RSA. To begin with, the host
data is divided into binary sequences of the length in accordance with the message
space of the given cryptosystem. Then, each sequence is transformed into an integer
called a symbol. After encryption, a su cient number of enciphered symbols are
selected to carry the watermark payload. We suppose that the selected symbols
are all composed of bits in the l-th bit-plane. To meet the fidelity requirement, the
change of bits in the l-th bit-plane must not cause perceivable degradation on the
visual quality of the image. For conciseness, we describe only how a single host
symbol is processed, as shown in Fig. 4.2.
Let p and q be two large primes and N = p · q. The alphabet of watermark
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Figure 4.2: Watermarking procedures for a selected symbol. Let x be a host symbol
and w be a watermark symbol. Alice encrypts x into E(x). Charlie encodes E(x)
with w into E(y). Bob decrypts E(y) into y and then decodes it into xˆ and wˆ.
symbols is defined as the set of k distinct positive integers up to N that are coprime
to N . Accordingly, we are able to embed log2 k bits of watermark information per
host symbol. The number of positive integers up to N that are relatively prime
to N can be calculated by Euler’s phi function  (N) = (p   1)(q   1) and thus
k   (N). This alphabet, denoted by W = {wi}k 1i=0 , is pre-shared between Alice
and Bob and serves as a codebook so that di↵erent payloads can be represented
by di↵erent watermark symbols. It is worth noting that revealing this pre-shared
alphabet to an attacker does not compromise the security since the alphabet can
be viewed as merely a pre-defined mapping between binary watermark digits to a
special set of integers. Let a host symbol be x 2 Z/NZ and a watermark symbol be
w 2W. To begin with, Alice encrypts x into E(x) and uploads it along with E(w)
to Charlie. The watermarking process is then operated by
E(y) ⌘ E(x) · E(w) ⌘ E(w · x) (mod N). (4.3)
After that, the marked and encrypted symbol E(y) is downloaded and sent to Bob
and is then decrypted into
y ⌘ D(E(y)) ⌘ w · x (mod N). (4.4)
Note that we strictly let w0 = 1 in practice in order to minimise the average distortion.
That is, when w = w0, the marked symbol will be kept intact. The distortion only
occurs when w = wi, 8i 6= 0, is embedded. We know that there exists a unique
modular multiplicative inverse of an arbitrary integer a modulo N if and only if
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gcd(a,N) = 1. Since W is a subset of all integers that are coprime to N , we can
construct the setW = {w 1i }k 1i=0 that comprises of the corresponding unique inverses.
We generate k possible candidates for x in such a way that each is given by
xi ⌘ y · w 1i (mod N). (4.5)
The above congruence can be rewritten as
xi ⌘ x · w · w 1i (mod N). (4.6)
Thus, we see that xi = x if and only if w
 1
i = w
 1. In other words, if we are able to
distinguish x from k possible candidates {xi}k 1i=0 , then we can determine w jointly.
Recall that a selected symbol is composed of bits that can be estimated with a certain
degree of accuracy from some other correlated bits. Let us denote an estimated
symbol for x by x˜. Therefore, the original x is determined by
xˆ = argmin
xi
 (xi, x˜), (4.7)
where   is a general distortion metric (e.g. Hamming distance). The reversibility,
namely the ability to recover the host media, primarily depends on two factors. One
is the number of candidates and the other is the estimation accuracy. The reason is
straightforward that given only a few possibilities and a highly credible clue, there is
a high probability that the answer is correctly deduced. The number of candidates
is governed by the capacity parameter k, whereas the estimation accuracy is related
to the fidelity parameter l. Hence, we summarise that
Capacity / k,
Fidelity / l 1,
Reversibility / l · k 1.
(4.8)
Example. Let us demonstrate the scheme with an example as follows. Assume that
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p = 11, q = 19, and N = 209. Let a payload bit be encoded by
w =
8>><>>:
w0, if the bit is 0,
w1, if the bit is 1,
where w0 and w1 can be any two numbers coprime to 209. Note that w0 is strictly set
to one in practice and we let w1 = 3 in this example. Suppose that Alice has a host
symbol x = 100 and wants to embed a bit one. As a result, the watermark symbol is
given by w = w1. By encryption, Alice outputs E(x) = E(100). After watermarking,
Charlie produces E(y) ⌘ E(3) · E(100) mod 209. By decryption, Bob obtains y = 91,
which is computed by
91 ⌘ 3 · 100 mod 209.
The modular multiplicative inverses of w0 and w1 are w
 1
0 = 1 and w
 1
1 = 70,
respectively. Hence, two candidates for x are x0 = 91 and x1 = 100, which are
computed by
91 ⌘ 91 · 1 mod 209,
100 ⌘ 91 · 70 mod 209,
respectively. Suppose that the approximation of x is x˜ = 102. We distinguish the
original value of x from a given set of candidates by choosing the candidate closest to
x˜ in terms of the Hamming distance, and determine the value of w correspondingly.
The distances are calculated by
 0 =  (91, 102) = 5,
 1 =  (100, 102) = 1,
and therefore the decoding results are xˆ = 100 and wˆ = 3.
It can be observed that the wrong candidate is, theoretically, a random integer.
Thus, if N is su ciently large and the number of candidates to distinguish from is
relatively small, then it is unlikely that randomly drawn integers would be closer to
the approximation of the correct one than the correct one itself.
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Figure 4.3: Watermarking as noise adding. Alice demultiplexes and encrypts the
host signal into encrypted components and then sends each component over either a
noiseless or noisy channel. Bob decrypts and multiplexes the received components
into a noisy signal.
4.3.2 Paillier-Based Scheme
We have seen that the reversibility of the previous scheme is related to the minimum
distance between possible candidates and the correct one. This distance is random
in the case when the multiplicative homomorphism is permitted. To achieve a better
performance, it is desirable to create the distances that are always far enough. We
found that it is possible to construct such a function under an additive homomorphism.
Let us consider embedding watermarks into encrypted data produced by an additive
homomorphic cryptosystem such as the Paillier cryptosystem. For this type of
cryptosystem, there exists an optimal strategy to maximise the Hamming distance
between candidates in a special case that only one bit is embedded per symbol and
there are only two candidates to be distinguished from in the decoding process (i.e.
k = 2). Certainly, there is always a trade-o↵. In this case, it is the non-trivial
data expansion from the message space to the cipher space due to homomorphic
encryption and a little compromise on the fidelity due to distance maximisation.
Before proceeding further, let us introduce another viewpoint of this research
problem, as diagramed in Fig. 4.3. Let Alice be a sender and Bob be a recipient.
There are two communication channels between the two parties: a noiseless channel
and a noisy channel. Let us assume that the noiseless channel is much more expensive
than the noisy one, which complies with our intuition. Suppose that a message can
be decomposed into several pieces of components and each component is transmitted
over one of the channels. Alice wants the communication cost to be as low as possible.
Bob, on the other hand, requires that the core idea of the message must be clear
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and comprehensible regardless of some errors induced by the channel noise. In other
words, the noisy components must not lead to the misunderstanding upon the core
idea of the message. Moreover, Bob hopes that the errors can be corrected from
the context given by the other correct components. Suppose that each message
component is concealed in a safe envelope during the transmission. Nevertheless,
the noisy channel is still capable of adding noise to the components even without
opening the envelope, imagining that raindrops pass through the envelope and wet
the letter.
This research problem is analogous to that of reversible watermarking in
the encrypted domain in the following senses. First, the noisy channel is analogous
to the watermarking function. Second, the reciprocal of the communication cost
corresponds to the watermarking capacity. Third, the requirement of preserving
the core idea of the message is equivalent to the fidelity constraint of watermarking.
Last, the context-based error correction is akin to the decoding process that jointly
detects the payload and recovers the host media. The task of error correction will
be easy if the noisy channel always modifies the components to those of the opposite
meaning in the presence of noise. The reason is that given a certain context, it is
much easier to sense an antonym of a word than a synonym of that word. Hence,
our objective is to construct a noisy channel that always maps components to their
farthest counterparts in the presence of noise, that is to say,
E(y) =
8>><>>:
E(x), if no noise occurs,
E(x¯), otherwise,
(4.9)
where x¯ is the farthest counterpart of x. Let x be a non-negative integer composed
of bits from a certain bit-plane and x¯ be the bitwise complement of x. Although the
Paillier cryptosystem does not permit homomorphic bitwise complement operation
upon the encrypted data, we are still able to obtain E(x¯) by
E(x¯) ⌘ E(2t   1) · E(x) 1 ⌘ E(2t   1  x) mod N2, (4.10)
where t = blog2Nc is the number of bits used to describe x. We will prove that
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x¯ = 2t   1  x later. Hence, the encoding process is carried out by
E(y) ⌘
8>><>>:
E(x) mod N2, if w = 0,
E(2t   1) · E(x) 1 mod N2, if w = 1,
(4.11)
and the decoding process is performed by
(x,w) =
8>><>>:
(y, 0), if  (y, y˜) <  (y¯, y˜),
(y¯, 1), otherwise,
(4.12)
where y¯ is the bitwise compliment of y, y˜ is the approximation of y, and   is the
measure of the Hamming distance.
Lemma. Let x be a non-negative integer, x¯ be the bitwise compliment of x, and
t = blog2Nc be the number of bits used to describe x. Then, x¯ = 2t   1  x.
Proof. Let us prove that
x+ x¯ = 2t   1
such that
x  x¯ = 11 . . . 1| {z }
t bits
, 8x, x¯ 2 Z/2tZ,
where   denotes the bitwise XOR operation. This is proved by the fact that integer
addition is equivalent to bitwise XOR and 2t   1 = 20 + 21 + · · ·+ 2t 1 = 11 . . . 1| {z }
t bits
.
4.4 Online and O✏ine Content-Adaptive Predictors
Let us demonstrate how to implement the estimation mechanisms in a practical
sense. Suppose that the host data is a digital image. Recall that we have to estimate
the symbols in order to activate the decoding process. A symbol is defined as an
integer converted from some randomly drawn bits from the l-th bit-plane. Therefore,
the objective is to predict those selected bits. A possible strategy is to predict the
pixel itself. This strategy is advantageous in terms of the implementation cost since
there are a lot of image reconstruction tools available already, such as the total
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variation denoising algorithm [217]. Nonetheless, most content-adaptive predictors
are ‘online’ processing algorithms and thus it is computationally demanding for
the decoder to perform those algorithms. In response to this, we further devise
an ‘o✏ine’ processing mechanism that e ciently infers the l-th bit of the given
pixel by a pre-learned lookup table. The approach is derived from the Bayesian
inference. We remark that these online and o✏ine algorithms can be viewed as a
classic example of space-time tradeo↵. We begin with the implementation of the
total variation denoising algorithm and then continue with the formulation of the
Bayesian inference.
4.4.1 Total Variation Denoising
Let us consider a marked image as a noisy signal. The result of noise removal can
be perceived as our expectation of the original signal. Recall that when the l-th
bit-plane is taken as the watermarking channel, the l-th bit of each modifiable pixel
is either flipped or kept intact. Therefore, by comparing the marked image with
its denoised counterpart, we are able to infer whether an observed pixel has been
modified or not. For instance, suppose that a pixel u is used to carry a watermark
bit. At the receiving end, we want to know whether u = u0 or u = u1, where u0
and u1 denote the pixel values by setting the l-th bit of u to 0 and 1, respectively.
By applying a denoising technique, we obtain an approximation of u denoted by u˜.
We contend that the value of u is the one that minimises the Euclidean distance
between u and u˜. Let u be a sequence of pixels to carry a watermark bit and u˜ be
an approximation of it. In practice, we tend to use an appropriately long sequence
of pixels to carry one single bit of information in order to minimise the error rate,
although, on the other hand, compromising the embedding rate. To decide whether
u = u0 or u = u1, we calculate
 0 = ku0   u˜k1 =
X
i
|u0,i   u˜i|,
 1 = ku1   u˜k1 =
X
i
|u1,i   u˜i|,
(4.13)
and choose the vector that produces a smaller L1 norm.
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Figure 4.4: A given pixel uO and its correlated neighbouring pixels uN , uS , uW , uE ,
uNW , uNE , uSW and uSE .
Total variation denoising is based on the principle that noisy signals have
high total variation. According to this principle, the denoising problem is modelled
as minimising the total variation of the reconstructed signal subject to it being close
to the original observed signal. Let the intensity function u0(x, y) denote the pixel
intensity of an observed noisy image and u(x, y) the pixel values of the desired clean
image for x, y 2 ⌦. Hence,
u0(x, y) = u(x, y) + n(x, y), (4.14)
where n(x, y) denotes the additive noise with zero mean and standard deviation  .
The objective is to remove n and reconstruct u from u0. The variational model is to
minimise ZZ
⌦
|ru| dx dy, (4.15)
subject to
1
2
ZZ
⌦
(u  u0)2 dx dy =  2. (4.16)
By introducing a Lagrange multiplier  , this problem can be converted into an
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unconstrained optimisation problem, which is to minimise the functional
J [u] =
ZZ
⌦
|ru| dx dy +  
2
ZZ
⌦
(u  u0)2 dx dy. (4.17)
Let us express the above equation in a compact form by
J =
ZZ
⌦
L(⌦, u,ru) d⌦. (4.18)
To minimise J , we find the partial derivatives of L, which are given by
@L
@u
=
@
@u
 
2
(u  u0)2 =  (u  u0), (4.19)
and
@L
@ru =
@L
@ux
+
@L
@uy
=
ru
|ru| , (4.20)
where
@L
@ux
=
@
@ux
|ru| = @
@ux
q
u2x + u
2
y
=
@
@ux
 
1
2 =   
1
2ux =
ux
|ru| ,
(4.21)
and similarly
@L
@uy
=
@
@uy
|ru| = @
@uy
q
u2x + u
2
y
=
@
@uy
 
1
2 =   
1
2uy =
uy
|ru| .
(4.22)
Note that we let  = u2x+u
2
y. By substituting these into the Euler-Lagrange equation
@L
@u
  d
d⌦
(
@L
@ru) = 0, (4.23)
we obtain
 (u  u0) r · ru|ru| = 0. (4.24)
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Therefore, the steepest descent equation for J is given by
@u
@t
=  (u  u0) r · ru|ru| , (4.25)
and thus at the time t we update
ut+1 = ut + @ut
= ut + @t( t(ut   u0) r · ru
t
|rut|),
(4.26)
where
r · ru|ru| =
@
@x
uxq
(ux)2 + u2y
+
@
@y
uyq
u2x + u
2
y
. (4.27)
At a given pixel uO, let uN , uS , uW and uE denote its four neighbouring
pixels at north, south, west and east directions respectively, as illustrated in Fig. 4.4.
To simplify the notations, we denote the four neighbouring pixels altogether by uP ,
where P 2 ⇤ = {N,S,W,E}. In the following, we present the numerical method for
updating uO via gradient descent. The algorithm is performed iteratively until it
converges to a stable state or the default maximum number of iterations is reached.
For each iteration, the numerical approximation of uO is computed by
ut+1O = u
t
O +  t · ( t(utO   u0O) 
1
h
rutO
|rutO|
), (4.28)
where  t and h are set to 1 in our implementation. For convenience, we set  t to a
fixed small number instead of updating it dynamically ( t = 0.001). We discretise
rutO
|rutO|
'
X
P2⇤
uP   utOq
(uP   utO)2 + ⇠2P + ✏
, (4.29)
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where
⇠N =
(uW + uNW )  (uE + uNE)
4
,
⇠S =
(uW + uSW )  (uE + uSE)
4
,
⇠W =
(uN + uNW )  (uS + uSW )
4
,
⇠E =
(uN + uNE)  (uS + uSE)
4
,
(4.30)
and ✏ is a very small number to avoid a zero divisor in practice.
4.4.2 Bayesian Inference
A statistical approach to estimate the l-th bit of a pixel given a certain context is to
collect a large number of samples in the same context and see which case, either that
the bit is 0 or 1, is observed more frequently. This method will, however, encounter
the so-called curse of dimensionality when the context is in a high dimensional space.
That is, the amount of data required to support the sampling grows exponentially
with the dimensionality of context. As aforementioned, a pixel is correlated to
its eight immediate neighbours, which implies that the l-th bit of a given pixel is
correlated to other 7 bits of that pixel and 8 bits of each neighbouring pixel. In total,
there are 71 correlated bits, which represent 271 di↵erent contexts. In this case, we
require an enormous amount of data so that there are su cient samples for each
context.
In order to reduce the dimensionality of context, we model that the l-th bit of
a given pixel is correlated to its immediate neighbouring bits on the current and the
two adjacent bit-planes, as illustrated in Fig. 4.5. For the least significant bit-plane,
we consider only the bits on the current and the second least significant bit-planes.
For the most significant bit-plane, we consider only the bits on the current and
the second most significant bit-planes. There are 8 correlated bits on the current
bit plane, 9 on each of the two adjacent bit-planes. For a bit on the second to the
seventh bit-plane, it has 26 correlated bits and thus 226 possible contexts. For a
bit on the first or last bit-plane, there are 17 correlated bits and accordingly 217
contexts. The number of contexts is significantly reduced and yet the estimation is
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Figure 4.5: A given bit (coloured in dark grey) and its correlated neighbouring bits
(coloured in light grey).
still remarkably accurate as demonstrated experimentally later. Let us denote the
bit to be estimated by b and the collection of correlated bits, or the context, by ⇥.
According to the Bayes’ theorem, we compute
P (b = 0|⇥) / P (⇥|b = 0)P (b = 0),
P (b = 1|⇥) / P (⇥|b = 1)P (b = 1),
(4.31)
where P (b) is the prior probability of the hypothesis of b, P (⇥|b) is the likelihood
of observing the evidence ⇥ given the hypothesis of b, and P (b|⇥) is the posterior
probability of the hypothesis of b given the observed evidence ⇥. Therefore, the
inference about the value of b is made by
b˜ = argmax
b2{0,1}
P (b|⇥). (4.32)
As a result, we learn the Bayesian probability table from a large number of image
samples and predict the bits by the lookup table, as illustrated in Table 4.1.
4.5 Experiments
In the following experiments, we test the schemes on 8-bit greyscale images of size
512⇥ 512, as shown in Fig. 4.6. We use the RSA and the Paillier cryptosystems as
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Table 4.1: Bayesian probability table, in which each column represents a possible
context and each row represents a possible bit value.
⇥1 ⇥2 · · ·
b = 0 P (b = 0|⇥1) P (b = 0|⇥2) · · ·
b = 1 P (b = 1|⇥1) P (b = 1|⇥2) · · ·
examples of multiplicative and additive homomorphic cryptosystems, respectively.
Two prime numbers for the cryptosystems are p = 7907 and q = 7919 so that
the bit-length of message is blog2 pqc = 25. Accordingly, for each bit-plane of an
image, we convert every segment of 25 bits into a decimal number in order to fit the
encryption function, where the marginal bits are negligible. The number of iterations
for the total variation algorithm is set to 2000 since empirically it produces stable
results. The Bayesian probability table is learned from a thousand image samples
in the BOSSBase [218]. We begin with the analysis of three-way trade-o↵ between
capacity, fidelity, and reversibility. Then, we make comparisons between the proposed
schemes and the state-of-the-art. The capacity is represented by the number of bits
embedded in an image, whereas the fidelity and reversibility are measured by the
peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR). Let ui,j and uˆi,j denote a pixel and its noisy
counterpart respectively, where i and j specify the pixel coordinates. The fidelity
is quantified by the PSNR between the original and the marked images, and in a
similar manner, the reversibility is evaluated by the PSNR between the original and
the recovered images. For further analysis, we also measure the reversibility in terms
of the number of bit errors in the following discussions.
Capacity-Fidelity Trade-O↵
The trade-o↵ between capacity and fidelity is visualised in Fig. 4.7a, which shows
that the RSA-based scheme achieves higher fidelity than the Paillier-based scheme
under the same capacity (2000 bits). The reason is straightforward: when the noise
occurs, the former only introduces a random distortion while the latter inflicts a
maximal distortion. Note that the fidelity is not content-dependent according to our
scheme design. The impact of the selection of di↵erent bit-planes as the watermarking
channel is shown in Table 4.2. It is intuitive that the fidelity of marked images
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(a) Airplane (b) Barbara (c) Cameraman
(d) Lena (e) Mandrill (f) Peppers
Figure 4.6: Greyscale test images of size 512⇥ 512 with 256 tonal options.
decreases drastically when a more significant bit-plane is engaged to carry watermark
information.
Capacity-Reversibility Trade-O↵
The trade-o↵ between capacity and reversibility is illustrated in Fig. 4.7b. To assess
the capacity-reversibility trade-o↵, we control the capacity by selecting di↵erent
bit-planes for watermarking in such a way that the fidelity remains at 48 dB, and
then observe the change of reversibility. Note that here we express the reversibility
in terms of the number of bit errors in order to amplify the trend. If the reversibility
is quantified by the PSNR, the proportionality may be indeterminate since a higher
decoding error rate does not necessarily mean a lower visual quality. For instance,
several errors occur on an insignificant bit-plane may still result in a higher visual
quality than a single error on a relatively significant bit-plane. It is observed that the
reversibility decreases as the capacity increases. It is due to the fact that we embed
less amount of information into the more significant bit-plane and more amount into
the less significant bit-plane in order to keep the fidelity at a fixed level.
103
Fidelity-Reversibility Trade-O↵
The trade-o↵ between capacity and reversibility is illustrated in Fig. 4.7c. In a
similar way, we evaluate the fidelity-reversibility trade-o↵ by setting the capacity
to 2000 bits, controlling the fidelity with the selection of encodable bit-plane, and
observing the change of reversibility. It is evident that the Paillier-based scheme
is advantageous in terms of the reversibility compared to the RSA-based scheme.
This is because that the Paillier-based scheme inflicts a stronger noise to the host
media, which is more distinguishable and removable than a faint noise imposed by
the RSA-based scheme. On top of that, it is shown that the predictor based on
total variation achieves higher reversibility than the predictor based on the Bayesian
inference. Moreover, it can be observed that the reversibility is inversely proportional
to the fidelity.
More comprehensive experimental results are demonstrated in Table 4.3,
where a variety of images are tested with every possible combination of encoding and
decoding mechanisms. It is witnessed that the error-free performance is achievable
in practice. It can be observed that the error rate generally approaches zero when
embedding payloads into a comparatively more significant bit-plane. From the
previous analyses, we conclude that
• Capacity is inversely proportional to fidelity.
• Capacity is inversely proportional to reversibility.
• Fidelity is inversely proportional to reversibility.
• The RSA-based scheme preserves higher fidelity than the Paillier-based scheme.
• The Paillier-based scheme achieves higher reversibility than the RSA-based
scheme.
• The predictor based on total variation is more content-adaptive and results in
higher reversibility than that based on Bayesian inference.
• The predictor based on Bayesian inference consumes less computational power
in decoding than that based on total variation.
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Figure 4.7: A three way trade-o↵ between capacity, fidelity, and reversibility measured
on the image Lena.
In the following, we compare the scheme performance with the state-of-the-art.
We begin by classifying the existing reversible watermarking schemes compatible with
public-key cryptosystems [200–202, 205, 206], as presented in Table 4.4. As far as we
are aware, our work is one of the pioneering research on the schemes compatible with
public-key homomorphic cryptosystems under the condition that neither additional
bit padding nor specific pre-processing is undertaken. Although schemes addressing
this strictly defined problem are hardly found, we remark that this design principle
was followed in the earlier literature of schemes based on traditional symmetric-
key cryptosystems. In order to make paralleled and meaningful comparisons, the
proposed schemes are compared with those under the same, or at least similar,
research constraint [180, 182, 219]. We test the fidelity and reversibility between
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Table 4.2: Fidelity evaluation of RSA-based and Paillier-based schemes by using
di↵erent bit-planes as the watermarking channel. It shows the PSNR (in dB) of the
marked image Lena.
RSA Paillier
l = 1 67.59 64.25
l = 2 61.19 58.41
l = 3 55.46 52.43
l = 4 49.46 46.28
l = 5 43.27 39.86
l = 6 37.58 34.22
l = 7 31.18 28.09
l = 8 25.31 21.96
(a) Capacity: 500 bits
RSA Paillier
l = 1 64.32 61.28
l = 2 58.32 55.10
l = 3 52.17 49.23
l = 4 46.29 43.39
l = 5 40.32 37.20
l = 6 34.11 31.25
l = 7 28.41 25.28
l = 8 22.37 19.12
(b) Capacity: 1000 bits
RSA Paillier
l = 1 62.53 59.70
l = 2 56.55 53.42
l = 3 50.61 47.62
l = 4 44.40 41.47
l = 5 38.48 35.33
l = 6 32.56 29.49
l = 7 26.57 23.53
l = 8 20.29 17.53
(c) Capacity: 1500 bits
RSA Paillier
l = 1 61.29 58.23
l = 2 55.57 52.26
l = 3 49.41 46.26
l = 4 43.32 40.31
l = 5 37.08 34.18
l = 6 31.18 28.32
l = 7 25.09 22.18
l = 8 19.05 16.30
(d) Capacity: 2000 bits
di↵erent schemes by embedding randomly generated 2000 bits into various host
images. It is observed from Table 4.5 that the visual qualities of various host
images are similar for any listed encoding algorithm and thus it is evident that the
fidelity is not content-dependent. Yet, di↵erent schemes and configurations result in
di↵erent fidelity. It is shown that the RSA-based and Paillier-based schemes preserves
comparatively high fidelity when embedding payloads into the third bit-plane. From
Table 4.6, we can further observe that the proposed schemes achieve relatively high
reversibility, especially when using the total variation technique for decoding. When
the sixth bit-plane is used as the embedding channel, the proposed schemes show the
error-free performance on most of the test images. Even when embedding payloads
into the third bit-plane, the reversibility is higher than the average in most cases.
The experimental results show that the proposed schemes achieve a remarkable
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balance between fidelity and reversibility under the given capacity constraint. On
top of this, the proposed schemes share the advantages of the modern public-key
cryptosystems.
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Table 4.3: Reversibility evaluation of di↵erent combinations of encoding and decoding
components. It shows the PSNR (in dB) and the number of bit errors of the recovered
images in which 2000 random bits are embedded.
RSA+TV
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
l = 1 65.38 403 63.10 667 71.61 102 63.75 581 62.36 795 62.82 715
l = 2 64.38 135 59.20 417 81.24 3 60.90 285 56.53 760 58.43 500
l = 3 69.10 13 59.18 112 1 0 64.06 39 52.44 489 56.41 205
l = 4 1 0 60.90 20 1 0 1 0 50.22 216 56.41 10
l = 5 1 0 63.60 3 1 0 1 0 54.21 23 1 0
l = 6 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
l = 7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
l = 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
RSA+Bayes
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
l = 1 62.85 706 61.82 886 67.51 249 62.02 859 61.90 882 61.68 915
l = 2 59.24 404 56.09 830 74.06 16 56.32 796 55.68 917 55.83 882
l = 3 62.04 60 52.93 434 1 0 54.89 282 49.93 876 51.23 645
l = 4 1 0 55.76 61 1 0 61.60 17 45.54 599 54.33 87
l = 5 1 0 61.60 4 1 0 1 0 45.42 160 1 0
l = 6 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 49.88 15 1 0
l = 7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
l = 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Paillier + TV
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
l = 1 64.30 253 60.78 569 74.53 24 61.41 492 59.37 787 60.09 667
l = 2 68.00 27 58.62 234 1 0 60.76 143 54.06 669 56.46 385
l = 3 1 0 63.28 20 1 0 73.28 2 50.87 348 58.16 65
l = 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 50.68 91 1 0
l = 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
l = 6 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
l = 7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
l = 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Paillier + Bayes
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
l = 1 59.60 746 58.42 979 65.64 186 58.51 960 58.42 981 58.31 1004
l = 2 57.11 331 52.69 916 1 0 53.10 833 52.32 999 52.41 977
l = 3 65.15 13 51.45 305 1 0 53.46 192 46.60 932 48.32 626
l = 4 1 0 59.48 12 1 0 1 0 42.61 584 55.36 31
l = 5 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 45.33 78 1 0
l = 6 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
l = 7 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
l = 8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
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Table 4.4: Classification of reversible watermarking schemes compatible with public-
key cryptosystems.
Proposed Wu et al. [200] Wu et al. [201] Li and Li [202] Zhang et al. [205] Xiang and Luo [206]
Bit-padding No Yes Yes Yes No No
Pre-processing No No No No Yes Yes
Table 4.5: Fidelity comparison with the state-of-the-art. It shows the PSNR (in dB)
of the marked images in which 2000 random bits are embedded.
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
RSA (l = 3) 49.27 49.32 49.47 49.43 49.13 49.19
RSA (l = 6) 31.13 31.08 31.31 31.18 31.32 31.19
Paillier (l = 3) 46.18 46.36 46.10 46.25 46.26 46.23
Paillier (l = 6) 28.14 28.37 28.17 28.32 28.26 28.16
Zhang [180] 41.11 41.04 40.98 41.06 41.04 41.0
Wu and Sun (l = 3) [219] 46.30 46.16 46.33 46.29 46.16 46.27
Wu and Sun (l = 6) [219] 28.25 28.39 28.25 28.43 28.38 28.22
Liao and Shu [182] 41.12 41.04 41.05 41.04 41.03 41.04
Table 4.6: Reversibility comparison with the state-of-the-art. It shows the PSNR (in
dB) and the number of bit errors of the recovered images in which 2000 random bits
are embedded.
Airplane Barbara Cameraman Lena Mandrill Peppers
PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM PSNR NUM
RSA + TV (l = 3) 69.10 13 59.18 112 1 0 64.06 39 52.44 489 56.41 205
RSA + TV (l = 6) 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
RSA + Bayes (l = 3) 62.04 60 52.93 434 1 0 54.89 282 49.93 876 51.23 645
RSA + Bayes (l = 6) 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 49.88 15 1 0
Paillier + TV (l = 3) 1 0 63.28 20 1 0 73.28 2 50.87 348 58.16 65
Paillier + TV (l = 6) 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Paillier + Bayes (l = 3) 65.15 13 51.45 305 1 0 53.46 192 46.60 932 48.32 626
Paillier + Bayes (l = 6) 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Zhang [180] 55.09 71 48.93 169 54.38 85 57.10 28 46.16 309 54.57 47
Wu and Sun (l = 3) [219] 1 0 58.58 59 1 0 69.30 5 50.03 423 57.66 73
Wu and Sun (l = 6) [219] 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Liao and Shu [182] 60.73 13 57.57 23 67.56 3 62.46 7 52.54 70 58.13 20
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4.6 Summary
This chapter considers the problem of entrusting the watermarking operation to a
cloud service provider without undermining data privacy. Constructing reversible
watermarking schemes compatible with public-key cryptosystems is of non-trivial
challenge since there is virtually no data redundancy to be exploited in the encrypted
domain. The recent development of various schemes required the host media either
to be enciphered in a redundant fashion or to be pre-processed prior to encryption.
To address these limits, we propose a novel paradigm and derive di↵erent schemes
compatible with di↵erent types of public-key homomorphic cryptosystems. The
host image is encrypted in such a fashion that a su ciently long sequence of bits,
instead of a pixel, is regarded as input to the encryptor. It significantly reduces
the size of the encrypted data and improves the space e ciency. In addition
to this, we suggest to encrypt di↵erent bit-planes separately in order to control
the fidelity factor. Any specific data pre-processing is not required in order to
promote the practicality and universality. For the RSA-like cryptosystems that
permit multiplicative homomorphic computation, the proposed scheme is flexible
in terms of embedding capacity. As for the Paillier-like cryptosystems that allow
additive operation as well as partial multiplicative operation, we propose a scheme
which is optimal with respect to the reversibility. Furthermore, we develop content-
adaptive predictors based on variational method and statistical inference for assisting
watermark decoding. Both online and o✏ine prediction algorithms are provided
in order to suit di↵erent operational requirements. We remark that the decoding
errors are inevitable from a theoretical point of view and yet in practice the error
rate approaches zero at a low expense of the fidelity and capacity. Experimental
results show that the proposed schemes achieve remarkable balance between fidelity
and reversibility under the given capacity constraint. From our perspective, it is of
great significance to develop privacy-aware watermarking methodology suitable for a
variety of modern cryptosystems. On top of this, more practical applications, such
as privacy protection in the Internet of Things, deserve further investigations.
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Chapter 5
Privacy-Preserving Secret
Sharing
Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging technology that utilises cloud connected
devices to collect data for analysis. Healthcare industry is one of the most promising
fields that have adopted IoT solutions since its early stage. The development of
wearable technology, wireless body area network and cloud computing has established
a new way for medical practitioners to acquire health data from patients. It greatly
benefits health monitoring, epidemiological studies, and pharmaceutical research
[220–222].
A common IoT-aware architecture for healthcare applications is illustrated in
Fig. 5.1, which consists of a gateway device, a cloud server and several sensor nodes.
Each sensor node can be viewed as a wearable equipment used for monitoring the
health status of an individual, such as heart rate, blood pressure, brain wave, glucose
level, etc. Under the given framework, the sensor nodes send the medical data to a
local gateway device via wireless communication such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, whereas
the gateway device aggregates the data and store it in the cloud server for further
analysis.
However, there are risks of information leakage during data transmission and
storage. For example, an adversary may attempt to eavesdrop the wireless commu-
nication, attack the gateway device or even access to the cloud server. Therefore, it
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GatewayHeart Rate Blood Pressure
Glucose LevelBrain Wave
Figure 5.1: An IoT-based healthcare architecture. The health data acquired from
the sensor nodes (e.g. heart rate, blood pressure, brain wave, and glucose level) is
aggregated at the gateway and store in the cloud.
is advisable to encrypt the data at each sensor node immediately after it is produced
and incorporate secret sharing schemes to realise access control. In more details,
each sensor node transmits the encrypted data to the gateway device by which data
is integrated and encoded into shares of information. Due to security concerns, these
shares are stored in separate cloud servers and the data retrieval must conform with
the access policy. To realise this system, we present a novel research upon secret
sharing in the encrypted domain.
In this chapter, we study secret sharing mechanisms towards resolving privacy
and security issues in IoT-based healthcare applications. Nevertheless, the applica-
tions of the proposed schemes are not limited to this particular IoT context. Instead,
the proposed schemes are rather general and can be served as potential solutions for
other similar problems. We show how multiple sources are possible to share their
data amongst a group of participants without revealing their own data to one another
as well as the dealer. Only an authorised subset of participants is able to reconstruct
the data. We analyse the pros and cons of several possible solutions and develop
practical schemes: a simple (2, 2)-threshold scheme, an extended (n, n)-threshold
scheme, and a generalised (t, n)-threshold scheme. The developed schemes follow
112
Sharmir’s construction in which a collusion of fewer than t participants has no
better chance of guessing the secret than a non-participant who has no privileged
information at all.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 gives a brief
introduction of secret sharing. Section 5.2 presents a variety of privacy-preserving
secret sharing schemes from the most limited construction to the most general
construction. The chapter is concluded in Section 5.3 with directions for future
research.
5.1 Secret Sharing
In this section, we discuss the basic notions and terminology of secret sharing and also
briefly introduce its history and applications. The focus of this section is Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme, which forms the cornerstone of our scheme constructions.
Secret sharing is a study in cryptography and plays an essential role in visual
cryptography. It can also be perceived as a special form of information hiding. In
addition to this, It is widely used in applications of secure multi-party computation
such as sealed-bid auction [223–226] and secret ballot [227–232].
Secret sharing was originated independently by Shamir [233] and Blakley
[234] in 1979. In general, a secret sharing scheme describes how a dealer can split
a secret message into pieces of information and distribute them amongst a group
of participants. Each piece of information is referred to as a share (as Sharmir’s
terminology) or a shadow (as Blakley’s terminology). The secret will be revealed
only in the presence of a su cient number of shares or when an authorised subgroup
of participants work together. It is also rigorously defined that any individual share
or unauthorised combination of shares reveals absolutely no information about the
secret. Consider a na¨ıve example of secret sharing in which a secret message, say,
‘password’ is split into the following shares: ‘pa------’, ‘--ss----’, ‘----wo--’, and ‘------rd’.
It is manifestly insecure in the sense that every share leaks part of the secret.
The most typical scheme of secret sharing is a (t, n)-threshold scheme, which
involves n participants and any group of t or more participants will be able to
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reconstruct the secret. In Shamir’s construction, the secret is set as the constant
term of a polynomial of degree t  1 and the secret shares are any n di↵erent points
on the polynomial. Hence, any t points will be su cient to define the polynomial and
thus its constant term, namely the secret digit. In Blakley’s construction, consider
the secret as a point in a three-dimensional space and the shadows as hyperplanes
whose common intersection is the secret point. As a consequence, any three planes
will su ce to identify the point. As each successive shadow is exposed, however, the
range of possible values of the secret narrows. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is
algebraic in nature in contrast to Blakley’s geometric solution.
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme forms the cornerstones for the later construc-
tions of the proposed scheme. Hence, let us discuss Shamir’s secret sharing in more
detail. Suppose that a dealer wants to share a secret to n participants in such a
way that only more than t participants pool their shares together will the secret be
reconstructed. Let the secret be denoted by s and we generate t  1 random numbers
denoted by r1, r2, ..., and rt 1. Then, we form a polynomial
f(x) ⌘ s+ r1x+ r2x2 + · · ·+ rt 1xt 1 (mod P ), (5.1)
where P is a randomly chosen prime number. Let us draw any n points from the
polynomial, for example, (1, f(1)), (2, f(2)), ..., and (n, f(n)), and distribute them
to n participants respectively as shares. It is observed that there are t unknown
variables in the polynomial and thus with t di↵erent points one is able to solve
for the variables including the secret (i.e. the constant term). In other words, the
reconstruction process is to simply use Lagrange interpolation to solve a set of t
simultaneous equations.
Since the introduction of secret sharing, numerous extended problems have
appeared. The study towards a general access structure was considered by Ito, Saito,
and Nishizeki [235] and had become a principal study since then [236–239]. To
manage various malicious behaviour by dishonest parties, the notion of verifiable
secret sharing was introduced by Chor et al. [240] and had been studied extensively
thereafter [241–246]. Another closely related branch is visual cryptography originated
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by Naor and Shamir [247] for the secrecy of visual information, including greyscale,
colour, and halftone images [248–250].
5.2 Privacy-Preserving Secret Sharing
In this section, we present the proposed privacy-preserving secret sharing schemes
that address the problem of sharing the secrets generated from multiple sources
amongst a group of n participants through the computations in the encrypted domain.
We analyse the pros and cons of several possible solutions and develop practical
schemes: a simple (2, 2)-threshold scheme, an extended (n, n)-threshold scheme,
and a generalised (t, n)-threshold scheme. The developed schemes follow Sharmir’s
construction in which a collusion of fewer than t participants has no better chance of
guessing the secret than a non-participant who has no privileged information at all.
In the remainder of this chapter, we assume all the homomorphic properties applied
are those of the Paillier cryptosystem unless otherwise specified [164]. Nevertheless,
the applicable homomorphic cryptosystems are included but by no means limited to
this particular cryptosystem.
5.2.1 Na¨ıve Solutions
In the following, let us consider two na¨ıve solutions to our research problem and
analyse their pros and cons. Among a variety of privacy protection mechanisms,
encryption has a high level of reliability and universality. Naturally, the secrets are
encrypted once they have been produced from the sources. The problem is therefore
reduced to the sharing of encrypted data. Consider a key server who has a pair of
public and private keys. The public key is used for encryption, whereas the private
key is employed for decryption. The first solution is to create shares of the private
key by arranging the key as the constant term in Eq. (5.1). The encrypted files,
instead of being encoded as shares, are stored in a database. At the time when the
number of collaborative participants are as many as required, the private key will
be reconstructed and then the files in the database can be deciphered. On the one
hand, this solution is simple and the computational load of the sharing procedure is
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light. On the other hand, however, to access the secret files, one must perform one
reconstruction algorithm for the key plus one decryption algorithm for the files. In
addition to this, this scheme requires di↵erent pairs of public and private keys for
di↵erent sets of secret files (e.g. di↵erent patients’ health records); otherwise, once
the participants reconstruct the private key, they will be able to decipher all the
files stored in the database. Furthermore, storing all the important files in a central
database may be vulnerable to a number of cyber attacks. Thus, it is reasonable to
share the files to authorised participants to reduce the risk of cyber threats.
The second solution is that suppose there are t encrypted secrets denoted
by E(s0), E(s1), ..., and E(st 1). We form a polynomial by arranging t encrypted
secrets as t coe cients in Eq. (5.1). More generally, we can assume that there are k
encrypted secrets, where k  t, and choose t  k random numbers as the rest of the
coe cients to complete the polynomial. Either way, we can draw n points as the
shares for individual participants. In the presence of t shares or more, the encrypted
data will be reconstructed. With the decryption key, the data will eventually be
revealed. In practice, this scheme has a non-trivial issue of key distribution amongst
the participants. It may be addressed by one of the following approaches. First,
use a secure channel to transmit the key to individual participants. Second, let the
pair of encryption and decryption keys be generated by a key agreement protocol
(e.g. Di e–Hellman key exchange protocol [155]) amongst the group of participants,
instead of being generated by the key server. Third, encrypt the key with each
participant’s public key and send it to the corresponding one as an instance of
asymmetrical cryptography (e.g. elliptic curve cryptosystems [156]). Aside from
the issue of key distribution, this scheme still requires extra e↵orts of participants,
namely, one reconstruction step for the encrypted data plus one decryption step for
the original data. It may be troublesome in particular situations. For instance, when
there is a surgical emergency, the time delay for accessing health records becomes
problematic. Hence, we conclude that these na¨ıve solutions, though feasible, are
deficient in several aspects, which motivate us towards finer constructions.
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5.2.2 (2, 2)-threshold scheme
To begin with, we introduce a (2, 2)-threshold multi-secret sharing scheme to split a
batch of two secrets into two shares via a semi-honest (or honest-but-curious) cloud
service provider. Only in the presence of two shares, the batch of two secrets can be
restored. Let us describe how this scheme can solve the problem of privacy-preserving
secret sharing. Let s1 and s2 be two secrets generated from two separate sources,
respectively. To preserve the privacy of secrets, s1 and s2 are encrypted immediately
after being produced. The encrypted secrets E(s2) and E(s2) are uploaded to the
dealer for sharing. Let x1 and x2 be any integers that satisfy
gcd(x1 + x2, N) = 1,
gcd(x1   x2, N) = 1.
(5.2)
Note that ‘gcd’ stands for greatest common divisor. It is not di cult to find proper
x1 and x2 because N is the product of two large primes. Since
x1
2   x22 ⌘ (x1 + x2) · (x1   x2) (mod N), (5.3)
we derive
gcd(x1
2   x22, N) = 1. (5.4)
This also implies
gcd(x1
2   x22, N) = 1. (5.5)
Then, two shares are created as
E(y1) ⌘ E(s1)x1 · E(s2)x2 (mod N2),
E(y2) ⌘ E(s1)x2 · E(s2)x1 (mod N2).
(5.6)
Following the homomorphic properties, we rewrite
E(y1) ⌘ E(s1x1 + s2x2) (mod N2),
E(y2) ⌘ E(s1x2 + s2x1) (mod N2).
(5.7)
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The dealer distributes x1 and x2 to two participants and sends E(y1) and E(y2) to
the key server for decryption. The decrypted results are
y1 ⌘ s1x1 + s2x2 (mod N),
y2 ⌘ s1x2 + s2x1 (mod N).
(5.8)
Then, y1 and y2 are also dispensed to the participants. When the participants pool
their shares (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) together, they compute
x1y1   x2y2 ⌘ (x12   x22)s1 (mod N). (5.9)
Note that
x1y1 ⌘ (x12s1 + x1x2s2) (mod N)
x2y2 ⌘ (x22s1 + x1x2s2) (mod N).
(5.10)
Since gcd(x12   x22, n) = 1, we know there exists one and only one modular multi-
plicative inverse such that
(x1
2   x22) · (x12   x22) 1 ⌘ 1 (mod N). (5.11)
The value of (x12   x22) 1 can be solved by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
Eventually, the secret s1 is unveiled by
s1 ⌘ (x1y1   x2y2) · (x12   x22) 1 (mod N). (5.12)
In the same manner, the secret s2 is decoded as
s2 ⌘ (x2y1   x1y2) · (x22   x12) 1 (mod N). (5.13)
It is worth noting that even though y1 and y2 have been disclosed to the key server
during the process, s1 and s2 are still kept secret since the key server has no knowledge
about x1 and x2. The secret reconstruction process does not involve the decryption
operation and thus is time-e cient.
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5.2.3 (n, n)-threshold scheme
Let us extend the previous (2, 2)-threshold scheme to a (n, n)-threshold scheme. For
conciseness, we omit modulus symbols in the following description where there is no
ambiguity. Let n secrets generated from sources be denoted by s1, s2, . . . , and sn.
After encryption, the encrypted results, written as E(s1), E(s2), . . . , and E(sn), are
transmitted to the dealer for sharing. The dealer chooses n random numbers x1, x2,
. . . , and xn such that a matrix
X =
0BBBBBBB@
x1 x2 x3 · · · xn
x2 x3 x4 · · · x1
...
...
...
. . .
...
xn x1 x2 · · · xn 1
1CCCCCCCA (5.14)
has a modular multiplicative inverse X 1 in Z/NZ. Alternatively, X must satisfy
gcd(det(X), N) = 1 and det(X) 6= 0. Note that ‘det’ stands for determinant. Let
the dealer compute
E(y1) = E(s1)x1E(s2)x2 · · · E(sn)xn ,
E(y2) = E(s1)x2E(s2)x3 · · · E(sn)x1 ,
...
E(yn) = E(s1)xnE(s2)x1 · · · E(sn)xn 1 .
(5.15)
According to the homomorphic properties, we derive
E(y1) = E(s1x1 + s2x2 + · · ·+ snxn),
E(y2) = E(s1x2 + s2x3 + · · ·+ snx1),
...
E(yn) = E(s1xn + s2x1 + · · ·+ snxn 1).
(5.16)
The sharing process can be fulfilled by cloud computing to relieve the dealer of
computational burdens without revealing the private information about the secrets.
The dealer dispenses x1, x2, . . . , and xn to n participants respectively and passes
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E(y1), E(y2), . . . , and E(yn) to the key server for decryption. The decrypted results,
written as 0BBBBBBB@
y1
y2
...
yn
1CCCCCCCA = X
0BBBBBBB@
s1
s2
...
sn
1CCCCCCCA , (5.17)
are allocated to individual participants as well. When all the participants pool their
shares together, they retrieve the secrets by
0BBBBBBB@
s1
s2
...
sn
1CCCCCCCA = X
 1
0BBBBBBB@
y1
y2
...
yn
1CCCCCCCA . (5.18)
Example. Let us demonstrate that the previous (2, 2)-threshold scheme is actually
a special case of the (n, n)-threshold scheme. In the case where there are two secrets
s1 and s2 to be encoded, the dealer randomly chooses x1 and x2 to form a matrix0B@x1 x2
x2 x1
1CA .
Then, we compute
E(y1) = E(s1)x1E(s2)x2 = E(s1x1 + s2x2),
E(y2) = E(s1)x1E(s2)x2 = E(s1x2 + s2x1),
which are equivalent to the results in Eq. (5.6) and Eq. (5.7). By decryption, we
obtain 0B@y1
y2
1CA =
0B@x1 x2
x2 x1
1CA
0B@s1
s2
1CA ,
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which are equal to the results in Eq. (5.8). Eventually, we retrieve the secrets by
0B@s1
s2
1CA =
0B@x1 x2
x2 x1
1CA
 10B@y1
y2
1CA ,
which are identical to the results in Eq. (5.12) and Eq. (5.13).
As an extension of the (2, 2)-threshold scheme, this scheme has the same
security strength. It is theoretically secure in the sense that any subset of participants
has absolutely no knowledge about the secrets unless all the shares are in presence.
The secret reconstruction procedure does not involve decryption. Thus, it is time-
e cient and can be established without the means of key distribution.
5.2.4 (t, n)-threshold scheme
In light of the previous (n,n)-threshold scheme, we further derive a generalised (t,
n)-threshold scheme. Before we proceed further, let us discuss some possible (t,
n)-threshold schemes and analyse their pros and cons. Let {si}ti=1 denote t secrets
generated from separate sources and P be a large prime. With Shamir’s algorithm,
the dealer constructs a polynomial
f(x) ⌘
tX
i=1
six
i 1 (mod P ), (5.19)
and draws n points (x1, f(x1)), (x2, f(x2)), . . . , (xn, f(xn)) as shares for n parti-
cipants. In our defined scenario, the secrets are encrypted into {E(si)}ti=1 immediately
after being produced. Let k denote the decryption key. The first possible scheme is
to split k into n shares by drawing n points from the following polynomial:
f1(x) ⌘ k +
t 1X
j=1
rjx
j (mod P ), (5.20)
where {rj}t 1j=1 are t   1 randomly chosen integers. The encrypted data has to
be stored in a database so that when t or more participants reconstruct the key
collaboratively, they can retrieve and decrypt the data. Nonetheless, the database
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may be vulnerable to numerous cyber attacks. The second possible scheme is to
create shares according to the following polynomial:
f2(x) ⌘
tX
i=1
E(si)xi 1 (mod P ). (5.21)
When t or more participants co-operate, they can reconstruct the encrypted data.
In order to decrypt the data, the scheme must engage a key distribution protocol to
share the key amongst the participants. To compensate for the shortcomings, one
may think of combining the previous two solutions and build a polynomial in the
following form:
f3(x) ⌘ k +
t 1X
j=1
E(sj)xj (mod P ). (5.22)
In this way, the authorised subset of participants is able to reconstruct and decrypt
the data from the shares. With the knowledge of the key, however, the dealer is able
to decipher the data and thus the privacy is threatened. Regrettably, as previous
strategies all have obvious limitations, we need to find another way to do so.
For a moment, let us forget about the problem of sharing ciphertexts and
only consider sharing the plaintexts since extending the idea to the sharing of the
ciphertexts is easy once the following concepts are understood. Let st,1 denote a
vector of t secrets, yn,1 denote a vector of n shares, and Xn,t denote an n⇥ t matrix.
We define an encoding function
yn,1 = Xn,t · st,1 (5.23)
and a decoding function
st,1 = X
 1
t,t · yt,1, (5.24)
where yt,1 ⇢ yn,1, and Xt,t ⇢ Xn,t. In the case of (n, n)-threshold secret sharing,
the above encoding and decoding functions are equivalent to Eq. (5.17) and Eq.
(5.18), respectively. In the previous special case, we only require that Xn,n has a
modular multiplicative inverse. In the current generalised case, however, we require
that any t⇥ t sub-matrix of Xn,t has a modular multiplicative inverse. In fact, when
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t = n, the current requirement reduces to the previous one since the one and only
sub-matrix of Xn,t is Xn,t itself. Our question is hence ‘is it possible to construct a
valid matrix Xn,t such that any square matrix Xt,t consisting of t rows of Xn,t has a
multiplicative inverse?’.
A matrix A is invertible if and only if its determinant is non-zero. When
t and n are small numbers, we could use trial and error to construct a valid Xn,t
such that det(Xt,t) 6= 0 for any Xt,t. This approach is, however, not practical since
collisions become di cult to be handled as the ratio between n and t, implying
the number of possible combinations, grows large. To obtain a valid matrix in a
systematic way, one of the possible solutions is to construct a Vandermonde matrix.
Definition (Vandermonde matrix). An n⇥ t Vandermonde matrix has a form
An,t =
0BBBBBBB@
↵10 ↵11 ↵12 · · · ↵1t 1
↵20 ↵21 ↵22 · · · ↵2t 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
↵n0 ↵n1 ↵n2 · · · ↵nt 1
1CCCCCCCA .
For a t⇥ t square Vandermonde matrix, the determinant is given by
det(At,t) =
Y
1i<jt
(↵j   ↵i).
Example. Let us compute det(A), where
A =
0BBBB@
1 ↵1 ↵12
1 ↵2 ↵22
1 ↵3 ↵32
1CCCCA .
The determinant of A is given by
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det
0BBBB@
1 ↵1 ↵12
1 ↵2 ↵22
1 ↵3 ↵32
1CCCCA
= det
0BBBB@
1 ↵1 ↵12
0 ↵2   ↵1 ↵22   ↵12
0 ↵3   ↵1 ↵32   ↵12
1CCCCA
= det
0B@↵2   ↵1 ↵22   ↵12
↵3   ↵1 ↵32   ↵12
1CA
= (↵2   ↵1)(↵3   ↵1) det
0B@1 ↵2   ↵1
1 ↵3   ↵1
1CA
= (↵2   ↵1)(↵3   ↵1) det
0B@1 ↵2   ↵1
0 ↵3   ↵2
1CA
= (↵2   ↵1)(↵3   ↵1)(↵3   ↵2)
Corollary (Invertible Vandermonde matrix). A square Vandermonde matrix is
invertible if and only if all ↵i are distinct. When the condition su ces, the matrix
has a nonzero determinant.
Given the above preliminaries, we can start with the detailed construction of
sharing ciphertexts. Consider a Vandermonde matrix written as
Xn,t =
0BBBBBBB@
x10 x11 x12 · · · x1t 1
x20 x21 x22 · · · x2t 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
xn0 xn1 xn2 · · · xnt 1
1CCCCCCCA , (5.25)
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where {xi}ni=1 are all distinct. The shares are created as
E(y1) = E(s1)x10E(s2)x11 · · · E(st)x1t 1 ,
E(y2) = E(s1)x20E(s2)x21 · · · E(st)x2t 1 ,
...
E(yn) = E(s1)xn0E(s2)xn1 · · · E(st)xnt 1 .
(5.26)
Due to privacy homomorphisms, the above results are equivalent to
E(y1) = E(s1x10 + s2x11 + · · ·+ stx1t 1),
E(y2) = E(s1x20 + s2x21 + · · ·+ stx2t 1),
...
E(yn) = E(s1xn0 + s2xn1 + · · ·+ stxnt 1).
(5.27)
After decryption, the results become
y1 = s1x1
0 + s2x1
1 + · · ·+ stx1t 1,
y2 = s1x2
0 + s2x2
1 + · · ·+ stx2t 1,
...
yn = s1xn
0 + s2xn
1 + · · ·+ stxnt 1,
(5.28)
or alternatively, as expressed in Eq. (5.23). Each participant will receive a share
(xi, yi), where i 2 {1, 2, . . . , n}. Suppose that a subset of participants has gathered
a collection of shares, say, (xj , yj), where j 2 {1, 2, . . . , t}. Hence, the participants
form a matrix
Xt,t =
0BBBBBBB@
x10 x11 x12 · · · x1t 1
x20 x21 x22 · · · x2t 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
xt0 xt1 xt2 · · · xtt 1
1CCCCCCCA , (5.29)
and reconstruct the secrets with Eq. (5.24). Note that Xt,t is a square Vandermonde
matrix, thus invertible. The reader may have observed that when Xn,t is a Vander-
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monde matrix, Eq. (5.23) and Eq. (5.24) are the encoding and decoding functions
of Shamir’s scheme per se. Let f(x) denote Shamir’s encoding function, while g(x)
denotes ours. The connection between two functions can be expressed as
g(x) =
tY
i=1
E(si)xi 1 = E(
tX
i=1
six
i 1) = E(f(x)). (5.30)
Except for the processing domain (either the plaintext or ciphertext domain), a
noticeable di↵erence between two schemes is the decoding process for which Shamir
uses the Lagrange interpolation and we utilise a matrix multiplication. We re-
mark that there are many studies on fast algorithms for matrix inversion [251] and
multiplication [252–254].
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we address a novel research problem of secret sharing in the encrypted
domain for IoT-based healthcare applications. We study the problem of sharing
encrypted data, acquired from di↵erent sensor nodes, among a set of cloud servers.
In conclusion, the proposed schemes are theoretically secure in the following senses.
First, since the secret data is concealed by a secure encryption algorithm immediately
after its creation, the dealer as well as other sources cannot access the secret data.
Second, the key server only has partial shares and thus is also unable to retrieve the
secret data. Third, conforming with the access policy, a subset of fewer than a certain
number of participants does not su ce to decode the secrets either. In addition
to this, the data is not required to be stored in a common database so that the
scheme is not vulnerable to cyber threats against the database. Furthermore, since
data retrieval does not involve computationally expensive decryption operations, the
scheme is advantageous in time-sensitive circumstances.
On the other hand, however, the proposed methods may have some limitations
since they are based on one of the most basic and fundamental secret sharing
scheme, namely Shamir’s scheme. That is to say, although the proposed schemes are
theoretically secure, they might not be su cient strong solutions when putting into
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a more complex environment (e.g. dishonest parties involved) and considering an
extended access structures. We would like to emphasise that the proposed methods
are intended to serve as prototypes of privacy-preserving secret sharing. In the near
future we intend to extend this work into a more general access structure based on
the assumption that there are dishonest parties involved. Another line of further
investigation is the application of this work in visual cryptography.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The objectives of this thesis are to explore novel privacy-preserving information
hiding techniques and their applications. Although conventional information hid-
ing techniques have been shown e↵ective and widely used for multimedia content
protection, there are privacy and security concerns when applying these techniques
in cloud computing environments. In spite of the advantages and benefits of cloud
computing, the society has undergone a number of catastrophic incidents regarding
data breaches and privacy invasions. In order to address privacy threats against
conventional information hiding, we develop various privacy-preserving information
hiding techniques that deals with encrypted multimedia.
In this thesis, a variety of privacy-preserving information hiding techniques
as well as their real-world applications in the contexts of cyber security and cloud
computing have been presented. The experimental results have been used to verify
their e↵ectiveness and to show the improvements over the state-of-the-art with
regards to various performance factors. A novel research of privacy-preserving secret
sharing was also introduced in order to realise a secure access control for IoT-based
healthcare systems.
6.1 Thesis Summary
The objectives of this thesis were to explore information hiding and secret sharing
techniques for various privacy-aware applications. We demonstrated the applicability
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of proposed approaches to all sorts of widely-used symmetric-key and asymmetric-key
cryptosystems, including stream ciphers, RSA cryptosystem, Paillier cryptosystem,
and other cryptosystems sharing the similar homomorphic attributes.
Background
In Chapter 2, a brief introduction of related disciplines and a survey of representative
prior art were provided. The problem of concealing information under carrier
media has a long and successful history. Information hiding can be broadly divided
into two branches of research according to di↵erent purposes and characteristics.
Steganography aims to conceal the very fact that a secret communication takes
place. By contrast, watermarking serves as a protection mechanism against a variety
of illegitimate attacks concerning the carrier media, including but not limited to
copyright infringement, data forgery, illegal distribution, and malicious tampering.
In spite the fact that imperceptible distortions inflicted by the act of in-
formation hiding could be admissible and tolerable in common usage, there are
situations in which such alterations would be strictly restricted, for example, in
military reconnaissance or medical diagnosis. It becomes a more critical concern
by taking account of the artificial intelligence aided automated systems, such as
autonomous vehicle systems and autonomous diagnostic systems, which could be
unfavourably a↵ected by subtle perturbations if not being properly trained.
Modern cryptography serves as the basis of privacy-preserving signal pro-
cessing systems. In general, symmetric-key algorithms are of higher computational
e ciency, while asymmetric-key algorithms are of higher level of security due to
the revocation of key exchange. The prior art of privacy-preserving information
hiding can be categorised by the class of cryptosystems on which it is based. The
schemes can also be characterised by whether some compulsory preprocessing steps
takes place prior to encryption. A scheme is referred to as reserving room before
encryption (RRBE) if preprocessing is obligatory and vacating room after encryption
(VRAE) if otherwise. Although it is arguable that there are both pros and cons
of each paradigm, we drew attention to the paradigm that requires no specifically
arranged preprocessing by identifying the flexibility and generality as a high priority.
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Information Hiding Based on Symmetric Cryptography
In Chapter 3, two privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes based
upon stream ciphers were presented. The proposed schemes can be used to prevent
data exfiltration in such a way that a permission code is embedded into an encrypted
image and can be detected by a network administrator when transmissions occur.
The permission code can be detected and read in the encrypted domain, which
preserves the content privacy throughout storage, retrieval, and transfer.
The first scheme exploits the arithmetic of quadratic residues to encode
messages into an encrypted image and a projection-based predictive model to recover
the original image copy. A quadratic residue has four square roots and this property
can be utilised to encode payloads in a dynamic fashion. If we regard an element of
carrier image as a square root, we can represent the intended message by altering
the element to one of the square roots which share the same quadratic residue.
Recovering the original copy of image is equivalent to distinguishing the original
element from the given set of square roots. This aim can be fulfilled by a specifically
devised predictive model that produces an estimation of the original element. We
devised an e cient weighted predictive model that computes the weight parameters
based upon Hilbert projection theorem.
The second scheme utilises lexicographic permutations for message embedding
and a gradient-based estimation mechanism for assisting the carrier signal recovery.
We started with a scheme that embeds payloads by changing the ordering of a
sequence of carrier elements to a particular permutation. It was observed that in
some extreme cases where elements are similar to one another, despite permuting
the elements, the perturbed sequence may still be similar to the original sequence.
This would cause ambiguity when attempting to distinguish the original sequence
from the wrong candidates. Hence, we introduced an invertible transform to further
randomise the perturbed elements in order to minimise the ambiguity during the
recovery process. In addition to this, we devised a content-adaptive predictor which
exploits edge gradient to estimate pixel values, and used this predictor to assist the
recovery of original carrier image.
Experimental results showed that the proposed schemes outperformed the
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state-of-the-art in terms of capacity, fidelity and reversibility in most cases observed.
Information Hiding Based on Asymmetric Cryptography
In Chapter 4, two privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes based
respectively upon the RSA and Paillier cryptosystems were proposed. The proposed
schemes permit a party to outsource the task of watermarking to a cloud service pro-
vider without compromising information privacy. The framework is nearly identical
to the conventional framework of watermarking with the only di↵erence that the
watermark embedding process is conducted in the encrypted domain. The early devel-
opment of cloud-based schemes were primarily based upon traditional symmetric-key
ciphers and thus the security might be endangered during key exchange.
Although schemes compatible with asymmetric-key cryptosystems have under-
gone considerable development in recent, there were still some practical weaknesses
to be tackled. In particular, the prior art either handles the encryption scheme
in an ine cient manner that expands the size of data tremendously, or requires
specially designed preprocessing for carrier signals and thus sacrifices the universality
and applicability to act on unprocessed carrier signals. To address these issues, we
proposed a novel research paradigm and presented schemes compatible with di↵erent
partially homomorphic cryptosystems. By taking the practicality and availability
into consideration, it would be preferable to design a scheme based upon partially
homomorphic cryptosystems, instead of fully homomorphic cryptosystems. The
proposed schemes are developed for multiplicative homomorphism such as the RSA
cryptosystem and additive homomorphism such as the Paillier cryptosystem. The
watermark embedding function is viewed as noise adding in the encrypted domain,
whereas the joint watermark extraction and carrier recovery function is perceived as
a special denoising process that distinguishes the original host symbol from a set of
possible candidates. For the RSA-like cryptosystems, the proposed scheme can adjust
the embedding capacity readily and flexibly by managing the number of possible
candidates. However, watermark extraction and image recovery are not optimal
since the scheme produces random distance between each candidate instead of the
farthest distance. In contrast to this, for the Paillier-like cryptosystems, the scheme
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produces the farthest distance between two candidates and therefore is optimal with
respect to the reversibility. Yet, the number of candidate is limited to two and thus
the fixed capacity.
We devised an online predictive model and an o✏ine predictive model to
cope with the denoising problem. The online predictor is based upon total variation
denoising, which is operated on a terminal machine iteratively until the carrier
image is restored to a steady state. The o✏ine predictor is based upon Bayesian
inference, which utilises a pre-constructed probability table to guide the restoration
of contaminated parts of the image. A three-way trade-o↵ between the capacity,
fidelity and reversibility was analysed and the experimental results showed that the
proposed schemes achieved the state-the-art performance.
Privacy-Preserving Secret Sharing
In Chapter 5, three privacy-preserving secret sharing schemes were developed with
di↵erent levels of generality. The schemes permit secrets generated from di↵erent
source to be shared amongst a group of terminal users. The secrets is encrypted
before being transmitted to a central hub for the distribution process that follows.
The retrieval of secrets must conform to the pre-defined access policy. Hence, the
problem can be viewed as secret sharing in the encrypted domain. This technique
can be applied to privacy protection in Internet of things enabled healthcare systems.
Consider a context that an individual’s health records are collected from di↵erent
wearable equipments and sensor nodes. In order to safeguard the privacy of patients
and to impose access control, these records are encrypted and distributed to a group
of medical practitioners and clinical analysts. The data is protected in such a way
that it can only be accessed if a su cient number of authorised individuals agree to
retrieve it.
We began with na¨ıve solutions which, despite the feasibility, encountered
the issues of key distribution and time-consuming data retrieval process. The data
retrieval process should be computationally e cient when taking account of surgical
emergency. In response to these problems, we proposed a (2, 2)-threshold scheme
and further derived an (n, n)-threshold scheme. Finally, we developed a generalised
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(t, n)-threshold scheme by using the invertible Vandermonde matrix. The proposed
(t, n)-threshold scheme provides a general access control that enables a group of t
out of n authorised share holders to reconstruct the secrets. We showed that the
proposed scheme can be viewed as an extension of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme
for encrypted data.
6.2 Future Work
Although this thesis has presented technical principles and practical applications of
privacy-preserving information hiding, rigorous security analysis is also of significant
importance and thus should be taken into further consideration. Privacy-preserving in-
formation hiding is a multidisciplinary research encompassing cryptography, stegano-
graphy, watermarking, and other areas of knowledge to which the systems are applied.
In spite of the fact that the proposed schemes are based upon theoretically secure
cryptographic algorithms, it is possible that some novel types of security threats
exist depending on di↵erent applied environments. Malicious attempts to remove or
replace the embedded messages as well as other means to corrupt and compromise the
systems entail more attention. In the meantime, although potential applications in
the context of cyber security, cloud computing, and Internet of things were discussed,
some novel applications would also be favourable. In view of the growing research
trends in autonomous vehicle technology, it might be possible to apply privacy-
preserving information hiding techniques to vehicle telematics. For instance, these
techniques could be integrated into navigation systems to protect and authenticate
vehicular communications. Aside from this, fake news and its dissemination on social
media has drawn increasing attention over time. Fingerprinting is a special class of
digital watermarking that is widely used for tracing the unauthorised distribution
of digital objects. It may also be applied to the study of fake news spread patterns
through embedding fingerprint codes into social media posts.
Previous studies of privacy-preserving reversible information hiding have
led to a wide variety of methods. This thesis has categorised the prior art by
the cryptosystems on which it is based and further divided it into the class of
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reserving room before encryption (RRBE) and the class of vacating room after
encryption (VRAE). However, it would not be surprising if a scheme is composed
of characteristics beyond these definitions. Therefore, a more constructive and
systematic review of the state-of-the-art would be especially beneficial. In addition
to this, a more general model integrating di↵erent types of schemes deserves further
investigation. Improvements over the latest predictive models are expected through
the use of advanced neural networks and machine learning techniques. Regarding the
research of privacy-preserving secret sharing, although the proposed scheme permits
a general access threshold, more complex access structures can be further studied. It
is equally significant to develop theoretical analysis of security and take into account
application-oriented attacks.
In conclusion, privacy-preserving information hiding is a rather new area of
knowledge that requires e↵orts from various research communities. It is hoped that
novel and original ideas presented in this thesis can be of the building blocks for
more future research devoted to this research area.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are:
• two privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes based upon sym-
metric cryptography using respectively arithmetic of quadratic residues and
lexicographic permutations.
• two privacy-preserving reversible information hiding schemes based upon asym-
metric cryptography using respectively multiplicative and additive privacy
homomorphisms.
• four predictive models for assisting the recovery of original signals using re-
spectively projection theorem, image gradient, total variation denoising, and
Bayesian inference.
• three privacy-preserving secret sharing algorithms in ascending level of general-
ity.
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• a variety of applications in the contexts of cloud computing, cyber security,
Internet of things, etc.
135
Bibliography
[1] S. Issenberg, “How Obama’s team used big data to rally voters,” MIT Technology
Review, Dec. 2012.
[2] C. Cadwalladr and E. Graham-Harrison, “Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles
harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data breach,” The Guardian, Mar. 2018.
[3] Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, “Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final
report,” House of Commons, Feb. 2019.
[4] L. M. Kaufman, “Data security in the world of cloud computing,” IEEE Security &
Privacy, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 61–64, July 2009.
[5] H. Takabi, J. B. D. Joshi, and G. Ahn, “Security and privacy challenges in cloud
computing environments,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 24–31, Nov.
2010.
[6] D. Zissis and D. Lekkas, “Addressing cloud computing security issues,” Future Gener-
ation Computer Systems, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 583–592, Mar. 2012.
[7] R. L. Lagendijk, Z. Erkin, and M. Barni, “Encrypted signal processing for privacy pro-
tection: Conveying the utility of homomorphic encryption and multiparty computation,”
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 82–105, Jan. 2013.
[8] C. Aguilar-Melchor, S. Fau, C. Fontaine, G. Gogniat, and R. Sirdey, “Recent advances
in homomorphic encryption: A possible future for signal processing in the encrypted
domain,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 108–117, Mar. 2013.
[9] J. R. Troncoso-pastoriza and F. Perez-Gonzalez, “Secure signal processing in the cloud:
Enabling technologies for privacy-preserving multimedia cloud processing,” IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 29–41, Mar. 2013.
136
[10] I. A. T. Hashem, I. Yaqoob, N. B. Anuar, S. Mokhtar, A. Gani, and S. U. Khan, “The
rise of “big data” on cloud computing: Review and open research issues,” Information
Systems, vol. 47, no. Supplement C, pp. 98–115, Jan. 2015.
[11] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant, “Privacy-preserving data mining,” in Proceedings of the
ACM International Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD), Dallas, TX, USA,
May 2000, pp. 439–450.
[12] M. Kantarcioglu and C. Clifton, “Privacy-preserving distributed mining of association
rules on horizontally partitioned data,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering, vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 1026–1037, Sept. 2004.
[13] Y.-C. Chang and M. Mitzenmacher, “Privacy preserving keyword searches on remote en-
crypted data,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Applied Cryptography
and Network Security (ACNS), New York, NY, USA, June 2005, pp. 442–455.
[14] Z. Erkin, A. Piva, S. Katzenbeisser, R. L. Lagendijk, J. Shokrollahi, G. Neven,
and M. Barni, “Protection and retrieval of encrypted multimedia content: When
cryptography meets signal processing,” EURASIP Journal on Information Security,
vol. 2007, pp. 17:1–17:20, Jan. 2007.
[15] A. B. Chan, , and N. Vasconcelos, “Privacy preserving crowd monitoring: Counting
people without people models or tracking,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), Anchorage, AK, USA, June 2008,
pp. 1–7.
[16] C. Wang, S. S. M. Chow, Q. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Privacy-preserving public
auditing for secure cloud storage,” IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 62, no. 2,
pp. 362–375, Feb. 2013.
[17] N. Cao, C. Wang, M. Li, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Privacy-preserving multi-keyword
ranked search over encrypted cloud data,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distrib-
uted Systems, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 222–233, Jan. 2014.
[18] M. Barni, G. Droandi, and R. Lazzeretti, “Privacy protection in biometric-based
recognition systems: A marriage between cryptography and signal processing,” IEEE
Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 66–76, Sept. 2015.
[19] Z. Xia, X. Wang, L. Zhang, Z. Qin, X. Sun, and K. Ren, “A privacy-preserving and
copy-deterrence content-based image retrieval scheme in cloud computing,” IEEE
137
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 11, pp. 2594–2608,
Nov. 2016.
[20] X. Wei, C. Li, Z. Lei, D. Yi, and S. Z. Li, “Dynamic image-to-class warping for occluded
face recognition,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 9,
no. 12, pp. 2035–2050, Dec. 2014.
[21] Y. Guan, C. Li, and F. Roli, “On reducing the e↵ect of covariate factors in gait
recognition: A classifier ensemble method,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis
and Machine Intelligence, vol. 37, no. 7, pp. 1521–1528, July 2015.
[22] N. Jia, V. Sanchez, and C. Li, “On view-invariant gait recognition: a feature selection
solution,” IET Biometrics, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 287–295, June 2018.
[23] C. Li, “Source camera identification using enhanced sensor pattern noise,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 280–287, June
2010.
[24] X. Lin and C. Li, “Preprocessing reference sensor pattern noise via spectrum equaliza-
tion,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 1, pp.
126–140, Jan. 2016.
[25] X. Lin and C. Li, “Enhancing sensor pattern noise via filtering distortion removal,”
IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 381–385, Mar. 2016.
[26] A. Khadidos, V. Sanchez, and C. Li, “Weighted level set evolution based on local edge
features for medical image segmentation,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing,
vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 1979–1991, Apr. 2017.
[27] X. Guan, C. Li, and Y. Guan, “Matrix factorization with rating completion: An
enhanced svd model for collaborative filtering recommender systems,” IEEE Access,
vol. 5, pp. 27 668–27 678, Nov. 2017.
[28] R. Leyva, V. Sanchez, and C. Li, “Video anomaly detection with compact feature sets
for online performance,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 26, no. 7, pp.
3463–3478, July 2017.
[29] X. Lin and C. Li, “Large-scale image clustering based on camera fingerprints,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 793–808, Apr.
2017.
138
[30] N. Kerris and T. Muller, “Update to celebrity photo investigation,” Apple Media
Advisory, Sept. 2014.
[31] T. Bianchi and A. Piva, “Secure watermarking for multimedia content protection: A
review of its benefits and open issues,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 30,
no. 2, pp. 87–96, Mar. 2013.
[32] B. Pfitzmann, “Information hiding terminology,” in Proceedings of the International
Workshop on Information Hiding (IH), Cambridge, UK, May 1996, pp. 347–350.
[33] F. A. P. Petitcolas, R. J. Anderson, and M. G. Kuhn, “Information hiding–A survey,”
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 87, no. 7, pp. 1062–1078, July 1999.
[34] P. Moulin and J. A. O’Sullivan, “Information-theoretic analysis of information hiding,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 563–593, Mar. 2003.
[35] S. Katzenbeisser and F. Petitcolas, Information Hiding. Norwood, MA, USA: Artech
House, 2016.
[36] I. J. Cox, M. L. Miller, J. A. Bloom, J. Fridrich, and T. Kalker, Digital Watermarking
and Steganography, 2nd ed. San Francisco, CA, USA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers
Inc., 2008.
[37] J. Fridrich, Steganography in Digital Media: Principles, Algorithms, and Applications.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[38] J. Trithemius, The Steganographia of Johannes Trithemius, A. McLean, Ed. Edinburgh,
Scotland: Magnum Opus Hermetic Sourceworks, 1982.
[39] Herodotus, The Histories. London, England: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1992.
[40] J. E. Hoover, “The enemy’s masterpiece of espionage,” Reader’s Digest, vol. 48, pp.
49–53, May 1946.
[41] G. J. Simmons, “The prisoners’ problem and the subliminal channel,” in Advances in
Cryptology, D. Chaum, Ed. Boston, MA, USA: Springer US, 1984, pp. 51–67.
[42] N. F. Johnson and S. Jajodia, “Exploring steganography: Seeing the unseen,” Computer,
vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 26–34, Feb. 1998.
[43] R. J. Anderson and F. A. P. Petitcolas, “On the limits of steganography,” IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 474–481, May 1998.
139
[44] N. Provos and P. Honeyman, “Hide and seek: an introduction to steganography,” IEEE
Security & Privacy, vol. 99, no. 3, pp. 32–44, May 2003.
[45] A. D. Ker, “Steganalysis of lsb matching in grayscale images,” IEEE Signal Processing
Letters, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 441–444, June 2005.
[46] J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, P. Lisonek, and D. Soukal, “Writing on wet paper,” IEEE
Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 53, no. 10, pp. 3923–3935, Oct. 2005.
[47] J. Mielikainen, “Lsb matching revisited,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 13, no. 5,
pp. 285–287, May 2006.
[48] X. Zhang and S. Wang, “E cient steganographic embedding by exploiting modification
direction,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 10, no. 11, pp. 781–783, November
2006.
[49] J. Fridrich and J. Kodovsky, “Rich models for steganalysis of digital images,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 868–882, June
2012.
[50] C.-Y. Chang and S. Clark, “Practical linguistic steganography using contextual syn-
onym substitution and a novel vertex coding method,” Computational Linguistics,
vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 403–448, June 2014.
[51] R. G. van Schyndel, A. Z. Tirkel, and C. F. Osborne, “A digital watermark,” in
Proceedings of the International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), vol. 2, Austin,
TX, USA, Nov. 1994, pp. 86–90.
[52] F. Hartung and M. Kutter, “Multimedia watermarking techniques,” Proceedings of the
IEEE, vol. 87, no. 7, pp. 1079–1107, July 1999.
[53] C. I. Podilchuk and E. J. Delp, “Digital watermarking: algorithms and applications,”
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 33–46, July 2001.
[54] P. Moulin and R. Koetter, “Data-hiding codes,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 93,
no. 12, pp. 2083–2126, Dec. 2005.
[55] I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, F. T. Leighton, and T. Shamoon, “Secure spread spectrum
watermarking for multimedia,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 6, no. 12,
pp. 1673–1687, Dec. 1997.
140
[56] D. Boneh and J. Shaw, “Collusion-secure fingerprinting for digital data,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 1897–1905, Sept. 1998.
[57] R. B. Wolfgang, C. I. Podilchuk, and E. J. Delp, “Perceptual watermarks for digital
images and video,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 87, no. 7, pp. 1108–1126, July 1999.
[58] I. J. Cox, M. L. Miller, and A. L. McKellips, “Watermarking as communications with
side information,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 87, no. 7, pp. 1127–1141, July 1999.
[59] N. M. and, “A buyer-seller watermarking protocol,” IEEE Transactions on Image
Processing, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 643–649, Apr. 2001.
[60] B. Chen and G. W. Wornell, “Quantization index modulation: A class of provably good
methods for digital watermarking and information embedding,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 1423–1443, May 2001.
[61] M. Barni, F. Bartolini, and A. Piva, “Improved wavelet-based watermarking through
pixel-wise masking,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 10, no. 5, pp.
783–791, May 2001.
[62] P. Bas, J. . Chassery, and B. Macq, “Geometrically invariant watermarking using
feature points,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 11, no. 9, pp. 1014–1028,
Sept. 2002.
[63] H. S. Malvar and D. A. F. Florencio, “Improved spread spectrum: A new modulation
technique for robust watermarking,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 51,
no. 4, pp. 898–905, Apr. 2003.
[64] C.-C. Chang, P. Tsai, and C.-C. Lin, “SVD-based digital image watermarking scheme,”
Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 26, no. 10, pp. 1577–1586, July 2005.
[65] F. A. P. Petitcolas, R. J. Anderson, and M. G. Kuhn, “Attacks on copyright marking
systems,” in Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information Hiding (IH),
D. Aucsmith, Ed., Portland, OR, USA, Nov. 1998, pp. 218–238.
[66] M. M. Yeung and F. Mintzer, “An invisible watermarking technique for image verific-
ation,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP),
vol. 2, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, Oct. 1997, pp. 680–683.
[67] J. Fridrich, “Image watermarking for tamper detection,” in Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), vol. 2, Chicago, IL, USA, Oct. 1998,
pp. 404–408.
141
[68] D. Kundur and D. Hatzinakos, “Digital watermarking for telltale tamper proofing and
authentication,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 87, no. 7, pp. 1167–1180, July 1999.
[69] M. Holliman and N. Memon, “Counterfeiting attacks on oblivious block-wise independ-
ent invisible watermarking schemes,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 9,
no. 3, pp. 432–441, Mar. 2000.
[70] E. T. Lin, C. I. Podilchuk, and E. J. Delp, “Detection of image alterations using
semifragile watermarks,” in Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 3971, San Jose, CA, USA, May
2000, pp. 152–163.
[71] C.-Y. Lin and S.-F. Chang, “Semifragile watermarking for authenticating jpeg visual
content,” in Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 3971, San Jose, CA, USA, May 2000, pp. 140–151.
[72] H. Si and C.-T. Li, “Fragile watermarking scheme based on the block-wise dependence
in the wavelet domain,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on Multimedia and Security
(MM&Sec), Magdeburg, Germany, Sept. 2004, pp. 214–219.
[73] C.-T. Li, “Digital fragile watermarking scheme for authentication of JPEG images,”
IEE Proceedings - Vision, Image Signal Processing, vol. 151, no. 6, pp. 460–466, Dec.
2004.
[74] J. Fridrich, “Security of fragile authentication watermarks with localization,” in
Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 4675, San Jose, CA, USA, Apr. 2002, pp. 691–700.
[75] M. U. Celik, G. Sharma, E. Saber, and A. M. Tekalp, “Hierarchical watermarking
for secure image authentication with localization,” IEEE Transactions on Image
Processing, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 585–595, June 2002.
[76] A. H. Ouda and M. R. El-Sakka, “Localization and security enhancement of block-based
image authentication,” in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Image
Processing (ICIP), vol. 1, Genova, Italy, Sept. 2005, pp. 673–676.
[77] C.-C. Chang, Y.-S. Hu, and T.-C. Lu, “A watermarking-based image ownership and
tampering authentication scheme,” Pattern Recognition Letters, vol. 27, no. 5, pp.
439–446, Apr. 2006.
[78] H. Liu and M. Steinebach, “Digital watermarking for image authentication with
localization,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Image Processing
(ICIP), Atlanta, GA, USA, Oct. 2006, pp. 1973–1976.
142
[79] C.-C. Chang, K.-N. Chen, C.-F. Lee, and L.-J. Liu, “A secure fragile watermarking
scheme based on chaos-and-hamming code,” Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 84,
no. 9, pp. 1462–1470, Sept. 2011.
[80] J. Lee and C. S. Won, “Authentication and correction of digital watermarking images,”
Electronics Letters, vol. 35, no. 11, pp. 886–887, May 1999.
[81] J. Fridrich and M. Goljan, “Images with self-correcting capabilities,” in Proceedings of
the International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), vol. 3, Kobe, Japan, Oct.
1999, pp. 792–796.
[82] X. Zhu, A. T. Ho, and P. Marziliano, “A new semi-fragile image watermarking with
robust tampering restoration using irregular sampling,” Signal Processing: Image
Communication, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 515–528, June 2007.
[83] T.-Y. Lee and S. D. Lin, “Dual watermark for image tamper detection and recovery,”
Pattern Recognition, vol. 41, no. 11, pp. 3497–3506, Nov. 2008.
[84] X. Zhang and S. Wang, “Fragile watermarking with error-free restoration capability,”
IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 1490–1499, Dec. 2008.
[85] C.-W. Yang and J.-J. Shen, “Recover the tampered image based on vq indexing,”
Signal Processing, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 331–343, Jan. 2010.
[86] X. Zhang, S. Wang, Z. Qian, and G. Feng, “Reference sharing mechanism for watermark
self-embedding,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 485–495,
Feb. 2011.
[87] X. Zhang, Z. Qian, Y. Ren, and G. Feng, “Watermarking with flexible self-recovery
quality based on compressive sensing and compositive reconstruction,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 1223–1232, Dec.
2011.
[88] C. Qin, C.-C. Chang, and P.-Y. Chen, “Self-embedding fragile watermarking with
restoration capability based on adaptive bit allocation mechanism,” Signal Processing,
vol. 92, no. 4, pp. 1137–1150, Apr. 2012.
[89] P. Korus and A. Dziech, “E cient method for content reconstruction with self-
embedding,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 1134–1147,
Mar. 2013.
143
[90] P. Korus and A. Dziech, “Adaptive self-embedding scheme with controlled reconstruc-
tion performance,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 9,
no. 2, pp. 169–181, Feb. 2014.
[91] P. Korus, J. Bia las, and A. Dziech, “Towards practical self-embedding for jpeg-
compressed digital images,” IEEE Transactions on Multimedia, vol. 17, no. 2, pp.
157–170, Feb. 2015.
[92] S. Sarreshtedari and M. A. Akhaee, “A source-channel coding approach to digital
image protection and self-recovery,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 24,
no. 7, pp. 2266–2277, July 2015.
[93] M. Hamid and C. Wang, “Adaptive image self-recovery based on feature extraction in
the dct domain,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 67 156–67 165, Nov. 2018.
[94] A. M. Eskicioglu and P. S. Fisher, “Image quality measures and their performance,”
IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 43, no. 12, pp. 2959–2965, Dec. 1995.
[95] Z. Wang and A. C. Bovik, “A universal image quality index,” IEEE Signal Processing
Letters, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 81–84, Mar. 2002.
[96] Z. Wang, A. C. Bovik, H. R. Sheikh, and E. P. Simoncelli, “Image quality assessment:
from error visibility to structural similarity,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing,
vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 600–612, Apr. 2004.
[97] A. W. Rix, A. Bourret, and M. P. Hollier, “Models of human perception,” BT
Technology Journal, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 24–34, Jan. 1999.
[98] B. B. Zhu, M. D. Swanson, and A. H. Tewfik, “When seeing isn’t believing: Multimedia
authentication technologies,” IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.
40–49, Mar. 2004.
[99] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A method for obtaining digital signatures
and public-key cryptosystems,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp.
120–126, Feb. 1978.
[100] G. L. Friedman, “The trustworthy digital camera: Restoring credibility to the pho-
tographic image,” IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, vol. 39, no. 4, pp.
905–910, Nov. 1993.
144
[101] I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Learning Representations
(ICLR), San Diego, CA, USA, May 2015, pp. 1–11.
[102] Y.-Q. Shi, X. Li, X. Zhang, H.-T. Wu, and B. Ma, “Reversible data hiding: Advances
in the past two decades,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 3210–3237, May 2016.
[103] J. M. Barton, “Method and apparatus for embedding authentication information within
digital data,” U.S. Patent 5 646 997, July 8, 1997.
[104] J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, and R. Du, “Invertible authentication,” in Proceedings of SPIE,
vol. 4314, San Jose, CA, USA, Jan. 2001, pp. 197–208.
[105] M. Goljan, J. J. Fridrich, and R. Du, “Distortion-free data embedding for images,” in
Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information Hiding (IH), Pittsburgh,
PA, USA, Apr. 2001, pp. 27–41.
[106] J. Fridrich, M. Goljan, and R. Du, “Lossless data embedding: New paradigm in digital
watermarking,” EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, vol. 2002, no. 2,
pp. 185–196, Feb. 2002.
[107] G. Xuan, J. Zhu, J. Chen, Y.-Q. Shi, Z. Ni, and W. Su, “Distortionless data hiding
based on integer wavelet transform,” Electronics Letters, vol. 38, no. 25, pp. 1646–1648,
Dec. 2002.
[108] M. U. Celik, G. Sharma, A. M. Tekalp, and E. Saber, “Lossless generalized-lsb data
embedding,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 253–266, Feb.
2005.
[109] M. U. Celik, G. Sharma, and A. M. Tekalp, “Lossless watermarking for image authen-
tication: a new framework and an implementation,” IEEE Transactions on Image
Processing, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 1042–1049, Apr. 2006.
[110] T. Kalker and F. M. J. Willems, “Capacity bounds and constructions for reversible data-
hiding,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Digital Signal Processing
(DSP), Santorini, Greece, July 2002, pp. 71–76.
[111] W. Zhang, B. Chen, and N. Yu, “Improving various reversible data hiding schemes
via optimal codes for binary covers,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 21,
no. 6, pp. 2991–3003, June 2012.
145
[112] S. Lin and W. Chung, “The scalar scheme for reversible information-embedding in
gray-scale signals: Capacity evaluation and code constructions,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1155–1167, Aug. 2012.
[113] X. Zhang, “Reversible data hiding with optimal value transfer,” IEEE Transactions
on Multimedia, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 316–325, Feb. 2013.
[114] X. Hu, W. Zhang, X. Hu, N. Yu, X. Zhao, and F. Li, “Fast estimation of optimal marked-
signal distribution for reversible data hiding,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 779–788, May 2013.
[115] W. Zhang, X. Hu, X. Li, and N. Yu, “Recursive histogram modification: Establishing
equivalency between reversible data hiding and lossless data compression,” IEEE
Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 22, no. 7, pp. 2775–2785, July 2013.
[116] W. Zhang, X. Hu, X. Li, and Y. Nenghai, “Optimal transition probability of reversible
data hiding for general distortion metrics and its applications,” IEEE Transactions on
Image Processing, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 294–304, Jan. 2015.
[117] F. Balado, “Optimum reversible data hiding and permutation coding,” in Proceedings
of the IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS),
Rome, Italy, Nov. 2015, pp. 1–4.
[118] J. Tian, “Reversible data embedding using a di↵erence expansion,” IEEE Transactions
on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 890–896, Aug. 2003.
[119] A. M. Alattar, “Reversible watermark using the di↵erence expansion of a generalized
integer transform,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 1147–
1156, Aug. 2004.
[120] D. Coltuc and J. Chassery, “Very fast watermarking by reversible contrast mapping,”
IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 255–258, Apr. 2007.
[121] S. Lee, C. D. Yoo, and T. Kalker, “Reversible image watermarking based on integer-to-
integer wavelet transform,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 321–330, Sept. 2007.
[122] H. J. Kim, V. Sachnev, Y. Q. Shi, J. Nam, and H. Choo, “A novel di↵erence expansion
transform for reversible data embedding,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 456–465, Sept. 2008.
146
[123] X. Wang, X. Li, B. Yang, and Z. Guo, “E cient generalized integer transform for
reversible watermarking,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 567–570,
June 2010.
[124] L. Kamstra and H. J. A. M. Heijmans, “Reversible data embedding into images using
wavelet techniques and sorting,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 14,
no. 12, pp. 2082–2090, Dec. 2005.
[125] Z. Ni, Y.-Q. Shi, N. Ansari, and W. Su, “Reversible data hiding,” IEEE Transactions
on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 354–362, Mar. 2006.
[126] D. M. Thodi and J. J. Rodriguez, “Expansion embedding techniques for reversible
watermarking,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 721–730,
Mar. 2007.
[127] V. Sachnev, H. J. Kim, J. Nam, S. Suresh, and Y. Q. Shi, “Reversible watermarking
algorithm using sorting and prediction,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems
for Video Technology, vol. 19, no. 7, pp. 989–999, July 2009.
[128] L. Luo, Z. Chen, M. Chen, X. Zeng, and Z. Xiong, “Reversible image watermarking
using interpolation technique,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 187–193, Mar. 2010.
[129] C. Qin, C. Chang, Y. Huang, and L. Liao, “An inpainting-assisted reversible stegano-
graphic scheme using a histogram shifting mechanism,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits
and Systems for Video Technology, vol. 23, no. 7, pp. 1109–1118, July 2013.
[130] M. Fallahpour, “Reversible image data hiding based on gradient adjusted prediction,”
IEICE Electronics Express, vol. 5, no. 20, pp. 870–876, Oct. 2008.
[131] D. Coltuc, “Improved embedding for prediction-based reversible watermarking,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 873–882, Sept.
2011.
[132] B. Ou, X. Li, Y. Zhao, R. Ni, and Y. Shi, “Pairwise prediction-error expansion for
e cient reversible data hiding,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 22,
no. 12, pp. 5010–5021, Dec. 2013.
[133] X. Li, B. Yang, and T. Zeng, “E cient reversible watermarking based on adapt-
ive prediction-error expansion and pixel selection,” IEEE Transactions on Image
Processing, vol. 20, no. 12, pp. 3524–3533, Dec 2011.
147
[134] G. Coatrieux, W. Pan, N. Cuppens-Boulahia, F. Cuppens, and C. Roux, “Reversible
watermarking based on invariant image classification and dynamic histogram shifting,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 111–120,
Jan 2013.
[135] W. Hong, “Adaptive reversible data hiding method based on error energy control and
histogram shifting,” Optics Communications, vol. 285, no. 2, pp. 101–108, Jan. 2012.
[136] Q. Pei, X. Wang, Y. Li, and H. Li, “Adaptive reversible watermarking with improved
embedding capacity,” Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 86, no. 11, pp. 2841–2848,
Nov. 2013.
[137] W. Hong, T.-S. Chen, and J. Chen, “Reversible data hiding using delaunay triangulation
and selective embedment,” Information Sciences, vol. 308, pp. 140–154, July 2015.
[138] M. Fallahpour and M. H. Sedaaghi, “High capacity lossless data hiding based on
histogram modification,” IEICE Electronics Express, vol. 4, no. 7, pp. 205–210, Apr.
2007.
[139] G. Xuan, Y. Q. Shi, P. Chai, X. Cui, Z. Ni, and X. Tong, “Optimum histogram pair
based image lossless data embedding,” in Proceedings of the International Workshop
on Digital Watermarking (IWDW), Guangzhou, China, Dec. 2007, pp. 264–278.
[140] X. Li, B. Li, B. Yang, and T. Zeng, “General framework to histogram-shifting-based
reversible data hiding,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 22, no. 6, pp.
2181–2191, June 2013.
[141] J. Wang, J. Ni, X. Zhang, and Y. Shi, “Rate and distortion optimization for reversible
data hiding using multiple histogram shifting,” IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics,
vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 315–326, Feb. 2017.
[142] X. Li, W. Zhang, X. Gui, and B. Yang, “A novel reversible data hiding scheme
based on two-dimensional di↵erence-histogram modification,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 7, pp. 1091–1100, July 2013.
[143] S. Wang, C. Li, and W. Kuo, “Reversible data hiding based on two-dimensional
prediction errors,” IET Image Processing, vol. 7, no. 9, pp. 805–816, Dec. 2013.
[144] I. Caciula and D. Coltuc, “Improved control for low bit-rate reversible watermarking,”
in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal
Processing (ICASSP), Florence, Italy, May 2014, pp. 7425–7429.
148
[145] X. Li, W. Zhang, X. Gui, and B. Yang, “E cient reversible data hiding based on
multiple histograms modification,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 10, no. 9, pp. 2016–2027, Sep. 2015.
[146] C. P. Bauer, Secret History: The Story of Cryptology. Boca Raton, FL, USA: CRC
Press, 2013.
[147] J. Katz and Y. Lindell, Introduction to Modern Cryptography, 2nd ed. Boca Raton,
FL, USA: CRC Press, 2014.
[148] A. Kerckho↵s, “La cryptographie militaire,” Journal des Sciences Militaires, vol. IX,
pp. 5–38, Jan. 1883.
[149] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” The Bell System Technical
Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, Oct. 1949.
[150] R. J. Anderson, Security Engineering, 2nd ed. Indianapolis, IN, USA: Wiley Publishing,
Inc., 2008.
[151] G. Vernam, “Secret signaling system,” U.S. Patent 1 310 719, July 22, 1919.
[152] S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin, and A. Shamir, “Weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithm of
rc4,” in Proceedings of the International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography
(SAC), Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Aug. 2001, pp. 1–24.
[153] E. Biham and A. Shamir, “Di↵erential cryptanalysis of des-like cryptosystems,” Journal
of Cryptology, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 3–72, Jan. 1991.
[154] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption
Standard. Springer, 2002.
[155] W. Di e and M. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, Nov. 1976.
[156] N. Koblitz, “Elliptic curve cryptosystems,” Mathematics of Computation, vol. 48, no.
177, pp. 203–209, Jan. 1987.
[157] R. L. Rivest, L. Adleman, and M. L. Dertouzos, “On data banks and privacy ho-
momorphisms,” in Foundations of Secure Computation, R. A. DeMillo et al., Eds.
Orlando, FL, USA: Academic Press, 1978, pp. 169–180.
149
[158] M. O. Rabin, “Digitalized signatures and public-key functions as intractable as factor-
ization,” MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA, Tech. Rep.
MIT/LCS/TR-212, Jan. 1979.
[159] S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, “Probabilistic encryption,” Journal of Computer and
System Sciences, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 270–299, Apr. 1984.
[160] T. ElGamal, “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 469–472,
Jul. 1985.
[161] J. Benaloh, “Dense probabilistic encryption,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on
Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC), Kingston, Canada, May 1994, pp. 120–128.
[162] T. Okamoto and S. Uchiyama, “A new public-key cryptosystem as secure as factoring,”
in Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Espoo, Finland, May 1998, pp. 308–318.
[163] D. Naccache and J. Stern, “A new public key cryptosystem based on higher residues,”
in Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
(CCS), San Francisco, CA, USA, Nov. 1998, pp. 59–66.
[164] P. Paillier, “Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residuosity classes,”
in Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Prague, Czech Republic, May 1999, pp.
223–238.
[165] I. Damg˚ard and M. Jurik, “A generalisation, a simplication and some applications of
Paillier’s probabilistic public-key system,” in Proceedings of the International Workshop
on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography (PKC), Feb. 2001, pp. 119–136.
[166] C. Gentry, “Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices,” in Proceedings of the
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), Bethesda, MD, USA, May
2009, pp. 169–178.
[167] M. van Dijk, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “Fully homomorphic
encryption over the integers,” in Proceedings of the Annual International Conference
on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), French
Riviera, France, May 2010, pp. 24–43.
150
[168] N. P. Smart and F. Vercauteren, “Fully homomorphic encryption with relatively small
key and ciphertext sizes,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Practice
and Theory in Public Key Cryptography (PKC), Paris, France, May 2010, pp. 420–443.
[169] D. Stehle´ and R. Steinfeld, “Faster fully homomorphic encryption,” in Proceedings
of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and
Information Security (ASIACRYPT), Singapore, Dec. 2010, pp. 377–394.
[170] C. Gentry and S. Halevi, “Implementing Gentry’s fully-homomorphic encryption
scheme,” in Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Tallinn, Estonia, May 2011,
pp. 129–148.
[171] Z. Brakerski and V. Vaikuntanathan, “E cient fully homomorphic encryption from
(standard) LWE,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS), Palm Springs, CA, USA, Oct. 2011, pp. 97–106.
[172] Z. Brakerski, C. Gentry, and V. Vaikuntanathan, “(Leveled) fully homomorphic
encryption without bootstrapping,” in Proceedings of the Innovations in Theoretical
Computer Science Conference (ITCS), Cambridge, MA, USA, Jan. 2012, pp. 309–325.
[173] J. H. Cheon, J.-S. Coron, J. Kim, M. S. Lee, T. Lepoint, M. Tibouchi, and A. Yun,
“Batch fully homomorphic encryption over the integers,” in Proceedings of the Annual
International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
(EUROCRYPT), Athens, Greece, May 2013, pp. 315–335.
[174] C. Gentry, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Homomorphic encryption from learning with
errors: Conceptually-simpler, asymptotically-faster, attribute-based,” in Proceedings
of the Annual Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), R. Canetti and J. A. Garay, Eds.,
Santa Barbara, CA, USA, Aug. 2013, pp. 75–92.
[175] J.-S. Coron, T. Lepoint, and M. Tibouchi, “Scale-invariant fully homomorphic encryp-
tion over the integers,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Practice and
Theory in Public-Key Cryptography (PKC), Buenos Aires, Argentina, Mar. 2014, pp.
311–328.
[176] N. P. Smart and F. Vercauteren, “Fully homomorphic SIMD operations,” Designs,
Codes and Cryptography, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 57–81, Apr. 2014.
151
[177] W. Puech, M. Chaumont, and O. Strauss, “A reversible data hiding method for
encrypted images,” in Proceedings of SPIE, vol. 6819, San Jose, CA, USA, Mar. 2008,
p. 68191E.
[178] P. Puteaux and W. Puech, “Reversible data hiding in encrypted images based on
adaptive local entropy analysis,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on
Image Processing Theory, Tools and Applications (IPTA), Montreal, Canada, Nov.
2017, pp. 1–6.
[179] P. Puteaux and W. Puech, “An e cient MSB prediction-based method for high-capacity
reversible data hiding in encrypted images,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 13, no. 7, pp. 1670–1681, July 2018.
[180] X. Zhang, “Reversible data hiding in encrypted image,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters,
vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 255–258, Apr. 2011.
[181] W. Hong, T. S. Chen, and H. Y. Wu, “An improved reversible data hiding in encrypted
images using side match,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 199–202,
Apr. 2012.
[182] X. Liao and C. Shu, “Reversible data hiding in encrypted images based on absolute
mean di↵erence of multiple neighboring pixels,” Journal of Visual Communication and
Image Representation, vol. 28, pp. 21–27, Apr. 2015.
[183] J. Zhou, W. Sun, L. Dong, X. Liu, O. C. Au, and Y. Y. Tang, “Secure reversible
image data hiding over encrypted domain via key modulation,” IEEE Transactions on
Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 441–452, Mar. 2016.
[184] C. Qin and X. Zhang, “E↵ective reversible data hiding in encrypted image with
privacy protection for image content,” Journal of Visual Communication and Image
Representation, vol. 31, pp. 154–164, Aug. 2015.
[185] Z. Qian, S. Dai, F. Jiang, and X. Zhang, “Improved joint reversible data hiding
in encrypted images,” Journal of Visual Communication and Image Representation,
vol. 40, pp. 732–738, Oct. 2016.
[186] R. Bhardwaj and A. Aggarwal, “An improved block based joint reversible data hiding
in encrypted images by symmetric cryptosystem,” Pattern Recognition Letters, Feb.
2018.
152
[187] X. Zhang, “Separable reversible data hiding in encrypted image,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 826–832, Apr. 2012.
[188] M. Johnson, P. Ishwar, V. Prabhakaran, D. Schonberg, and K. Ramchandran, “On
compressing encrypted data,” IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 52, no. 10,
pp. 2992–3006, Oct. 2004.
[189] R. Lazzeretti and M. Barni, “Lossless compression of encrypted grey-level and color
images,” in Proceedings of the European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO),
Lausanne, Switzerland, Aug. 2008, pp. 1–5.
[190] D. Schonberg, S. C. Draper, C. Yeo, and K. Ramchandran, “Toward compression of
encrypted images and video sequences,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 749–762, Dec. 2008.
[191] W. Liu, W. Zeng, L. Dong, and Q. Yao, “E cient compression of encrypted grayscale
images,” IEEE Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 1097–1102, Apr.
2010.
[192] D. Klinc, C. Hazay, A. Jagmohan, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin, “On compression
of data encrypted with block ciphers,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 6989–7001, Nov. 2012.
[193] J. Zhou, O. C. Au, G. Zhai, Y. Y. Tang, and X. Liu, “Scalable compression of stream
cipher encrypted images through context-adaptive sampling,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 9, no. 11, pp. 1857–1868, Nov. 2014.
[194] Z. Qian and X. Zhang, “Reversible data hiding in encrypted images with distributed
source encoding,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology,
vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 636–646, Apr. 2016.
[195] Z. Qian, X. Zhang, and G. Feng, “Reversible data hiding in encrypted images based on
progressive recovery,” IEEE Signal Processing Letters, vol. 23, no. 11, pp. 1672–1676,
Nov. 2016.
[196] Z. Qian, H. Zhou, X. Zhang, and W. Zhang, “Separable reversible data hiding in
encrypted JPEG bitstreams,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing,
vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 1055–1067, Nov. 2018.
153
[197] K. Ma, W. Zhang, X. Zhao, N. Yu, and F. Li, “Reversible data hiding in encrypted
images by reserving room before encryption,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 553–562, Mar. 2013.
[198] X. Cao, L. Du, X. Wei, D. Meng, and X. Guo, “High capacity reversible data hiding
in encrypted images by patch-level sparse representation,” IEEE Transactions on
Cybernetics, vol. 46, no. 5, pp. 1132–1143, May 2016.
[199] K. Chen and C.-C. Chang, “High-capacity reversible data hiding in encrypted images
based on extended run-length coding and block-based msb plane rearrangement,”
Journal of Visual Communication and Image Representation, vol. 58, pp. 334–344,
Jan. 2019.
[200] H.-T. Wu, Y.-M. Cheung, and J. Huang, “Reversible data hiding in Paillier cryptosys-
tem,” Journal of Visual Communication and Image Representation, vol. 40, pt. B, pp.
765–771, Oct. 2016.
[201] X. Wu, B. Chen, and J. Weng, “Reversible data hiding for encrypted signals by
homomorphic encryption and signal energy transfer,” Journal of Visual Communication
and Image Representation, vol. 41, pp. 58–64, Nov. 2016.
[202] M. Li and Y. Li, “Histogram shifting in encrypted images with public key cryptosystem
for reversible data hiding,” Signal Processing, vol. 130, pp. 190–196, Jan. 2017.
[203] B. Chen, X. Wu, and Y.-S. Wei, “Reversible data hiding in encrypted images with
private-key homomorphism and public-key homomorphism,” Journal of Visual Com-
munication and Image Representation, vol. 57, pp. 272–282, Nov. 2018.
[204] C.-W. Shiu, Y.-C. Chen, and W. Hong, “Encrypted image-based reversible data hiding
with public key cryptography from di↵erence expansion,” Signal Processing: Image
Communication, vol. 39, pp. 226–233, Nov. 2015.
[205] X. Zhang, J. Long, Z. Wang, and H. Cheng, “Lossless and reversible data hiding in
encrypted images with public-key cryptography,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and
Systems for Video Technology, vol. 26, no. 9, pp. 1622–1631, Sept. 2016.
[206] S. Xiang and X. Luo, “Reversible data hiding in homomorphic encrypted domain by
mirroring ciphertext group,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for Video
Technology, vol. 28, no. 11, pp. 3099–3110, Nov. 2018.
154
[207] C.-C. Chang and S.-M. Tsu, “Arithmetic operations on encrypted data,” International
Journal of Computer Mathematics, vol. 56, no. 1-2, pp. 1–10, Apr. 1995.
[208] G. H. Hardy and E. M. Wright, An Introduction to the Theory of Numbers, 6th ed.,
R. Heath-Brown et al., Eds. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008.
[209] I. C. Dragoi, H. G. Coanda, and D. Coltuc, “Improved reversible data hiding in
encrypted images based on reserving room after encryption and pixel prediction,” in
Proceedings of the European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO), Kos, Greece,
Aug. 2017, pp. 2186–2190.
[210] C. W. Honsinger, P. W. Jones, M. Rabbani, and J. C. Sto↵el, “Lossless recovery of an
original image containing embedded data,” U.S. Patent 6 278 791, Aug. 21, 2001.
[211] Y. Yang, X. Sun, H. Yang, C.-T. Li, and R. Xiao, “A contrast-sensitive reversible
visible image watermarking technique,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems
for Video Technology, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 656–667, May 2009.
[212] W.-L. Tai, C.-M. Yeh, and C.-C. Chang, “Reversible data hiding based on histogram
modification of pixel di↵erences,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems for
Video Technology, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 906–910, June 2009.
[213] Z. Qian, X. Zhang, Y. Ren, and G. Feng, “Block cipher based separable reversible
data hiding in encrypted images,” Multimedia Tools and Applications, vol. 75, no. 21,
pp. 13 749–13 763, Nov. 2016.
[214] X. Zhang, Z. Qian, G. Feng, and Y. Ren, “E cient reversible data hiding in encrypted
images,” Journal of Visual Communication and Image Representation, vol. 25, no. 2,
pp. 322–328, Feb. 2014.
[215] F. Huang, J. Huang, and Y.-Q. Shi, “New framework for reversible data hiding in
encrypted domain,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11,
no. 12, pp. 2777–2789, Dec. 2016.
[216] W. Zhang, K. Ma, and N. Yu, “Reversibility improved data hiding in encrypted images,”
Signal Processing, vol. 94, pp. 118–127, Jan. 2014.
[217] L. I. Rudin, S. Osher, and E. Fatemi, “Nonlinear total variation based noise removal
algorithms,” Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 259–268, Nov. 1992.
155
[218] P. Bas, T. Filler, and T. Pevny´, “Break our steganographic system: The ins and outs
of organizing BOSS,” in Proceedings of the International Workshop on Information
Hiding (IH), Prague, Czech Republic, May 2011, pp. 59–70.
[219] X. Wu and W. Sun, “High-capacity reversible data hiding in encrypted images by
prediction error,” Signal Processing, vol. 104, pp. 387–400, Nov. 2014.
[220] T. Wu, F. Wu, J. Redoute´, and M. R. Yuce, “An autonomous wireless body area
network implementation towards iot connected healthcare applications,” IEEE Access,
vol. 5, pp. 11 413–11 422, June 2017.
[221] F. Sebbak and F. Benhammadi, “Majority-consensus fusion approach for elderly IoT-
based healthcare applications,” Annals of Telecommunications, vol. 72, no. 3, pp.
157–171, Apr. 2017.
[222] U. Satija, B. Ramkumar, and M. Sabarimalai Manikandan, “Real-time signal quality-
aware ECG telemetry system for iot-based health care monitoring,” IEEE Internet of
Things Journal, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 815–823, June 2017.
[223] H. Kikuchi, S. Hotta, K. Abe, and S. Nakanishi, “Distributed auction servers resolving
winner and winning bid without revealing privacy of bids,” in Proceedings of the
International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS), Iwate, Japan,
July 2000, pp. 307–312.
[224] M. Abe and K. Suzuki, “Receipt-free sealed-bid auction,” in Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Information Security (ISC), Sao Paulo, Brazil, Sept. 2002, pp.
191–199.
[225] K. Peng, C. Boyd, E. Dawson, and K. Viswanathan, “Robust, privacy protecting and
publicly verifiable sealed-bid auction,” in Proceedings of the International Conference
on Information and Communications Security (ICICS), Singapore, Dec. 2002, pp.
147–159.
[226] K. Suzuki and M. Yokoo, “Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming
with polynomial secret sharing,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on
Financial Cryptography (FC), Southampton, Bermuda, Mar. 2003, pp. 44–56.
[227] J. D. C. Benaloh, “Verifiable secret-ballot elections,” Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University,
New Haven, CT, USA, 1987.
156
[228] R. Cramer, M. Franklin, B. Schoenmakers, and M. Yung, “Multi-authority secret-
ballot elections with linear work,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on
the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Saragossa,
Spain, May 1996, pp. 72–83.
[229] B. Schoenmakers, “A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application
to electronic voting,” in Proceedings of the Annual International Cryptology Conference
(CRYPTO), Santa Barbara, CA, USA, Aug. 1999, pp. 148–164.
[230] M. Hirt and K. Sako, “E cient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption,”
in Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Bruges, Belgium, May 2000, pp. 539–556.
[231] C. A. Ne↵, “A verifiable secret shu✏e and its application to e-voting,” in Proceedings of
the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), Philadelphia,
PA, USA, Nov. 2001, pp. 116–125.
[232] S. Iftene, “General secret sharing based on the Chinese remainder theorem with
applications in e-voting,” Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 186,
pp. 67–84, July 2007.
[233] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 22, no. 11, pp.
612–613, Nov. 1979.
[234] G. R. Blakley, “Safeguarding cryptographic keys,” in Proceedings of the AFIPS National
Computer Conference (NCC), New York, NY, USA, June 1979, pp. 313–317.
[235] M. Ito, A. Saito, and T. Nishizeki, “Secret sharing scheme realizing general ac-
cess structure,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference
(GLOBECOM), Tokyo, Japan, Nov. 1987, pp. 99–102.
[236] J. Benaloh and J. Leichter, “Generalized secret sharing and monotone functions,”
in Proceedings of the Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptography
(CRYPTO), Santa Barbara, CA, USA, Aug. 1988, pp. 27–35.
[237] E. F. Brickell, “Some ideal secret sharing schemes,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on
the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Houthalen,
Belgium, Apr. 1989, pp. 468–475.
[238] E. F. Brickell and D. M. Davenport, “On the classification of ideal secret sharing
schemes,” Journal of Cryptology, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 123–134, Jan. 1991.
157
[239] A. Beimel and B. Chor, “Universally ideal secret-sharing schemes,” IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 786–794, May 1994.
[240] B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and B. Awerbuch, “Verifiable secret sharing and
achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults,” in Proceedings of the Annual Sym-
posium on Foundations of Computer Science (SFCS), Portland, OR, USA, Oct. 1985,
pp. 383–395.
[241] P. Feldman, “A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing,” in
Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (SFCS),
Los Angeles, CA, USA, Oct. 1987, pp. 427–438.
[242] T. Rabin and M. Ben-Or, “Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with hon-
est majority,” in Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
(STOC), Seattle, WA, USA, May 1989, pp. 73–85.
[243] M. Tompa and H. Woll, “How to share a secret with cheaters,” Journal of Cryptology,
vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 133–138, Oct. 1989.
[244] T. P. Pedersen, “Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret
sharing,” in Proceedings of the Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO),
Santa Barbara, CA, USA, Aug. 1991, pp. 129–140.
[245] M. Stadler, “Publicly verifiable secret sharing,” in Proceedings of the International Con-
ference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT),
Saragossa, Spain, May 1996, pp. 190–199.
[246] R. Cramer, I. Damg˚ard, and U. Maurer, “General secure multi-party computation
from any linear secret-sharing scheme,” in Proceedings of the International Conference
on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Bruges,
Belgium, May 2000, pp. 316–334.
[247] M. Naor and A. Shamir, “Visual cryptography,” in Proceedings of the Workshop on
the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), Perugia,
Italy, May 1994, pp. 1–12.
[248] C. Blundo, A. D. Santis, and M. Naor, “Visual cryptography for grey level images,”
Information Processing Letters, vol. 75, no. 6, pp. 255–259, Nov. 2000.
[249] Y.-C. Hou, “Visual cryptography for color images,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 36, no. 7,
pp. 1619–1629, July 2003.
158
[250] Z. Zhou, G. R. Arce, and G. D. Crescenzo, “Halftone visual cryptography,” IEEE
Transactions on Image Processing, vol. 15, no. 8, pp. 2441–2453, July 2006.
[251] L. Csanky, “Fast parallel matrix inversion algorithms,” in Proceedings of the Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (SFCS), Berkeley, CA, USA, Oct.
1975, pp. 11–12.
[252] V. Strassen, “Gaussian elimination is not optimal,” Numerische Mathematik, vol. 13,
no. 4, pp. 354–356, Aug. 1969.
[253] D. Coppersmith and S. Winograd, “Matrix multiplication via arithmetic progressions,”
Journal of Symbolic Computation, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 251–280, Mar. 1990.
[254] F. Le Gall, “Powers of tensors and fast matrix multiplication,” in Proceedings of the
International Symposium on Symbolic and Algebraic Computation (ISSAC), Kobe,
Japan, July 2014, pp. 296–303.
159
